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Abstract 
This thesis applies securitisation theory to the Israeli-Palestinian case with a particular focus 
on the potential for desecuritisation processes arising from Israeli-Palestinian 
cooperation/coexistence efforts in peace education and water management. It aims to apply 
securitisation theory in general and the under-employed concept of desecuritisation in 
particular, to explore the limits and prospects as a theoretical framework. 
Concepts, arguments and assumptions associated with the securitisation theory of the 
Copenhagen School are considered. In this regard, the thesis makes a contribution to Security 
Studies through its application of securitisation theory and sheds light on a complex conflict 
situation. Based on an analytical framework that integrates the concept of desecuritisation 
with the concepts of peace-building and peace-making, the thesis pays attention to 
desecuritisation moves involving Israeli and Palestinian civil societies through peace 
education and water management. The thesis contributes to debates over the problems and 
prospects of reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians, so making a significant 
empirical and theoretical contribution in the development of the concept of desecuritisation as 
a framework for analysing conflict resolution. 
The thesis develops an analytical framework that combines political level peace-making with 
civil society actors' peace-building efforts. These are seen as potential processes of 
desecuritisation; indeed, for desecuritisation to occur. The thesis argues that a combination of 
moves at both the political and societal levels is required. By contrast to securitisation 
processes which are mainly initiated by political andlor military elites with the moral consent 
of society (or 'audience' in Copenhagen School terms), processes of desecuritisation, 
especially in cases of protracted conflicts, go beyond the level of elites to involve society in 
cultural and structural peace-building programmes. Israeli-Palestinian peace education and 
water management cases are employed to illustrate this argument. 
Key Words: Copenhagen School, Securitisation Theory, Desecuritisation, Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict, Peace Education, Water Management, Conflict Resolution, Peace-making, Peace-
building 
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INTRODUCTION 
Securitisation has been developed by a number of scholars affiliated to the Copenhagen Peace 
Research Institute (COPRI) as a theoretical framework to answer the question of what really 
makes something a security problem (Wrever 1995:54). It emerged in the context of security 
debates durin g the 1990s and in less than two decades it has become one of the most 
controversial approaches of contemporary Security Studies. The work of Barry Buzan, Ole 
Wrever and others has made a major contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of 
security by introducing the concepts of'securitisation' and 'desecuritisation.' However, while 
the securitisation framework has made a major theoretical contribution few attempts have 
been made at empirical application and most of these deal with European cases only. They 
also largely ignore the concept of desecuritisation. 1 
Of the few scholars who have attempted to analyse desecuritisation within the context of 
empirical cases, Paul Roe (2004) analyses the conditions of desecuritisation in the context of 
minority rights in Europe, Rens Van Munster (2004) explores the desecuritisation of illegal 
migration in Europe and Andrea Oelsner (2005) attempts to explain regional peace in South 
America through desecuritisation analysis. 
The starting point of this thesis is a recognition of the gap between the theory and application 
of the Copenhagen School's securitisation framework particularly with reference to 
desecuritisation. It addresses the need for the securitisation framework to be applied to other 
conflict/peace analysis cases. The thesis argues that an application beyond European-based 
cases will enrich the framework and so applies it to an analysis of the complex Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. This conflict, it is argued, provides an interesting case for analysing 
1 The terms securitisation and desecuritisation refer both a scholarly tool and an effect of policy. Throughout the 
thesis the terms securitisation and desecuritisation are used to refer to a concept, an approach, a process, and a 
move/initiative. These various meanings are used deliberately. Mainly the concepts of securitisation and 
descuritisation are developed by Wrever as part of the Copenhagen School's securitisation framework. While 
securitisation! desecuritisation refer to the Copenhagen School's approach to analyse securitisation/ 
desecuritisation processes empiricaJly, the terms securitisation/desecuritisation moves and securitisation/ 
desecuritisation initiatives are used interchangeably to refer attempts which do not end up as fuJly-fledged 
securitisationl desecuritisation processes. 
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securitisation processes which have been shaped by military and political elites, and 
desecuritisation processes which have been initiated by Israeli and Palestinian civil societies. 
The thesis has two related goals. The principal one is to apply the securitisation framework in 
general and the under-theorised desecuritisation concept in particular. Stemming from the 
application of the securitisation framework to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it explores the 
limits and prospects of securitisation as a theoretical framework. In this way it aims to 
contribute to the development of Copenhagen School's desecuritisation concept as a 
framework for analysing conflict resolution and peace. The secondary goal is to contribute to 
debates over the problems and prospects of reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. 
The thesis thus explores the prospects for reconciliation in the Israeli-Palestinian case through 
an analysis of both desecuritising and securitising processes. Within this context, the thesis 
sheds light on how the securitisation framework can be better applied and also on the ways in 
which antagonistic relationships can be changed over time. In short, the thesis makes a 
contribution to Security Studies by applying securitisation framework in a complex conflict 
situation, and by analyzing the Israeli and Palestinian coexistence/cooperation efforts with 
their potential for desecuritisation. 
The originality of the thesis lies in three main areas. The first is the application of 
securitisation framework to a complex conflict situation. Almost two decades after its 
emergence, the Copenhagen School is undergoing a process of revision and reconsideration. 
This thesis constitutes a timely contribution to this process. Second, by developing an 
innovative analytical framework, the thesis integrates the concept of desecuritisation with the 
concepts of peace-building and peace-making. Third, and related, the thesis goes beyond the 
analysis of ongoing securitisations and argues that in the Israeli-Palestinian context, there 
exist important desecuritisation moves involving Israeli and Palestinian civil societies. Hence, 
the thesis analyses bottom-up peace-building efforts with a particular focus on several peace 
education and water management projects. 
The Time Period and the Case Studies Selected 
Following the Copenhagen School's approach to desecuritisation the discussion will start by 
first analysing how particular issues are securitised in the Israeli-Palestinian context (Chapters 
2 and 3), and then analysing desecuritisation itself (Chapters 5 and 6). Within this context, the 
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thesis provides an analysis of the securitisation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well. 
Chapter 2 covers the period beginning with the World Zionist Organisation's meeting in 1897 
and ends with the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2004. This long timeframe is divided 
into four consecutive periods that cover different phases of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 
from the 1897 World Zionist Organisation's meeting to the establishment of the state ofIsrael 
in 1948; from 1948 to the end of the Six Day War in 1967; from 1967 to the first Palestinian 
Intifada in 1987; and from 1988 to the Second Intifada in 2000. Chapter 3 then focuses on the 
conflict following the outbreak of the Second Intifada. In this chapter the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is explored as a securitisation process through an analysis of Israeli and Palestinian 
security discourses regarding the 'other' and the exceptional measures taken to deal with the 
threat posed by this manifestation. In this part of the study, mainly military and political 
leaders' statements and public speeches are taken into consideration. In the Israeli case, 
members of the ruling elite - prime ministers, the foreign affairs and defence ministers and the 
opposition leaders - are considered to be the main securitising actors. In the Palestinian case it 
was quite difficult to name the securitising actors since the Palestinian leadership has been 
divided since the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1994. As a 
consequence, besides the public speeches and declarations of leaders of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the various Chairmen of the PNA, the statements of 
Hamas and other Islamic resistance movements are also explored since these movements have 
appeared as powerful securitising actors in Palestinian politics. 
Even though this thesis is primarily concerned with the analysis of the efforts to secure 
cooperation and coexistence between Israeli and Palestinian civil society2 during and after the 
peace process (1993-2007), earlier attempts to reconcile Israelis and Palestinians are also 
briefly reviewed. The analytical framework based on the concept of desecuritisation is 
applied in two cases, namely, peace education and water management; both of these cover 
important aspects of reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. These two cases are 
employed to illustrate the bottom-up desecuritisation attempts, or in the Copenhagen School's 
terminology 'desecuritisation moves'. Within this context, the Israeli Palestinian Centre for 
2 Here LSE's Centre of Civil Society's definition of civil society is taken into consideration which refers to the 
arena of volunteer collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. Civil societies often consist of 
organisations such as registered charities, non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's 
organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social 
movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups. See 'What is Civil Society' 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/whatiscivil·society.htm [accessed 15 June 2008] 
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Research and Information (IPCRI), Windows, the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East 
(PRIME), Seeds of Peace's peace education projects, the Israeli Palestinian Centre for 
Research and Information (IPCRI), Friends of Earth Middle East (FoEME), the Arava 
Institute for Environmental Studies and the Water and Environmental Development 
Organisation's water management projects are analysed. 
The peace education projects were chosen based on the following criteria: First they are run 
jointly by Israeli and Palestinian directors, second they aim at reaching both Israeli and 
Palestinian recipients and third they are developed by a project team consisting of Israeli and 
Palestinian participants. Similarly, water management projects were chosen based on their 
promotion of collaboration between both Israelis and Palestinians. All the civil society 
organisations considered in the thesis have contributed to Israeli-Palestinian joint efforts 
regarding the management of shared water resources between Israelis and Palestinians. It is 
important to note that this part of the thesis does not engage in measuring the impact of these 
desecuritisation moves on the public in general and their impact on participants of these 
projects in particular. Rather, it aims to analyse the Israeli and Palestinian civil societies' 
coexistence/cooperation efforts as desecuritising moves. 
Methodology 
This thesis is an example of adaptive approach as proposed by Derek Layder which 
underlines the interplay between theory and empirical data. According to Layder, "the theory 
both adapts to, or is shaped by, incoming evidence at the same time as the data themselves are 
filtered through (and adapted to) the extant theoretical materials" (Layder 1998:38). By using 
an adaptive approach, the researcher finds the opportunity to formulate or reformulate the 
theory under consideration, in this case that of (de)securitisation, on the basis of empirical 
findings, which, in turn, contribute to the further development of the theory in question. 
Unlike grounded theory, adaptive theory "attempts to combine an emphasis on prior 
theoretical ideas and models which feed into and guide research while at the same time 
attending to the generation of theory from ongoing analysis of data" (Layder 1998: 19) The 
adaptive approach puts emphasis on the employment of prior or extant theory as well as the 
generation of new theory. Furthermore, the adaptive approach attempts to trace the reciprocal 
influences and interconnections between social activities and the wider systemic environment. 
Hence, an adoptive approach is considered to be the most suitable one to the application of 
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securitisation theory in order to analyse securitisationldesecuritisations in the particular case 
of Israeli-Palestinian relations. 
In this study, the principle of triangulation implied using various types of data. The basic idea 
of triangulation is to obtain data from a wide range of different and multiple sources. 
Triangulation serves two purposes: confirmation and completeness (Arksey and Knight 
2007:21). According to Denzin (1970:27) there is no single method which provides 
completely sound casual propositions. Thus the application of a series of complementary 
methods of testing is required in order to confirm results and to validate causality. 
Triangulation is regarded as a strategy to overcome problems of validity and bias. By 
collecting diverse sets of data there is a less chance of making errors, or drawing 
inappropriate conclusions than relying on just one data set (Arksey and Knight 2007:22). 
Hence, this study involves the analysis of six different corpora, i.e. political 
speeches/statements, primary historical documents, newspaper articles, public opinion polls, 
documents produced by selected civil society entities and semi-structured interviews. 
Triangulation helps provide a detailed picture of both securitisation processes and 
desecuritisation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Bringing together a range of views 
has the potential to generate explanations that better capture the complexity of the case. It is 
believed that the use of different data collection methods allows for a more comprehensive 
and accurate analysis. 
Since the analysis of securitisation requires the analysis of speech acts, Chapter 2 and 3 ofthis 
thesis mainly relies on discourse analysis of primary texts, such as declarations, agreements, 
peace treaties as well as discourse analysis of speeches and statements of the Israeli and 
Palestinian leaders. Here the analysis of text and speech depends as much on focusing on 
what is said, and how a specific argument regarding the existence of particular security threats 
is developed. The analysis is also interested in the rhetorical work of the text, how the specific 
issues it raises are structured and organised and chiefly how it seeks to persuade audience 
about the authority of its understanding of the issue. Within this context, word repetitions and 
repeat patterns (particularly which words having been used repetitively), content words (what 
kind of words having been used to refer to the other side) and the use of .personal 
pronouncements (us/we - them/they particularly in relation to respective identity construction 
processes) are taken into consideration for the analysis of security/enmity discourses in these 
sources. 
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The analysis of discourse (both text and speech) in Chapter 2 specifically focuses on how 
ideas, practices and identities emerge, transform, have mutated through Israeli-Palestinian 
interactions during the period 1948-2000. The analysis of security/enmity discourse in 
Chapter 2 seeks to understand and describe the historical trajectory of the contemporary 
securitisations, which constitutes the main focus of Chapter 3. For a brief overview of 
security/enmity speech acts for the period of 1948 - 2000 the historical documents and 
official speeches and statements ofIsraeli Prime Ministers and of PLO (later on PNA) leaders 
were studied. For this investigation Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs' archive (in English), 
Israeli Palestinian Centre for Research and Information Database and Yale University Avalon 
Project's Middle East Documentary Record served as the main databases. Chapter 3 deals 
with more recent period of Israeli-Palestinian relations by analysing the tensions between 
securitisations and normalisation attempts of 2000 - 2007. The discourse of this period is 
investigated through an analysis of declarations, statements and speeches of Israeli Prime 
Ministers and PNA Chairman as well as the extracts from the discourses of their opponents 
which are mainly provided through extracts from magazines and newspapers. 3 Major 
historical documents, statements and speeches of Israeli Prime .Ministers and Palestinian 
leaders4 related to the Palestinian issue and peace process will be taken into consideration. 
The analysis particularly deals with documents, speeches and statements that refer to the key 
issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; that constitute the bases of security/enmity speech 
acts and those that contain historical conceptions, narratives about how the other side has been 
perceived as an existential threat. For this analysis, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 
archive (in English), the Office of the Israeli Prime Minister's speech archive, the Israeli-
Palestinian Centre for Research and Information Database and Yale University Avalon 
Project's Middle East Documentary Record were consulted as main databases. 
The data for desecuritisation analysis was collected between April 2005 and March 2007. 
Most of the data was collected from research centres, think tanks, universities and joint 
3 Mainly English medium Israeli and Arab media resources such as Haaretz, Haaretz Magazine, Jerusalem Post, 
Jerusalem Times, Al-Ahram Weekly, Palestine-info, The Middle East Media Research Institute and international 
media such as BBC news, CNN.com, The Guardian, The Times and The New York Times were used as main 
media resources. 
4 During the pre-PNA period, the PLO was dominant in the Palestinian security discourse, even though the PLO 
leadership had developed outside the Palestinian territories. Hence, in chapter 3 the PLO elites are considered as 
the main securitising actors. Besides the PLO and, after 1994 PNA elites, other fedayeen groups' like Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad leaders' securitising moves are also taken into consideration. 
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Israeli-Palestinian cooperation/coexistence projects. For desecuritisation analysis, the text in 
selected civil society organisations' publicity materials, projects reports and related 
conference/workshop proceedings were consulted as the basic primary documents. 
In this study interviews are considered as complementary source of data and provide a source 
for checking and deepening the data available from texts. In general, interviews provide data 
on understandings, opinions, attitudes and feelings that informants have in common. 
Qualitative interviews in particular, concentrate on the distinctive features of situations and 
events, and the beliefs of individuals or sub-cultures. Through· the interviews researcher 
underlies the claim is. that perception, memory, emotion and understanding are human 
constructs and yet, this construction takes place within cultural and sub-cultural settings that 
provide a framework for meaning-making. According to this view people share similar 
understandings of things that are common experiences and subject to society-wide 
interpretations (Arksey and Knight 2007:2-3). In this regard, the interviewees' responses were 
considered supportive to the data collected from documents and texts for analysing 
desecuritisation moves in this highly securitised case. 
In general by conducting semi-structured interviews the researcher has a specific agenda to 
follow and has selected beforehand the relevant topic areas and themes to pursue. The 
interviews were loosely structured around key questions. This allowed the interviewer to 
follow up ideas, probe responses and ask for clarification or further elaboration. For their part 
informants can answer the questions in terms of what they see as important. (Arksey and 
Knight 2007:7) In this study 10 semi-structured interviews were carried out with Israeli and 
Palestinian academics, NGO workers and directors in order to explore interviewees' attitudes, 
motivations and perceptions regarding Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and reconciliation.s 
Furthermore, a more spontaneous and unstructured talks were conducted with NGO 
volunteers. The answers that were given by informants, particularly by anonymous volunteers 
, The interviewees were selected based on two criteria: their specialisation and their affiliation. As far as the 
criterion of specialisation is concerned, all of the 10 interviewees are working either for peace education or water 
management projects/research that includes both Israelis and Palestinians. The second criterion, affiliation, is 
particularly important for the selection of interviews from NGOs. The NGOs, most of the interviewees are 
affiliated with, are chosen based on the following criteria: (I) it is run jointly by Israeli and Palestinian directors, 
(2) it aims at reaching both Israeli and Palestinian recipients and (3) it is developed by a project team consisting 
of Israeli and Palestinian participants. All the interviewees selected have participated/contributed to Israeli-
Palestinian joint efforts for peace education andlor water management which constitute the case studies of this 
dissertation. 
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and participants, represent the personal versions of the story written on web-sites and 
pUblicity documents. Formal interviews on the other hand were particularly effective in 
providing guidance for the document analysis and structuring the analysis. Interviews were 
also expected to go beyond the formal language of text and exploring personal attitudes, 
motivations and perceptions of the members of civil society who are working on peace-
building projects. It is believed that the enthusiasm, determination and commitment of these 
people are only be observed through face-to-face encounters. 
Interviewees were willing to share their views about the projects in which they are 
participating and related problems. Most of the interviews were recorded, with only a few 
cases arising in which interviewees objected to a record being made. The places of interviews 
were chosen by interviewees, which gave them a sense of comfort. The semi-structured nature 
of the interview provided flexibility regarding how the conversation developed even though a 
number of the topics to be covered during the interviews were chosen beforehand. The 
flexible nature of the interview allowed for the raising of additional questions when 
necessary. In spite of their various benefits, the interviews also contained certain drawbacks. 
Given the emotional conditions of intractable conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, daily 
developments regarding the conflict might affect interviewees' responses. Indeed, the 
interview period coincided with a turbulent political situation in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. Besides the diplomatic and economic isolation of the Hamas-led Palestinian 
government by the international community, internally, there were also clashes between 
Harnas and Fatah all over the Palestinian territories. As a result of this turbulent political 
situation, Palestinian respondents were not able to focus their attention on joint 
cooperation/coexistence projects with Israelis. On the other hand, Israeli interviewees were 
very upset because of the first ever suicide bombing attack in EiJat on 31 January 2007. As 
was eloquently put by one respondent, during times such as these it was really difficult to talk 
about peace education and coexistence. 
Besides the primary sources and semi-structured interviews secondary sources such as 
scholarly journals and books, articles and contributions to edited collections are also 
consulted. 
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Thesis Outline 
The first chapter explores the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory. This chapter 
reviews the concepts, arguments and assumptions introduced by the Copenhagen School with 
a particular emphasis on the notion of desecuritisation. Furthermore, based on the notion of 
desecuritisation, an analytical framework for analysing the desecuritisation moves of Israeli 
and Palestinian civil societies will be presented at the end ofthe chapter. 
Chapter 2 gives an historical account of Israeli-Palestinian security discourses. Beginning 
with an exploration of the political and historical conjuncture that brought Jews against 
Palestinian Arabs, this chapter examines the competing claims of Zionists and Palestinian 
Arabs regarding the land of Palestine, claims which constitute the roots of Israeli and 
Palestinian securitisations. The chapter covers a long period from 1897 till the 2000s and 
considers how both sides securitised the other side as an existential threat to their respective 
existence in Palestine. 
Chapter 3 provides a securitisation analysis of the period following the outbreak of the 
Second Intifada. This chapter involves a detailed analysis of post-Oslo security discourses by 
the Palestinian and Israeli political and military elites; how particular policies and actions 
were affected by security discourses; and public opinion of the Palestinian and Israeli 
societies. The continuities and changes in securitisation processes in the Israeli Palestinian 
context will also be analysed. In this chapter the following questions are explored: How is 
support for security measures achieved and viewed as a legitimate exercise of state power? 
What is the position of the Israeli and Palestinian publics regarding threats that have been 
securitised? 
Before proceeding, however, Chapter 4 reviews the development of the idea of 
reconciliation and peace, as opposed to the continuous securitisation processes, in the Israeli-
Palestinian context. 
In Chapter 5, given its cooperation potential, it is argued that water management could be a 
means for desecuritisation in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Therefore, this chapter discusses 
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the place of water as part of the peace-making and structural peace-building processes in the 
Israeli-Palestinian context. 
In Cbapter 6, joint Israeli-Palestinian peace education projects are considered as examples of 
cultural peace-building and the following questions are answered: What is the impact of joint 
peace education efforts on the desecuritisation of the other? How is peace education work 
affected by ongoing securitising moves? 
The conclusions summarise the findings and reflect on securitisation theory. This last chapter 
outlines issues of policy relevance; revisits the questions/issues raised in introduction and 
analysis chapters and draws out implications for the development of the desecuritisation 
approach. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Securitisation Theory 
Thanks to its mixed roots, which come from both traditional Security Studies and from the 
more recent critical and post-structuralist approaches to security, securitisation theory has 
become one of the most controversial approaches in contemporary Security Studies in less 
than two decades. 
The literature associated with the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory is less concerned 
with the application of securitisation as a framework of analysis. There have been a few 
attempts to apply the theory to empirical cases. Moreover, most of the empirical work on 
securitisation theory analyses Western European and American cases, contrary to the 
Copenhagen School's claim to have produced a conceptualisation of security that can escape 
the European orientation of International Relations in general and Security Studies in 
particular. For example, the securitisation of migration in Europe has generated a considerable 
literature (Boswe1l2007, Nyers 2003; Bigo 2001a/b, 2002; Huysmans 1995). However, only a 
few works can be found regarding the application of securitisation theory in non-European 
cases (Coskun 2008, Wilkinson 2007, Jackson 2006, Kaliber 2005, Smith 2000). Given this 
gap between theory and application, this thesis aims to apply securitisation theory to an 
analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one of the most complex conflicts of modem 
history. 
Neither Barry Buzan nor Ole Wrever explicitly discuss whether securitisation is considered as 
. a theory as they do for the regional security complex theory (2003). From time to time they 
refer it as theory and the concepts of securitisation and desecuritisation as theoretical tools (ie. 
in Buzan and Wrever 2003, Wrever 2003). Similarly, most of the scholars who write on 
securitisation (or criticise it) refer it as theory (Williams 2003, Oelsner 2005, Taureck 2006, 
Jackson 2006, Stritzel 2007, Wilkinson 2007), others refer it as an approach (Booth 2005, 
Kaliber 2005, Roe 2004, Behnke 2000). In this chapter the term securitisation theory is used 
to refer to the theoretical framework and tools as a whole including the concepts of 
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securitisation, desecuritisation, (de )securitising actor, audience and facilitating factors as 
developed by the Copenhagen SchooL 
The objective of this chapter is to overview securitisation theory with a particular emphasis on 
the notion of desecuritisation. By taking on Copenhagen School's arguments and assumptions 
the chapter claims to provide a more comprehensive framework to analyse (de )securitisation. 
The chapter is divided as follows: the first section reviews the general arguments, 
assumptions and main premises of the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory. After this 
review the main components of the theoretical framework suggested within the context of 
securitisation theory namely securitising actors, audience and context as well as facilitating 
conditions of securitisation are explored. The theoretical framework presented in this section 
will be employed in analysing security discourses of protagonists in their historical context 
(Chapter 2) with a special emphasis on the security discourse of the post-Arafat era (Chapter 
3). The second section studies the Copenhagen School's notion of desecuritisation. Stemming 
from this review, an analytical framework will be developed to analyse Israeli-Palestinian 
civil society'S cooperation/coexistence efforts as desecuritisation moves in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6. 
1.1 Securitisation Theory 
Securitisation theory was developed by the Copenhagen School during the 1990s. The 
Copenhagen School refers to the work of Barry Buzan and his colleagues at the Centre for 
Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen. Buzan's book People, States and Fear published 
in 1983 and revised in 1991 constitutes the foundation stone for the Copenhagen School. 
Since 1985, the Copenhagen School has explored how to move Security Studies beyond a 
narrow agenda which focuses on military relations between states. Within this context, 
together with Buzan, a number of scholars including Ole Wrever, Jaap De Wilde, Morten 
Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre and Elzbieta Tromer from the Centre for Peace and Conflict 
Research have developed the following concepts/frameworks: the notion of security sectors, 
regional security complex theory and the concepts of securitisation and desecuritisation. This 
group of scholars came to be dubbed the Copenhagen School by Bill McSweeney (1996). As 
indicated in the title of their reply to Bill McSweeney's criticism in 1997 this tag was 
embraced by the group and has been widely accepted to refer as the collective shorthand to 
the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. 
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To broaden up the security agenda by adding economic, political, societal and environmental 
security sectors (Buzan et al. 1998) was the first step in the Copenhagen School's 
reconstruction of Security Studies. The second step was to conceptualise security as a multi-
level concept by introducing the regional security complex theory (Buzan and Wrever 2003). 
Last but not least, as a third step, Wrever's securitisation theory was integrated in the 
Copenhagen School's approach to security analysis. Even though there are a number of 
scholars involved in Copenhagen School, along with Buzan, Wrever has had the most 
influence on the Copenhagen School's security approach. 
As W rever claims, the aim of securitisation theory is to construct a "neo-conventional security . 
analysis (which) sticks to the traditional core of the concept of security (existential threats, 
survival), but is undogmatic as to both sectors (not only military) and referent objects (not 
only states)" (Wrever 1996:110). According to the Copenhagen scholars, what is needed is an 
understanding of the cultural process of securitisation; by which actors construct issues as 
threats to security. Within this context, Wrever argues that threats and security are not 
objective matters; rather "security is a practice, a specific way of framing an issue. Security 
discourse is characterised by dramatising an issue as having absolute priority. Something is 
presented as an absolute threat ... " (1996: 1 08). 
Securitisation theory is based on an interdisciplinary approach which ranges from linguistic 
theories to sociology. Throughout his many writings, W rever makes references to various 
theoretical thinkers including John L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Carl Schmitt and Kenneth 
Waltz that inspired the securitisation theory. 
For the Copenhagen School, the contemporary security environment is deeply related to the 
politicising of an issue. Security politics is not just about underlining pre-existing threats; but 
also a perfonnative activity that makes certain issues visible as a threat. Within this context, 
security refers to a concept that is more about how a society or any group of people come to 
designate, or not designate, something as a threat. It is about the process by which threats get 
constructed. This view thus proposes the concept of securitisation be defined as "the 
discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a 
political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and 
to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat" (Buzan and 
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Wrever 2003:491). A successful securitisation consists of three steps: the identification of 
existential threat( s); emergency action; and the legitimisation of exceptional measures even by 
breaking free of norms and rules of normal (Taureck 2006:55). For a securitisation move to be 
successful, a certain level of support from an audience is required. At the very least, political 
groups that are wilJing to act to secure the threatened object should be mobilised through the 
securitisation process. 
As far as the Copenhagen School is concerned, two elements of the traditional security 
approach have been influential: survival and existential threat. In this sense Kenneth Waltz's 
reading of security has had considerable influence on the securitisation theory. According to 
Waltz, in international politics, albeit that there are differences in their aims and strategies, aH 
the states have one common desire: survival (2001 :203). By placing survival at the heart of 
their concept of security, the Copenhagen School shares a similar position to Waltzian 
neorealism and defines security as "survival in the face of existential threats" (Buzan et al. 
1998:33). Buzan and Wrever define a security issue as being "posited (by a securitising actor) 
as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the liberal international 
economic order, rain forests), which is claimed to have a right to survive. Since a question of 
survival necessarily involves a point of no return at which it will be too late to act, it is not 
defensible to leave this issue to normal politics" (Buzan and Wrever 2003:71). It is argued that 
securitisation rests on political choices. "Security can never be based on the objective 
reference that something is in and of itself a security problem. That quality is always given to 
it in human communication" (Buzan and Wrever 1997:246). The threat can thus be used to 
legitimate political action which might not otherwise appear as legitimate. 
The theory of securitisation nnderlined two intertwined logics, namely the claim about 
existential threats and the legitimisation of exceptional measures. Through the securitisation 
process, it is claimed that a particular security issue necessitates priority over others; 
therefore, the securitising actor claims the special right to handle the issue using exceptional 
measures. Securitisation results in a confrontational mind-set. Hence, positing an issue as an 
existential threat requires a move from normal to emergency politics since the usual political 
procedures do not apply in a state of war or emergency and responses to existential threats faH 
outside standard political practices. The Copenhagen School presents the exception as a 
deviation from normal deliberative politics but does not give a definition of normal politics. 
Rather, it views normal politics as being not fixed but as historicaHy changing through action. 
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Roughly, the Copenhagen School differentiates securitisation from politicisation whilst 
recognising both processes as intersubjective6 (Buzan et al. 1998:30). The politicisation of an 
issue makes it a matter of public choice, which is part of the normal politics of public 
deliberation. On the other hand, securitisation of an issue removes it from the context of 
normal politics and justifies the necessity of emergency politics and leaves it to the decisive 
action of securitising actors (Fierke 2007:108). Proclaiming an issue to be a security threat 
can confer legitimacy on the methods employed by the state to protect citizens from such 
threats. That is to say, securitisation justifies introducing security practices and technologies, 
which would not be introduced under normal conditions. Moreover, in democratic polities the 
suspension of normal politics as a result of a successful securitisation may occur at the 
expense ofliberal democratic principles and may lead to an erosion of civil liberties. 
The analysis of securitisation focuses on "the questions of when and under what conditions 
who securitises what issue" (Buzan and Wrever 2003:71). As far as the question of what issue 
can be securitised is concerned, according to the Copenhagen School's approach, issues in 
sectors (political, societal, environmental and human security) other than the military may 
also be subject to securitisation. Social groups (ethnic, religious etc.) are considered by the 
Copenhagen School to be equally important as distinctive referent objects of security. Societal 
security, more specifically concerns "the ability of the society to persist in its essential 
character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats ... Societal security is about 
situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms" (Wrever et al., 1993: 23). In the 
Israeli-Palestinian case, the Palestinian political elite have extensively securitised issues in the 
societal and human sectors of security; in parallel, the Israeli elite has securitised issues in the 
political and societal sectors of security. According to the Copenhagen School, societal 
insecurity occurs "when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality 
as a threat to the survival of their community" or more accurately the identity of their 
community as such (Buzan et al. 1998:119). Societal security highlights the role of identity or 
the sense of we-ness in security relations. This concept has been criticised by McSweeney 
(I996) who argues that the Copenhagen School defines societal identity as being singular, 
6 According to the Copenhagen School the process of securitisation is intersubjective since it is neither a 
question of an objective threat or a subjective perception of a threat Instead securitisation of a subject depends 
on an audience accepting the securitisation speech act (Buzan et a1. 1998, 30). 
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thereby denying the fluidity and multiplicity of social identities. Michael Williams argues, 
however, that McSweeney's criticism misses the point of the Copenhagen School that 
illustrates how a securitising speech act creates the conditions for the reification of identity in 
a monolithic form. As Williams argues, "a successful securitisation of identity involves 
precisely the capacity to decide on the limits of a given identity ... to cast this as a 
relationship of threat and even enmity and to have this decision and declaration accepted by 
[a] relevant group" (2003:519). 
Human security deals with security issues that directly or indirectly endanger human lives and 
human wellbeing. As in the Israeli-Palestinian case, human security may be endangered 
because of states' unrestrained quest for their own security. As far as the political sector of 
security is concerned, Buzan (1991:118) considers threats which are aimed at the 
organisational stability of the state within the context of the political sector. Within this 
context, the existence of a particular state can be the target of political security threats. 
Political threats are typically about recognition, support, or legitimacy. They are made to the 
internal legitimacy of the political unit andlor the external recognition of the state (external 
legitimacy). Generally, however, threats from outside are directed at a particular state's 
legitimacy (Buzan et al. 1998:144). 
The idea of securitisation as a process of threat construction has drawn attention to the 
symbiotic relation between securitisation and the formation of collective political identities. In 
this regard Carl Schmitt's concept of the political is of particular importance. Schmitt's 
concept of the political was defined in relation to 'the other', which represents an existential 
threat. (Meier et al. 1995:33) He claims that the essence of politics lies in the relationship 
between friend and enemy, and the possibility of conflict. Because enmity lies at the heart of 
his concept of the political, Schmitt suggested that enmity also presupposes the existence of 
other political entities. For Schmitt, friendship and enmity provide the foundations of 
allegiance and solidarity. The commonality of friendship is inextricable from enmity and from 
the possibility of a life and death struggle with that enemy (Williams 2003:517). Schmitt's 
discussion of the political was the decision that constituted the unity of the political group in 
the exceptional situation, the face of the existential enemy (Schmitt 1996:32). According to 
Williams, this line of thought can be clearly seen in the process of securitisation, where a 
securitising actor is at its most efficient exactly because of operating 'legitimately' beyond 
otherwise binding rules and regulations (Williams 2003:518). The securitising actor only 
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achieves this status by underlining the existence of 'the other' as an 'existential' threat for two-
reasons: first, because security is always relational in the sense that one's insecurity/security 
centres on other(s') insecurity/security - the classical formulation of a security dilemma'. 
Second, it makes little sense to speak of one's security without recognising the source of the 
threat, 'the other'. In the absence of 'the other' one cannot speak about security (Wrever 
1997:353). In this sense, securitisation is about the process through which a state/society is 
consolidated vis-a-vis an enemy-other (Fierke 2007:112). In the following chapter, this point 
will be illustrated through an examination of the parallel processes of Israeli and Palestinian 
state/society consolidation. 
1.1.1 Analysing Securitisations 
The Copenhagen School distinguishes itself from the broader category of Critical Security 
Studies through its emphasis on security as a process of threat construction. Accordingly, the 
task of securitisation analysis is to understand how the dynamics of security work. For Buzan 
and others 
[olur approach links itself more closely to existing actors, tries to understand 
their modus operandi, ... our philosophical position is in some sense more 
radically constructivist in holding security to always be a political 
construction and not something the analyst can describe as it 'really' is 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 35). 
The Copenhagen School's securitisation theory rests on two central concepts: three 
components of securitisation, the speech act, the securitising actor and the audience, and three 
facilitating factors that affect the success of a securitising move (Figure l.l). Therefore, the 
analysis of securitisation processes requires attention to both the components of securitisation 
and the facilitating factors. 
7 The security dilemma is a two-level strategic predicament in relations between states and other actors. The first 
level consists of a dilemma of interpretation about the motives, intentions and capabilities of others; the second 
level consist of a dilemma of response about the most rational way of responding (Booth and Wheeler 2008:5). 
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Figure 1.1 Central Concepts of Securitisation Analysis 
Three Components 
of Securitisation 
Speech Act 
Securitising Actor 
Audience 
1.1.1.1 Security as a Speech Act 
Facilitating Conditions 
1. The demand internal to the speech act 
of following the grammar of security. 
2. The social conditions regarding the 
position of authority for the securitising 
actor (the relation between securitising 
actor and audience). 
3. Features of the alleged threats that 
either facilitate or impede securitisation. 
The main argument of securitisation theory is that security is a speech act. According to 
Wrever, security is not an objective condition; rather it is a speech act: "The utterance itself is 
the act. By saying it something is done" (WreverJ 995:55). Wrever defines security as a speech 
act, where "security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the 
utterance itself is the act. .. By uttering 'security', a state representative moves a particular 
development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are 
necessary to block it" (Wrever 1995:55). That is to say, the mere invocation of something 
using the word 'security' declares its threatening nature and "invokes the image of what 
would happen if security did not work" (Wrever 1995 :61). Thus, a specific security rhetoric 
which underlines survival, priority of action and urgency defines the contours of 
securitisation. 
The Copenhagen School's conceptualisation of security as a speech act draws on John L. 
Austin's concept ofperJormative utterances. According to Austin, performative utterances do 
not just describe but also create a new reality. As stated by Austin, the name is derived from 
the verb to 'perform', which indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an 
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action (Austin 1975:6). Stemming from this concept Wrever argues that the utterance of 
security is more than just saying or describing something; it is the performance of an action. 
Besides Austin, Wrever also draws on insights from Jacques Derrida. Derrida is important for 
securitisation theory on a metatheoreticallevel. Wrever acknowledges Derrida's famous claim 
that "there is nothing outside the text" (Derrida 1998: 158). By claiming this, Derrida points 
out that meaning is only in the sentence itself, and not above and beyond that. Within this 
context, in securitisation analysis, the answers to how we study the context can only be given 
by analyzing narrative. Narrative provides the vital hermeneutic which links definitions and 
practices, meaning and action. Hence, it is crucial to read the context in order to understand 
specific security-related policies. In this sense, discourse analysis provides an analytical tool 
for analyzing securitisation processes. As was pointed out by Buzan et al. (1998 :25), the way 
to study securitisation is to study discourse, which shows the extent to which an argument 
with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieves sufficient effect to make the 
particular audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have been obeyed. 
Discourse analysis here does not claim to ascertain an actor's intentions. As Wrever states, 
"discourse analysis works on public texts. It does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of 
the actors ... What interests us is neither what individual decision makers really believe, not 
what are shared beliefs among a population, but which codes are used when actors relate to 
each other" (200 I :26-27). That is to say, securitisation theory does not mean to analyse how 
actors think but what they say aloud. The analyst has to work with what has actually been said 
or written in order to explore patterns in and across the statements and to identify the social 
consequences of different discursive representations of reality. 
As was stated above, performative speech acts can neither be true nor false but depend upon 
certain conditions that can be called the 'facilitating (felicity) conditions' of security as a 
speech act. For a successful securitisation, two constitutive rules are required: the internal, 
linguistic (grammatical rule) and the external, contextual (social rule). As Williams suggests, 
the securitisation process is structured first "by the different capacity of actors to make 
socially effective claims about threats; second, by the forms in which these claims can be 
made in order to be recognised and accepted as convincing by the relative audience, and third, 
by the empirical factors or situations to which these actors can make reference" (Williams 
2003:514). According to Buzan et al., securitisation is only possible if players follow these 
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rules (1998:32). Hence, the following section presents the other components of securitisation 
as well as the facilitating factors that determine the success or failure of a securitising move. 
1.1.1.2 Securitising Actor, Audience and Facilitating Factors 
As discussed above, the C<;>penhagen School posits securitisation as being founded upon a 
speech act by an actor claiming to speak in defence of a collectivity and demanding the right 
to act on its behalf. As a speech act is one of the basic components of securitisation, by 
definition it is an inter-subjective communication process that requires, as a rule, at least two 
sides: a securitising actor and an audience. Securitisation necessitates the use and perpetual 
repetition of the rhetoric of existential threat by the securitising actor, which is usually the 
government and/or its military and bureaucratic elites. For Wrever "security is articulated only 
from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites" (1995:57). Hence, by "naming a 
certain development a security problem, the 'state' can claim a special right, one that will, in 
the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites" (Wrever 1995:54). Therefore, 
securitisation is utilised as a technique of governance. 
Through the articulation of danger and existential threat, the securitising actor demands 
justification from the audience to use all necessary means to eliminate the threat. To decide 
whether an issue is a security issue is not something the securitising actor can decide alone 
(Buzan et al. 1998; Wrever 2000). According to Paul Roe, securitisation is a kind of' call and 
response' process. An actor makes a call that something is a matter of security and the 
audience must respond with their acceptance. If there is no such level of acceptance, 
securitisation will have failed (Roe 2004:281). As Buzan et al. state "presenting something as 
an existential threat does not by itself create securitisation - this is a securitising move, but the 
issue is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as such" (1998:25) However, as 
they note that "acceptance does not necessarily mean [ ... 1 civilised, dominance-free 
discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as consent" (Buzan et 
al. 1998:23 [emphasis original]). In the case of consent, through hislher ability to identify 
with the audience's feelings, needs and interests, the securitising actor can persuade the 
audience by playing with language in accordance with the audience's experience. If a 
securitising actor succeeds in obtaining the audience's identification with hislher security 
statements, some sort of cognitive and behavioural change can occur among the audience 
(Balzacq 2005:184). 
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According to Thierry Balzacq, the securitising actor can get two kinds of support from the 
audience: formal and moral. The more harmonious these forms are, the more likely that 
securitisation will be successful. Securitising actors seek moral support from respective 
societies which are embodied in the form of public opinion. As securitisation is an attempt to 
legitimise the use of exceptional measures to prevent an existential threat, securitising actors 
mainly require formal backing for a successful securitisation. To illustrate this, Balzacq has 
given the example of to wage a war in order to rid a threat. Besides the political agents' 
appeal for the public support for waging a war, a degree of formal support is required. In the 
case of waging a war the formal approval of the parliament is necessary whether the public 
opinion had been persuaded by securitising actor to wage a war or not (Balzacq 2005:184-
185). In most of the cases, securitising actors securitise an issue without the moral backing of 
the public. 
To complement the speech act, securitising actor and audience triumvirate, the Copenhagen 
School considers 'facilitating conditions' that influence the success of the securitisation 
process. Inspired by Austin's concept of 'felicity conditions', these refer to: the demand 
internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security and constructing a plot with 
existential threat, point of no return and a possible way out; the social capital of the 
enunciator, the securitising actor, who has to be in a position of authority, although this 
should neither be defined as official authority nor taken to guarantee success with the speech 
act; and conditions historically associated with a threat: it is more likely that one can conjure a 
security threat ifthere are certain objects to refer to which are generally held to be threatening 
- be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters. In themselves they never make for 
necessary securitisation, but they are definitely facilitating conditions (Buzan et al. 1998:33, 
Wrever 2003:15). Only if these three conditions are met, a securitising act has a chance to be 
successful, in other words a securitising actor has been able to convince herlhis audience of 
the need to mobilize extraordinary measures. 
As argued by scholars like Stritzel, "facilitating conditions offer a more specific framework 
for analysing securitisation than the securitisation framework as a whole" (2007:364). Buzan 
and W rever introduce these conditions as important factors in understanding securitising 
speech acts with a particular focus on power and the inter-subjective establishment of threat 
(1998: 25, 31-32). In this regard, they claim that "it is important to be specific about who is 
27 
more or less privileged in articulating security. To study securitisation is to study the power 
politics of a concept" (Buzan et al. 1998:32). 
As far as the aforementioned context is concerned, the Copenhagen School's position is to 
assume that language is performative. Hence, a secure place can be insecure as a result of the 
speech act. As Balzacq points out, the context is shaped by the use of the concept of security 
and "what is key here is the 'abductive power's of words; indeed, as an abductive tool, the 
concept of security permits the activation of a new context, or converts the existing one into 
something different" (2005:180). Hence, security utterances operate as instructions for the 
construction and interpretation of a security threat. Within this context, 'security' does not 
always point out an objective reality. It is the securitising actor who uses discourses on 
existential threats. Given this internalist view of the context, Balzacq suggests that, in order to 
win an audience, security statements must be related to an external reality. That is to say, the 
success of securitisation rests on whether the historical conjuncture renders the audience more 
sensitive to its vulnerability (2005: 182). 
It is argued that the capacity to mobilise security expectations depends on the position, status, 
and authority of the would-be securitising actor (Huysman 1999:19). Wrever's restrictions on 
who is likely to succeed in securitisation are based on the realist notion of the distribution of 
capabilities and powers. The more capabilities a securitising actor has the more likely this 
actor will succeed in attempted securitisation. In other words, individuals or groups deprived 
of powers and capabilities in the society can seldom act as securitising actors. They may 
speak about security to and of themselves, but they never have the power and capability to 
securitise the particular issue they perceive as an existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998:27). 
What is important for the previous discussion is that securitisation in Buzan and Waever's 
scheme and in Balzacq' s analysis is an elite process - because it leads to policy. The 
securitisation approach is so much elite-oriented and there is a general tendency to ignore the 
role of the audience and other segments of society who could speak security in this process. 
As stated by Balzacq, the securitising actor also needs the moral support of society. In the 
securitisation process, how the things are securitised can be mapped through the analysis of 
whom or what is defined as the threats and whom the actor targets in countermeasures (Buzan 
8 Abductive reasoning starts from a set of accepted facts and infers their most likely or best explanations. 
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and Wrever 2003:462). This process can be viewed through an analysis of who speaks 
security (securitising actor), who listens to it (audience) and how something gets put together 
and accepted as a threat (facilitating conditions): 
In his article, Stritzel argues that there are two centres of gravity of securitisation theory; each 
reflects two rather autonomous readings of securitisation. According to Stritzel, the first 
understanding focuses on the speech act and it is grounded in the concept of performativity. 
This understanding corresponds with an intemalist, more poststructuralist (Derridarian) reading 
of securitisation. The second understanding studies the process of securitisation based on the 
idea of embeddedness (Stritzel 2007:359). This would correspond with an extemalist, more 
constructivist reading of securitisation. While not undermining the role of the speech act in 
securitisation analysis, this study takes sides with an extemalist position - as suggested by 
Stritzel - and claims that securitisations should be analysed within the context of "their broader 
discursive contexts from which both the securitising actor and the performative force of the 
articulated speech act/text gain their power" (Stritzel 2007:360). Thus, a specific emphasis 
would be put upon facilitating conditions in order to explore the embeddedness of security 
articulations in social relations of power in the Israeli~Palestinian case. For the analysis of 
securitisation speech acts in the Israeli-Palestinian case, a number of facilitating conditions 
would be taken into consideration, including global political changes, regional power 
asymmetries (as between Israel and the Palestinians) and other discourses confirming or 
limiting the security discourse such as the discourse on terror and the Axis of Evil and the 
discourses of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. 
1.2 Desecuritisation 
Even though securitisation theory refers to processes of both securitisation and 
desecuritisation, desecuritisation, the return of issues from emergency politics to normal 
politics, has been left undertheorised by Copenhagen scholars. As this thesis particularly aims 
to apply the desecuritisation concept in the Israeli-Palestinian context, it is necessary to 
review the Copenhagen School's take on desecuritisation. Thus, this section presents the 
arguments and debates related to desecuritisation. 
Considering the dangers of framing certain issues in the language of security, the Copenhagen 
School has underlined the preference for desecuritisation and defines desecuritisation as "a 
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process in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an 
existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional 
measures to deal with the threat" (Buzan and Wrever 2003 :489). 
Desecuritisation is best understood as the fading away of a particular issue from the security 
agenda and implies that issues, for which the potential use of exceptional measures had 
previously been legitimised, gradually start to take steps backward so that violence will no 
longer be considered as a legitimate option. As Wrever makes clear, particular issues, such as 
the environment, can often be dealt with through normal political processes since the logic of 
war may not be conducive to ecological concerns (Wrever 1995:57). In much the same way, 
human security may be better dealt with through the normal political process. 
The ultimate goal of desecuritisation is the achievement of a situation in which the issue in 
question is no longer seen as threatening, and thus is no longer defined in security terms. As 
far as the question of how to desecuritise is concerned, the Copenhagen School outlines three 
options for policy makers: not to talk about issues in terms of security in the first place, once 
an issue is securitised, try not to generate security dilemmas and vicious circles and to move 
security issues back into normal politics (Wrever 2000:253). Since it is too late for the first 
and second strategies in situations such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the only viable 
desecuritisation strategy is the third one: to move security issues back into the realm of 
normal politics. Dealing with the third strategy can be extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
Particularly in the societal sector of security, the defence of societal identity might constitute 
the security discourse since securitising actors argue that the other identity threatens the 
existence of their own identity. Desecuritisation in the societal sector requires a level of 
acceptance that two identities could and should be able to coexist. As Roland Bleiker stresses, 
accepting the other's sense of identity requires tolerance. Hence, for a fully-fledged 
desecuritisation in the societal sector, the two sides of a conflict should accept their different 
and perhaps incompatible identities (Bleiker 2002:301). 
Stemming from the Copenhagen School's approach, JefHuysmans' work provides an ethical-
political approach to the issue of why to desecuritise. He suggests that "desecuritisation 
unrnakes politics which identify the community on the basis of the expectations of hostility. 
Instead of simply removing policy questions from the security sector and plugging them into 
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another sector, desecuritising turns into a political strategy which challenges the fundamentals 
of the political realist constitution ofthe political community" (Huysmans 1998:576). 
As argued by W 'lever, securitised issues can be managed or transformed. However, there 
exists a distinction between the management of securitised issues (normalisation) and 
desecuritisation. The management of securitised issues may bring with it the notion of 
normalising the situation - an insecurity situation. Security and insecurity do not constitute an 
opposition. A security situation means that a threat is articulated and sufficient counter-
measures are available, in contrast, insecurity has a security threat but no, or insufficient, 
response (W'lever 1998:81). Both conditions share the security problematique. In the case of 
desecuritisation there is neither security nor insecurity. If the situation is taken out of the 
realm of security conceptualisation, the situation can be inelegantly described as one of 'a-
security' or 'non- insecurity' (Wrever 1998:81). The challenge lies in the transformation of 
the securitised issues, the shifting of an issue from something that is security to something 
that is 'asecurity' (Roe 2004:285). Security and insecurity are not exhaustive options and 
more attention needs to be given to asecurity (Wrever 1998:71). As Wrever states, 
"transcending a security problem by politicizing it cannot happen through thematisation in 
security terms, only away from such terms" (1995:56 original emphasis). For Wrever, the best 
way is to prevent issues from being framed in terms of security in the first place, which is not 
an option in the Israeli-Palestinian case. Thus, Wrever's solution is not satisfactory at all in 
cases like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for which desecuritisation requires a drastic 
transformation of the securitised issue to make it part of the normal political process. For a 
long time in the Israeli-Palestinian context the situation has swung from security to insecurity 
but never reached a condition of a-security. In between the periods of violent attacks 
following securitisations, both sides have managed to have periods of in-security. The periods 
of in-security have mainly been marked by declarations of· ceasefire by Palestinian 
liberation/resistance movements and by successive Israeli governments' introduction of strong 
defence measures. Yet, because the securitising actors continue to securitise during these 
periods of in-security, desecuritisation has not been realised. 
Desecuritisation is conceived by the Copenhagen School as travelling in the opposite 
direction to the securitisation process driven by speech acts. This suggests that the same 
components of the securitisation process (securitising actor, audience, speech act and 
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facilitating conditions) can be applied to the analysis of desecuritisation processes with 
adjustments (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 1.2 Concepts of Desecuritisation Analysis9 
Three Components 
of Desecuritisation 
Desecuritising 
Language 
Desecuritising 
Actor 
Audience 
Facilitating Conditions 
1. The change in the language used to 
define the previously securitised issue 
2. The social conditions regarding the 
position ofthe desecuritising actor (the 
relation between desecuritising actor and 
audience). 
3. Conditions that point out the necessity 
for desecuritisation 
By contrast to securitising actor(s), the Copenhagen School does not explicitly define who 
could be a desecuritising actor. In this regard, Andrea Oelsner who has applied the concept of 
desecuritisation on the case of regional peace in Latin America suggests that in the 
desecuritisation process, the crucial actors may be policy-makers and other political, 
economic, and intellectual elites, who will try to convey to the public (the audience, in the 
language of securitisation theory) their re-interpreted perceptions (Oelsner 2005: 15). The 
same actors that had previously advocated securitisation may now encourage the process of 
desecuritisation by renegotiating appropriate responses with relevant audiences as well as 
other actors. This time, the aim will be to remove certain issues from the security agenda. On 
the other hand, in her critique of the Copenhagen School's approach to desecuritisation, 
Claudia Aradau argues that the agents should not be the self-same agents of securitisation. For 
9 As they are not dermed by the Copenhagen School explicitly. here the components of desecuritisation analysis 
and its facilitating conditions are inferred from the components and facilitating conditions that are suggested for 
securitisation analysis by Copenhagen School (Figure!). 
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Aradau, desecuritising actors should be from within the previously silenced 'other'. In this 
sense Aradau thinks of desecuritisation in terms of the local (2003 :20). As is the case in the 
Israeli Palestinian context, in most of the cases the securitising actors are unwilling of 
desecuritisation and consider normalisation or conflict management as an option. At its best 
political elites initiate and/or agree to participate official peace-making processes but that 
does not end up with desecuritisation necessarily. Therefore, actors other than the securitising 
actors should initiate the process. 
As far as the language of desecuritisation is concerned, according to Andreas Behnke, 
desecuritisation as a speech act is contradictory. As Behnke points out, to declare that a 
particular issue no longer constitutes a threat opens up a language game. Once desecuritised, 
the issue does not leave the discourse on security. An issue is desecuritised through a lack of 
speech, not through speech acts affirming its new status (Behnke 2006:65). On the other hand, 
since desecuritisation requires a process of redefinition and reinterpretation of previously 
securitised issues, the changes in language thorough the process should be taken into 
consideration: What kind oflanguage is used by desecuritising actors? To what extent has the 
language changed compared to the language used to define the previously securitised issue? 
In order to answer these questions the discourse suggested by desecuritising actors should be 
analysed thoroughly. 
Since the Copenhagen School does not suggest as explicit a framework for its analysis as it 
has done for securitisation, different scholars have interpreted desecuritisation differently. 
Oelsner's analysis is directly related to the possible strategies that might be employed by 
desecuritising actors. Oelsner analyses the ways in which an issue transcends the security 
language and is then desecuritised. According to Oelsner, an issue can transcend security 
language in two ways: either it loses its threatening image because agent and audience's 
perception of the nature of the threat change in a positive manner or they perceive a 
qualitative change in the relationship between them and the securitised threat. They gradually 
begin to trust the fact that it no longer poses an existential threat (2005:4). The first 
mechanism is a rather passive one. It seems to involve almost no effort on the part of agent 
and audience; the threat seems to just lose its power or capabilities. On the other hand, the 
second mechanism requires a more active qualitative transformation, because the relationship 
itself has been reassessed. Several different factors can encourage this move which need 
detailed examination in each empirical case. They can range from changes in the constitution 
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of domestic governments, changes in domestic preferences, pressure from interest groups in 
one direction or another, emergence or decline of related concerns that make actors reconsider 
priorities and regional and global transformations, etc (Oelsner 2005:5). In some cases, the 
beginning of the process is to be found at the regional and/or global level and will encourage 
domestic desecuritisation. That is to say, the desecuritisation process can start as a bottom-up 
process or a top-down one. It is important to note that even though external conditions might 
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have effects on them, both securitisation and desecuritisation processes are essentially 
domestic developments. In the Israeli-Palestinian case both global and regional developments 
led to the initiation of the peace process between Israel and Palestine. During the Oslo Process 
the peace-making efforts of official negotiators and mediators aimed to promote the bottom-
up peace-building efforts of the two peoples, as will be discussed in the following section. 
The expected transformation from securitisation to desecuritisation was not realised at the 
official level and the failure of peace-making paved the way for a renewal of securitisation 
processes. However, in spite of the outbreak of a new wave of securitisation, civil society's 
efforts at desecuritisation have continued. 
One can expect peace to be more stable and solid in the absence of mutual security concerns 
or when issues have been effectively desecuritised. Oelsner identifies two stages of 
desecuritisation. The first phase is about peace stabilisation and the first few steps towards 
domestic desecuritisation; the second involves peace consolidation, the expansion of mutual 
desecuritisation and the growth of mutual trust. According to Oelsner, the first phase involves 
a change of direction to a gradually improving one. The second phase, meanwhile, refers to 
the development and consolidation of the desecuritisation process (2005: 11). 
Once desecuritisation is perceived as a convenient and feasible policy option, Oelsner 
believes that a more stable peace may occur. This first stage opens the door to a different type 
of relationship between former antagonists. If the initial changes continue to develop in a 
positive marmer, they will facilitate the advance to the second stage of the process, that 
involving a redefinition of the relationship. It is this latter phase that leads to more durable 
changes, which in turn will result in a consolidated type of peace and a domestic situation 
dominated by a sense of asecurity (Oelsner 2005: 13). To redefine the relationship implies a 
simultaneous re-evaluation of the vision of 'the other' and of the self as well. According to 
Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov, this complex learning process "requires a redefinition or re-
evaluation of the parties' national interests, so that each party will perceive a mutual interest 
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in establishing and maintaining the peace between them as the most important factor in 
assuring each other's security and even existence" (2000: 24-25). The development towards a 
more consolidated peace involves a process of redefinition and reinterpretation of the 
perceptions of 'the other'. According to Adler and Barnett, during this process social actors 
"manage and even transform reality by changing their beliefs of the material and social world 
and their identities" (1998:43-44). 
Changing negative perceptions and initiating a desecuritisation process cannot be realised 
quickly. Negative perceptions and attitudes towards 'the other' often have deep roots and 
serve in strengthening societal identities, maintaining unity and justifying one's own 
aggression. Eventually, incremental changes facilitate, at least among the elites, a degree of 
working trust that focuses on the common interests that exist amid continuing differences in 
perceptions and attitudes. Within this context, Marc Howard Ross argues that the problem in 
attempting to resolve a conflict is not merely to seek "a formula on which the parties can 
agree but also to first find a way to alter the hostile perceptions and mutual fears that lock the. 
parties into a zero-sum view of any proposals" (1993:160). To this end, two factors can help 
to desecuritise the relations: rhetoric, as the manifestation of political will, and the 
construction of co-operative institutions and organisations (Oelsner 2005:14). When the 
conflicting sides show signs of readiness to cooperate and/or coexist, shared discourses, 
common projects and even common institutions can be expected to evolve. As a consequence 
of this, the relationships between the parties become desecuritised (Oelsner 2005:14). 
Common institutions, high levels of interdependence and compatible domestic regimes, 
among others, point to the existence of efforts to desecuritise (Adler and Bamett 1998:104). 
As was stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis aims to apply the desecuritisation 
concept to the Israeli-Palestinian context. Stemming from this review of the Copenhagen 
School's notion of desecuritisation and Oelsner's application of desecuritisation as a 
framework for the analysis of regional peace in Latin America, the following section presents 
an analytical framework for the analysis of Israeli-Palestinian desecuritisation attempts. It is 
argued that the analytical framework developed here contributes to the development of the 
Copenhagen School's notion of desecuritisation as a framework for analysing conflict 
resolution and peace. 
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The analytical framework suggested at the end of this chapter aims at dealing with the third 
option of the Copenhagen School for desecuritisation: to move the security issue back into 
normal politics. That is to say it suggests a framework for analysing the transformation from 
security to asecurity. Partly based on Oelsner's model that view desecuritisation through steps 
towards peace, namely peace stabilisation and peace consolidation, the analytical framework 
integrates the concepts related to conflict resolution such as peace-making and peace-building 
with the Copenhagen School's desecuritisation concept. By differentiating structural and 
cultural peace-building the framework aims at analysing positive changes in relations between 
former adversaries as suggested by Oelsner (2005) and their perceptions towards each other as 
suggested by Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov (2000) as desecuritising moves. Last but not 
least, for the analysis of desecuritisation almost all of the components of the securitisation 
analysis will be implied: the (de )securitising actor, the audience and facilitating conditions. 
But instead of analysing desecuritisation through speech acts, the differences in the language 
used by securitising actors and desecuritising actors will be explored. As far as the question of 
the desecuritising actor is concerned the framework suggests the necessity of the existence of 
a variety of desecuritising actors both from societal and official level. 
1.3 Securitisation Theory as a Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of 
Israeli-Palestinian Relations 
Even though securitisation theory offers one of the most concise and attractive analytical tools 
in Security Studies, it has attracted several criticisms. First of all, it is argued that the 
analytical field is rather narrow and centred around the state, focusing overwhelmingly on 
state behaviour. As Huysman (1999) has argued, the Copenhagen School approaches 
securitisation from a rather classical International Relations perspective in which the state is 
considered as a privileged security actor. This position is, however, defensible. According to 
Knudsen, the state remains important in Security Studies because it performs essential 
security functions that are rarely performed by other types of organisations, such as being the 
major collective unit processing notions of threat; the major unit for the exercise of elite 
power; the organisational expression that gives shape to communal identity and culture and 
the legitimiser of authorised action and possession (Knudsen 2001:363). Yet while the state 
remains central, the Israeli-Palestinian case provides a test case for securitisation theory since 
one of the actors involved in the conflict is a state whilst 'the other' is not. 
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A second major criticism concerns the use of the concept of securitisation within the societal 
sector. The Copenhagen School explicitly states that referent objects other than a state are 
possible. However, their definition of society and societal insecurity is criticised as focusing 
on an inherently European understanding of collective identity based on nations and ethnic 
groups which links collective identities to the state. In other words society is defined by the 
Copenhagen School within a given politico-territorial identity (Wilkinson 2007: 10). Hence, 
securitisation theory is criticised as a consequence of its inherently Eurocentric assumptions 
about the social and political context within which securitisation occurs (Wilkinson 2007: 11). 
Given the critiques regarding its Eurocentricism (see Wilkinson 2007, lackson 2006, Aradau 
2004 and Hansen 2000), it is one of the objectives of this thesis to apply securitisation theory 
in an extra-European context to discuss the limitations and prospects of se cur it is at ion theory. 
The Copenhagen School's speech act formulation has been criticised, thirdly, for being overly 
discursive because of its privileging of speech over other means of expression (van Munster 
2002, Bigo 200la and 2001b, Hansen 2000). The implications of this focus on speech have 
been explored by Hansen who discusses the issue of who can and carmot 'speak security' 
(2000: 285-287). Hansen's critique is particularly relevant in non-Western countries where 
most of the population carmot express their security concerns as a result of censorship, 
imprisonment and threats. It is argued that the central position of speech in the Copenhagen 
School's securitisation theory sets restrictive criteria for analysis of security. In this regard, 
Williams (2003) underlines the increasing importance of media images in political 
communication and calls for securitisation theory to develop a broader understanding of the 
mediums and structures of political communication. This is particularly important in settings 
where politics is not a participatory process. According to Williams, one has to consider the 
means through which security is expressed and how securitising actors and referent objects 
are constructed. 
A further criticism concerns the discursive formation of security portrayed as a dramatic act 
before a passive audience (Williams 2003, Hansen 2000, Eriksson 1998). Securitisation 
theory has been criticised because the audience is insufficiently theorised. As securitisation 
can be pushed by powerful securitising actors, who use security to pursue their own ends, and 
the success of a securitisation is dependent on the power and capabilities of the securitising 
actor, the role of the audience has been underplayed. Another problematic issue regarding the 
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audience is the difficulty of defining precisely who the audience is. It is not made up of the 
entire population, but rather varies according to the political system and the nature of the 
issue. The more immediate groups to be involved, or rather to be convinced, are the political 
elite and military officials, who are part of the securitising actor already, which, in turn, blurs 
the idea of inter-subjectivity. 
Much of the criticism stems from the Copenhagen School's under-theorisation of the 
desecuritisation concept. This critique constitutes the starting point of the thesis in that it 
attempts to develop the notion of desecuritisation in the Israeli-Palestinian context. More 
specifically, the concept of the desecuritising actor will be put under scrutiny since the choice 
of desecuritising actor as members of the civil society, challenges the Copenhagen School's 
view of securitisation and desecuritisation as political processes initiated by the political elite. 
Lastly, securitisation theory has been subjected to criticism regarding its moral and ethical 
motives. Particularly, Claudia Aradau criticises the moral/ethical dimension in the process of 
securitisation. For Aradau, the analyst using securitisation theory has a political responsibility 
(2004). In this regard, securitisation is no longer viewed as a theoretical tool but merely as a 
political method. Taureck draws attention to the two different things: securitisation the theory 
and securitisation as a normative practice and underlines that the Copenhagen School views 
securitisationldesecuritisation "as a political choice by a securitising actor, which the analyst 
seeks to uncover by means of using securitisation theory" (2006:58). Therefore, the question 
of whether the analyst agrees with securitisationldesecuritisation practices is irrelevant. In this 
thesis securitisation is viewed as a theoretical tool to analyse Israeli and Palestinian 
securitisations and not as a normative practice. 
While keeping in mind all those critiques, at this level the aim of this thesis is to present an 
analytical framework and apply it to the Israeli-Palestinian case. Stemming from the 
application of securitisation theory in general and the analytical framework presented in the 
following section, it is believed that this will provide a theoretical reflection and conceptual 
restructuring for the securitisation theory. 
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1.4 An Analytical Framework: Desecuritisations as a Framework for 
Analysing Conflict Resolution 
Desecuritisation by downgrading or ceasing to treat 'the other' as an existential threat is an 
indispensable part of conflict resolution between former adversaries. Conflict resolution 
addresses the deep-rooted sources of conflict. The aim of conflict resolution is to transform 
actually and potentially violent conflict into a non-violent process of social and political 
change (Ramsbotham et al. 2007:30). The ideal outcome of conflict resolution is 
reconciliation. Reconciliation refers to a situation other than a peace agreement between 
former adversaries and requires the active participation of peoples who were divided by 
enmity. Reconciliation means to learn to accommodate differences and live together. Hence, 
it requires forgiving the past and being in a position to move forward together. As noted by 
Louis Kriesberg, "after intense struggle between large-scale adversaries, it is not likely that 
reconciliation will be universal among all members of the opposing sides" (Kriesberg 
1998:184). Nonetheless, reconciliation has a social function of restoring a neutral or more 
positive relationship between former enemies. 
Both peace-making and peace-building efforts constitute a process of desecuritisation with 
reconciliation being a possible outcome. Peace-making, which aims at ending direct violence 
between the adversaries, refers to the attempts "through traditional diplomatic activities [to 
reach 1 a settlement between conflicting parties" (Fisher 1997: 1 0). Peace-making is used in the 
sense of moving towards a conflict settlement where conflicting parties are induced to reach 
an agreement (Ramsbotham et al. 2007:30). Peace-building, meanwhile, refers to the attempts 
to make peace from the bottom up. Ronald J. Fisher defines peace-building as "efforts for 
improving the relationship between adversaries toward greater trust and cooperation, more 
accurate perceptions and attitudes, a more positive climate, and a stronger political will to 
deal constructively with their differences" (1997:11). Peace-building underpins peace-making 
by addressing structural issues and the long-term relationship between conflicting parties 
(Ramsbotham et al. 2007:30). 
Johann Galtung suggests that peace-making aims to change the attitudes of the main 
protagonists and brings negative peace, whereas peace-building tries to overcome the 
contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict and brings positive peace (1996: 112). 
Galtung defines negative peace as the cessation of direct violence and positive peace as the 
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overcoming of structural and cultural violence as well. Based on Galtung's models of 
conflict, violence and peace, peace-building is classified as structural and cultural peace-
building. Structural peace-building addresses the issues such as security concerns, civil and 
human rights, economic stability and growth, the sharing of resources and the distribution of 
power. If successful, structural peace-building leads to normalisation. On the other hand, 
cultural peace-building addresses issues like education, peace and conflict awareness, cultural 
exchanges and people-to-people encounters. If successful, cultural peace-building leads to 
reconciliation (Ramsbotham et al. 2007:14). In this sense, structural peace-building paves the 
way for the re-definition and re-evaluation of relations between former adversaries and 
cultural peace-building paves the way for the re-definition· and re-evaluation of the 
perceptions regarding the other side of the conflict. 
However, not all conflict resolution initiatives end up with reconciliation. The renewal of 
violence is not a rare event in the history of conflicts. The failure of the political process 
indicates that conditions are not ripe for conflict resolution. As in the Israeli-Palestinian case, 
in most of the cases, the collapse of conflict resolution results in the construction of a conflict 
management approach that involves new strategies and tactics aimed at advancing each side's 
interests according to the new violent confrontation (Bar-Siman-Tov 2007:10). According to 
Bar-Siman-Tov, conflict management is considered to be a prefatory stage toward resolution 
or transition to resolution (2007:10). A distinction is drawn between three types of conflict 
management: unilateral, joint and external. Unilateral management refers to the efforts made 
by each side separately to prevent the other side from initiating violence. The erection of the 
separation barrier between Israeli and Palestinian lands and Israel's unilateral disengagement 
from the Gaza Strip are among the examples of unilateral management of conflict. Joint 
management refers to the official and unofficial efforts made by both sides to prevent 
violence. In this case, both sides adopt a certain degree of coordination and cooperation. 
External management on the other hand refers the efforts made by a third party. The 
European Union's monitoring mission on the Rafah border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip 
is considered as an example of external conflict management (Bar-Siman-Tov 2007: 11). 
Since peace-making often faces with political considerations and other distortions, it is the 
responsibility of peace-builders to become active in exploring various peace avenues and to 
help in activating peace initiatives throughout all levels of society. In general, peace-building 
incorporates official-level conflict settlement efforts with bottom-up conflict resolution 
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· efforts. In this process, civil society tries to bring about changes by taking direct action 
themselves through peace-building. In the Israeli-Palestinian context, one of the main faults 
of the Oslo agreements, which marked the beginning of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, 
was the lack of attention and care to the concept of peace-building. The agreement was made 
in 1993 by politicians who failed to incorporate peace-building within official peace-making 
efforts. The investment in people-to-people activities following the signing of the peace 
agreement was not sufficient to prevent the deterioration of the Palestinian-Israeli peace. 
Ultimately, the diplomatic peace-making efforts did not succeed in preventing the collapse of 
the process and the re-emergence of severe violence from 2000. However, peace-building 
activities have continued even under a situation of mutual violence. The continuation of 
Israeli and Palestinian civil societies' peace-building activities becomes extremely important 
for the desecuritisation of relations and for the reconciliation as a long-term outcome of the 
desecuritisation process. 
As shown in Figure 1.3, the analytical framework suggested here links both peace-building 
and peace-building efforts with desecuritisation. It is argued that for a successful 
desecuritisation both official level political will to end conflict through peace-making and 
societal or civil society level determination for peace-building is necessary. It is argued that a 
fully-fledged desecuritisation requires more than one set of desecuritising actors both among 
the political elite and from civil society. Ideally both sides' desecuritising efforts should 
complement each other. 
Figure lA shows the situation in the Israeli-Palestinian case. Peace-making was interrupted in 
2000 and since then official level support for the peace-building has decreased drastically. 
Hence, the continuation of peace-building activities has become extremely important to 
desecuritising moves. It is argued that for a full-fledged desecuritisation these moves would 
complement the peace-making process when it is reinitiated. In the mean time by continuing 
their peace-building work and putting pressure on respective leaderships, civil society actors 
ofIsrael and Palestine have been contributing in the initiation of the descuritisation process. 
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Figure 1.3 Transformation from Security to Asecurity 
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Figure 1.4 Transformation from Security to Asecurity: The Israeli - Palestinian Case 
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One of the key areas which can be instrumental in encouraging cooperation between 
conflicting parties and peace-building is water management. In terms of peace-building, 
issues regarding water resources potentially offer a window of opportunity for cooperation 
and coexistence between former adversaries. Since cooperation among conflicting parties 
involved in water disputes increases access to water and lowers the risk of armed conflict over 
scarce resources, water can be utilised as a catalyst for conflict resolution and peace-building. 
Hence, cooperation over the management of shared water resources will be discussed in 
Chapter 5 as part of structural peace-building, and thus as desecuritisation moves in the 
Israeli-Palestinian context. 
As far as cultural peace-building is concerned, it is extremely important, particularly in 
intractable conflicts where a history of hostility and frequent eruption of violence disrupts the 
normal functioning of society. One of the common devices of cultural peace-building used by 
civil society is peace and conflict awareness through education and training. Peace education 
aims at transforming the perceptions and related language through dialogues and other 
people-to-people encounters involving grassroots· and middle-level participants from both 
sides. It is expected that individuals involved in peace education understand the other's point 
of view and could change hislher perception vis-a-vis 'the other'. Here it is argued that peace 
education is one of the means for cultural peace-building that contributes to the 
desecuritisation process in the long term. In this context, Israeli-Palestinian peace education 
efforts will be analysed in Chapter 6. 
1.5 Reflecting on Peace Practice: Criteria to Judge the Potential for 
Desecuritisation 
Since the end of the Cold War, civil society groups have been increasingly involved in peace-
building activities. The end of superpower rivalry brought possibilities for the civil society to 
play a role in conflict resolution. Civil society efforts are undertaken in all stages of conflict, 
from situations of latent conflict tension and threatened violence, to full-blown civil war, to 
unstable periods after peace agreements are reached. Within this context, civil society 
agencies offer peace education programs, or training in conflict analysis, peace skills, or non-
violent activism. They organise people-to-people exchanges or they develop programs to 
promote reconciliation through specially targeted reconstruction or economic development 
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efforts. They facilitate unofficial negotiation channels among political leaders, or bring 
representatives of divided communities together for dialogue (Andersen and Olson 2003:8). 
In general few civil society agencies involve in conflict resolution aim to forge peace accords 
or end all violence. For civil society which has limited resources, leverage, programming 
expertise, and funding building the broader peace is a high goal. Instead they focus on one of 
the aspects of cultural or structural peace-building as peace education and water management. 
The question then is what are the criteria by which civil society actors can assess whether 
their peace-building efforts have contributed to progress of conflict resolution and 
desecuritisation? How can they judge whether their approach will have a positive impact on 
the conflict resolution? 
The analytical framework suggested here does not offer any criteria to asses the impact of the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace-building efforts. In this regard, Reflecting on Peace Practice 
Project's criteria for assessing the effectiveness of peace-building efforts will be employed. 
Reflecting on the Peace Practice Criteria was developed by Collaborative for Development 
Action (CDA) and it involves exploring its effectiveness on two levels: the programme level 
and the conflict resolution/peace level. The assessment of programme level lO effectiveness is 
generally measured by independent academicians or independent research companies. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the effectiveness of individual peace-building 
programmes, in this thesis the Israeli-Palestinian peace education and water management 
programmes' effectiveness at a broader level will be discussed. The effectiveness question at 
this level will ask whether the programmes under consideration make a contribution to the 
bigger picture of conflict resolution, therefore, desecuritisation (Anderson and Olson 
2003:14). 
For the assessment of the effectiveness of civil society'S peace-building efforts four criteria 
were defined by Reflecting on Peace Practice Proj ec!. These criteria capture how practitioners 
and communities think about meaningful impacts on conflict resolution. In 'Confronting War: 
Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners' Mary Anderson and Lara Olson suggest that a peace-
10 Assessing effectiveness at the program focuses on whether a specific activity (for example, peace education, a 
dialogue workshop, advocacy, or an intemational accompaniment effort) achieving its intended goals. This 
usually includes the project design, the selection of participants, how well the methodology was implemented, 
how well problems and follow-up were managed, how participants responded, and what were the immediate 
results (Anderson and Olson 2003: 14) 
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building programme contributes to conflict resolution if/when he effort causes participants 
and communities to develop their own initiatives for peace; the effort results in the creation or 
reform of political institutions to handle grievances that fuel the conflict; the effort prompts 
people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence; and the effort results in an 
increase in people's security (2003:16-18). 
According to first criterion a peace-building activity is effective if, as a result of an agency's 
activities, people undertake independent initiatives, working in creative ways within their own 
communities to cross lines of division or to influence outside constituencies. These efforts 
should continue in the face of difficulty, threats, or other overt pressure. This criterion focuses 
on the shift made by people who are caught in conflict from being supporters, bystanders, or 
victims of conflict to being actors and activists undertaking personal efforts to bring about 
peace (Anderson and Olson 2003: 16). 
The second criterion suggests that a peace building activity is considered effective if it 
develops or supports institutions or mechanisms to address the specific inequalities and 
injustices that cause and fuel a conflict. Such grievances may include inequity in the 
administration of justice and social benefits, or observance of people's basic rights. Peace-
building activities can focus on political institutions and address weaknesses in or the lack of 
structures to manage conflicts non-violently. 
The third criterion is whether to increase people's ability to resist manipulation and 
provocation. This can be achieved through programs that increase skills for analyzing, 
managing, and responding to conflict, or that change values and attitudes toward the use of 
force (Anderson and Olson 2003: 17). 
The last criterion suggests that a peace-building programme is effective if it results in 
concrete reductions in the threat of violence and/or changed perceptions of vulnerability. This 
criterion has two dimensions: The first one is that if perceptions of threat are reasonable, then 
the impact will be seen in concrete efforts to protect vulnerable groups and reduce the threat 
of violence; and the second one is if perceptions of threat are exaggerated, then the impact 
will be seen in efforts that reduce the perception of threat. This can happen, for example, 
through efforts to promote contact and accurate information (Anderson and Olson 2003: \8). 
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These criteria will be employed in Chapter 5 and 6 to discuss the potential impact of water 
management and peace education programmes on the Israeli-Palestinian desecuritisation. But 
before proceeding, the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian water management and peace 
education programmes as desecuritising moves, in Chapters 2 and 3 the Israeli and Palestinian 
securitisations will be explored with a particular focus on the period following the outbreak of 
the second Intifada in 2000 till the end of 2006. It is argued that analysis of securitisation is 
significant in assessing the parameters of desecuritisation as well as in understanding the 
problems and prospects for desecuritisation. 
47 
CHAPTER TWO 
A Tale of Two Peoples: The Origins of Israeli and Palestinian 
Securitisations 
ERETZ-ISRAEL [the Land ofIsrael, Palestine] was the birthplace of the 
Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was 
shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of 
national and universal significance ... 
The Israeli Declaration of Independence 1948 
Palestine ... is where ihe Palestinian Arab people was born, on which it 
grew, developed and excelled. Thus the Palestinian Arab people ensured 
for itself an everlasting union between itself, its land, and its history. 
The Palestinian Declaration ofIndependence 1988 
As discussed in Chapter I, the Copenhagen School analyses security as a cultural process of 
securitisation by which particular issues are constructed as threats. This chapter presents the 
constructions of the respective securitisation processes in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Due to 
the fact that the two sides of the conflict have interpreted the same reality through different 
lenses, which are deeply steeped in their respective pasts, it is argued that most of the recent 
securitisations of Palestinians and Israelis are rooted in perceptions of that past. Any attempt, 
therefore, to analyse desecuritisation requires a careful investigation of competing/conflicting 
discourses and claims which have evolved though mutual interaction. This understanding is 
crucial in terms of assessing the problems and prospects of desecuritisation. 
In general, the Israeli discourse regarding the Palestinian issue was shaped and developed 
particularly after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. On the other hand, the 
Palestinian national discourse, apart from the pan-Arabist discourse, was developed under 
Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leadership after the end of the Six-
Day War in 1967. Unlike the Jews, who have constructed a strong national identity based on 
Zionist ideology, as far as Palestinian nationality is concerned no similar historical precursor 
exists. Palestine was part of two Ottoman provinces and its inhabitants were part of the Arab 
section of the Ottoman Empire. The people of Palestine did not consider themselves as 
Palestinians but as Arabs in general and Syrians in particular. Palestinians have constructed 
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their distinct national identity and security discourse with regard to this national identity 
throughout their struggle with the Zionist national movement, particularly after the defeat of 
the Arab coalition in the 1967 War. 
In order to contextualise the contemporary securitisation process in the Israeli-Palestinian case 
and before advancing to the securitisation analysis of Palestinians and Israelis in the post-
Arafat era, this chapter takes a snapshot of the development of the security discourse on both 
sides. The year 1897, when the World Zionist Organisation set out a programme (the Basel 
Programme) for the establishment of a national home for Jewish people on Palestinian land, is 
considered here as the turning point regarding the antagonisms between the two parties. It goes 
on to excavate some overarching securitisations that have developed throughout the respective 
nation-building processes of Palestinians and Israelis. Thus, the chapter starts with examining 
the pre-1948 official documents/agreements to trace back the beginning of the tensions and 
violence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine (Table 2.1). 
After this section, the development of the security discourses of both sides is reviewed in three 
consecutive sections: from the declaration of the State ofIsrael in 1948 to the Six-day War in 
1967, from 1967 to the first Intifada in 1987 and from 1987 to the second Intifada in 2000. It is 
important to note that it is not the aim of this chapter to engage in decades-long historical 
debates regarding the roots and the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather, the chapter 
aims at exploring speech acts and facilitating conditions that led to Israeli-Palestinian 
securitisations. In this chapter, major historical documents and statements related to the 
Palestinian issue and the peace process and speeches by Israeli Prime Ministers and PLO 
leaders!! (Table 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4) will mainly be taken into consideration in order to analyse the 
securitisation of 'the other' as a threat. Most of the extracts in these sections are taken from 
these political speeches/statements and from official documents/agreements. It is argued that a 
discursive analysis ofthese documents and speeches will examine the speech acts as well as the 
analysis of facilitating conditions. The analysis particularly deals with those passages and 
extracts from speeches/statements that refer to the key issues of a particular period - such as 
the refugee issue, the legitimacy of the State of Israel, the Palestinian liberation movement vs. 
11 During the pre-PNA period, the PLO was dominant in the Palestinian security discourse in the international 
arena, even though the PLO leadership had developed outside the Palestinian territories. Hence, in this chapter, 
mainly the PLO elites are considered as securitising actors. Besides the PLO and after 1994 PNA elites, other 
fedayeen groups' like Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders' securitising moves are also taken into consideration. 
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Palestinian terror and peace - that constituted the basis of security/enmity speech acts and those 
that contain historical conceptions: narratives about how the other side has been perceived as 
an existential threat. Since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has always been influenced by both 
domestic and external factors, the analysis will also focus on facilitating factors including 
global political changes, regional power asymmetries (as between Israel and the Palestinians) 
and other discourses confirming or limiting the security discourse such as the discourse on 
terror and the Axis of Evil, discourses of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. 
2.1 When Zionists Met Palestinians: The Political and Historical Context 
(1897 -1948) 
Zionism was first developed as a coherent political philosophy by Theodor Herzl in Der 
Judenstaat - the Jewish State' (1896). In The Jewish State Herzl demanded for Jews the right to 
national self-determination and proposed a secular state that would be bound by laws that 
derived from European civil codes. 
In a short time Herzl' s book become a blueprint for action. Based on Herzl' s proposal, in 1897 
the World Zionist Organisation met in Basel in order to organise the establishment of a Jewish 
state. Two geographical alternatives were discussed: Palestine and Argentina. The obvious 
candidate for a homeland was Palestine. As was stated by Herzl, Palestine was the Jewish 
people's "ever-memorable historic home. The very name of Palestine would attract our people 
with a force of marvellous potency" (Herzl, 1896). After the expulsion of the Jews from 
Palestine by the Roman Empire in 70 AD, Jewish people had urged a return to those ancient 
lands. As formulated by the Zionist leadership, the Jews' right to Palestine derived from three 
interrelated claims: the Jewish people's bond with the land of Palestine was sui generic, the 
Arab inhabitants of Palestine were not a separate nation but part of a greater Arab nation, and 
the Jewish people had historical right to Palestine whereas the indigenous Arab population had 
mere residential rights (Finkelstein 1995:14). Based on these claims, Palestine was chosen for 
the establishment of Eretz Yisrael (Land ofIsrael). The plan was based on a gradual continuous 
migration (aliyah) of the Jews to Palestine. 
Until Jewish migration following the Basel Conference (1897) within the framework of the 
Zionist movement, the native Arabs paid little attention to the Jewish settlers who were already 
living in Palestine. However, with the influx of Jews, the native Palestinian population began to 
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feel threatened. The Zionist project of Jewish immigration and land acquisition in Palestine led 
to a growing friction between Arab and Jewish communities (Guyatt 1998:4). 
The situation got worse with British involvement in the Middle East. When World War I broke 
out, Britain sought to gain the support of the Arabs against Ottoman rule. According to the 
Hussein-McMahon Correspondence (1915), SharifHussein, the leader of the Arab nationalists, 
agreed to support Britain in return for independence for the Arabs. With this letter, Sir Henry 
McMahon (1862-1949), the British High Commissioner in Cairo, negotiated in 1915-16 with 
Husain Ibn Ali, the Sharif of Mecca. The British governrnent promised to support his bid for 
the restoration of the Caliphate and leadership in the Arab world. While the negotiations with 
Arabs were taking place, Britain made other agreements, which contradicted the promises of 
independence contained in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence: the Sykes-Picot agreement 
(1916) with France, a plan for the post war division of the Middle East, and the Balfour 
Declaration (1917) with the Zionists, which offered the British governrnent's support for the 
establishment of a national home for Jews in Palestine (See Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916 and 
Balfour Declaration 1917). 
At the end of the War, the Arab countries were not given independence as promised. Instead, 
the League of Nations assigned allied states to administer the Arab countries within the 
mandate system. The mandate for Greater Palestine (Israel and Jordan of today) was given to 
Britain with a clause inserted providing for the application of the Balfour Declaration. 
According to Article 2 of The Council of the League of Nations' Palestine Mandate, "the 
Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative 
and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid 
down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for 
safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of 
race and religion." Furthermore, Furthermore, with Article 4 of the Mandate, the Zionist 
organisation was recognised "as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating 
with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect 
the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in 
Palestine ... ". The Zionist organisation was assigned "to take steps in consultation with His 
Britannic Majesty's Governrnent to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to 
assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home" (The League of Nations Palestine 
Mandate 1922). 
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In order to alleviate Arab anxieties and prevent a possible Arab resistance movement, at the 
Zionist Congress meeting at Carlsbad in September 192 I, a resolution was passed expressing 
the official statement of Zionist aims, which was quoted in the British White Paper of 1922: 
[ ... ] the determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on 
terms of unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the 
common home into a flourishing community, the up building of which may 
assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development (British 
White Paper of 1922). 
Within this context, the Zionist leadership offered indigenous Palestinians institutional 
safeguards that their civil rights would not be violated once the Jewish state was established 
(Finkelstein 1995:10). However, the fear of expulsion from Palestine urged Palestinian 
opposition to Zionism. 
Since the mandate system did not recognise the existence of the indigenous Arabs as a 
community, during the Mandate period Palestinian Arabs were alienated and marginalised. In 
most of the official documents of that time, the Palestinian Arabs were described as 'non-
Jewish communities' or 'the other sections of population'. In accordance with the British 
Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour's Memorandum of 1919, in practice no self-governing 
institutions were ever developed for the country at large: 
In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the 
wishes of the present inhabitants of the country ... The four great powers are 
committed to Zionism. And Zionism '" is rooted in age-long traditions, in 
present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and 
prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land (Balfour in 
Said 1980:16). 
The policies and actions of Mandate administration accompanied with statements like this 
caused Palestinian Arabs to be fearful of the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic 
population, language and culture in Palestine. As a result Palestinian Arabs organised a 
resistance, which escalated from delegations, petitions, demonstrations and strikes, to riots and 
violent clashes with the British security forces and Jewish settlers. Palestinian Arabs were 
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demanding the cessation of Jewish immigration and the prohibition of Jewish land purchases in 
Palestine (Segev 2000: 1 07). 
In the wake of the 1929 Arab revolt, Zionist leaders came up with compromise formulae and 
promises to ease Palestinian Arabs' worries. Within this context Ze'ev Jabotinsky, one of the 
most prominent Zionist leaders, promised to Palestine's Arabs full and equal rights as a 
national entity but the principle of a Jewish majority or Jewish state would not be compromised 
under any circumstances. However, for many Zionists, Palestine was just for the Jews as 
Joseph Weitz, the director of the Jewish National Fund, wrote in his diary on December 19, 
1940: "It must be clear that there is no room for both peoples in this country ... If the Arabs 
leave the country, it will be broad and wide-open for us. And ifthe Arabs stay, the country will 
remain narrow and miserable" (Weitz 1965:181). By contrast, Khalil al-Sakakini, one of the 
leading Palestinian nationalists, wrote that Arab nationalists rejected the idea of binationalism 
and believed that the conflict between the Arabs and the Jews would be solved in one of two 
ways: "Either the country will remain ours [Arabs'] or it will be taken ... by force" (Sakakini in 
Segev 2000:410). 
Following the 1929 Arab rebellion, proposals for a partially elected legislative council were 
presented by the Administration but they were rej ected by the Jews. In 1936, Arabs started a 
general strike to support their demands "for self-government, the prohibition of land transfers 
to Jews and the immediate cessation of Jewish immigration" (Appendix IV of Anglo-
American Committee of Inquiry Report 1946). The strike and the violence that followed 
brought the Palestine problem to the attention of the British Government. A Royal 
Commission was established to investigate the situation and reached the conclusion that the 
Mandate had become unworkable and must be abolished. The Commission suggested a 
Partition Plan, also known as the Peel Proposal: A Jewish State that would include Galilee, 
the Plain of Esdraelon and the coastal plain and an Arab State that included most of the rest of 
Palestine and Trans-Jordan. Permanent mandates were proposed for the Jerusalem area and 
certain Christian Holy Places (Appendix IV of Anglo-American Committee ofInquiry Report 
1946). The Peel Report was published on 7th July 1937 but the partition proposal was 
considered by the Jewish Agency as a breach of the Balfour Declaration which had promised 
a National Home in the whole of Palestine. The Arab leaders, both the Arab Higher 
Committee and. the National Defense Party, denounced the partition and reiterated their 
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demands for independence (Appendix IV of Anglo-American Committee of inquiry Report 
1946). 
The outbreak of World War II dramatically affected the situation in Palestine. The Jews and 
Palestinian Arabs became more and more hostile towards each other. Given the conditions they 
faced in Palestine and the fear of losing their lands and livelihoods, the Palestinian Arab 
leadership supported the Axis Powers. Muhammad Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of 
Palestine, proposed the establishment of an Arab-Islamic army in Germany. By contrast, 
Zionist leaders supported the Allies to secure the defeat of Nazi Germany and units of 
volunteer Jewish armed groups (Haganah) served alongside British forces to prepare for 
resistance in case of an Axis occupation of Palestine. The Jewish units were secretly armed and 
trained by British and deployed at strategic points. Furthermore, the reports regarding the 
horrors of concentration camps resulted in the Zionist leaders' call for a complete end to 
controls on Jewish immigration to Palestine and the granting of authority to the Jewish Agency 
to develop the uncultivated land in Palestine. Given the Nazi regime's systematic persecution 
of Jews in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, the Anglo-American Inquiry Commission (1946) 
called for the lifting of the restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine (Smith 1984:71). 
The Arab rebellions and radical Jewish groups' attacks on British targets convinced the British 
Mandate Administration that there was no chance of creating a single community of Jews and 
Arabs. Therefore, the British Mandate Administration decided to pass the issue to the United 
Nations. In November 1947, the UN General Assembly called for an end to the British 
Mandate and the establishment of two independent states and an international administration 
for Jerusalem (See Map 1 UN Partition Map). 
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Table 2.1 Historical Documents and Statements Related to the Palestinian Issue (Pre-
1948 period) 
Hussein-McMahon Correspondence 1915 
h!!J:1:llwww.thejerusalemfund.orgicaQ:xover/documents/mcmah 
on.html 
Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916 
http://avalon.law.yale.edul20th_century/sykes.asp 
Balfour Declaration 2 November 1917 
htt~:/lavalon.law.yale.edul20th centunjbalfour.asQ 
The League of Nations' Palestine Mandate 24 July 1922 
http://avalon.law.yale.edul20th centunJQalmanda.asQ 
British White Paper June 1922 
h!!J:1:llavalon.law.yale.edul20th centuryibrwh 1922.asQ 
Anglo-American Committee of inquiry Report to the United 20 April 1946 
States Government and His Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th centunJangcov.asQ 
UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (Partition Plan) 29 November 1947 
httl1:llavalon.law.yale.eduI20th century/resl81.asl1 
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Map 2.1 UN Partition Plan for Palestine 1947 
The UN Partition Plan Map is downloadedfrom Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFAlFacts+About+Israel/Israel+in+Maps/J947+UN+Partition+Plan.htm 
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2.2 One's Ha'atzma'ut (Independence) was Another's Nakba (Catastrophe) 
(1948 -1967) 
Following the British withdrawal, on 14 May 1948 members of the People's Council, 
representatives of the Jewish Community ofEretz-Israel and ofthe Zionist Movement, declared 
the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel. 
The wording of the Declaration was carefully chosen. The Israeli proclamation claims explicit 
international recognition for the historic connection of the .Jewish people with Palestine and 
their right to reconstitute their national home. Within this context, the Declaration gave 
references to Balfour Declaration, the Mandate of the League of Nations and the UN General 
Assembly's resolution 18!. Moreover, it is also significant to note that three paragraphs of this 
short proclamation were devoted to the effects of the Holocaust suffered by the Jews in World 
War II in order to underline the humanitarian dimension of the Zionist project. 
The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people - the massacre of 
millions of Jews in Europe - was another clear demonstration of the 
urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in 
Eretz-Israel the Jewish State. 
Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts 
of the world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, 
restrictions and dangers, and never ceased to assert their right to a life of 
dignity, freedom and honest toil in their national homeland. 
In the Second World War, the Jewish community ofthis country contributed 
its full share to the struggle of the freedom- and peace-loving nations 
against the forces of Nazi wickedness and, by the blood of its soldiers and its 
war effort, gained the right to be reckoned among the peoples who founded 
the United Nations (Declaration of Israel's Independence 1948 [Emphasis 
added]). 
In the Declaration of Israel's Independence full and equal citizenship for the Arab inhabitants 
of Palestine was offered. As with the general Zionist approach to Palestinian Arabs during the 
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1930s, the founders of the State oflsrael also ignored Palestinian Arabs' claims, but by offering 
this olive branch attempted to convince them to give up their claims for independence. 
WE APPEAL - in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now 
for months - to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace 
and participate in the up building of the State on the basis of full and equal 
citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent 
institutions (Declaration oflsrael's Independence 1948 [Emphasis original]). 
On 11 May 1949 in UN General Assembly Israel's membership to the UN was agreed with 
resolution 273. However, Palestinian Arabs did not recognise the State of Israel as the 
legitimate authority of Palestine. Consequently, a few months after the proclamation of the 
State of Israel on I October 1948, Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, stood before the 
Palestine National Council in Gaza and declared the short-lived All-Palestine Government 
(Hukumat Umum Filastin). In this declaration, Palestinians were referred to as the owners of 
Palestine and declared the independence of the Palestinian state in its entirety: 
The Arabs of Palestine who are the owners of the country and its indigenous 
inhabitants and who constitute the great majority of its legal population '" 
declare Palestine in its entirety and within its boundaries as established before 
the termination of the British mandate an independent state and constitute a 
government under the name of the all-Palestine government. (Declaration of 
All-Palestine Government 1948) 
In the Declaration, the founders of the State of Isra.eI also offered their hand to neighbouring 
states "in an offer of peace and good neighbourliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds 
of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land" 
(Declaration of Israel's Independence 1948). But this appeal was far from persuasion. The 
day after the Declaration, the Arab League declared a statement about the Declaration of the 
State of Israel. In this declaration the members of the Arab League criticised Britain 
disregarding the Palestinian Arabs' rights for independence and pointed out Zionism as an 
obstacle to find a just solution of the Palestinian problem. In this statement the members of 
the Arab League accused Zionists for the disruption of security and stability in the region in 
general and in Palestine in particular: 
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The Zionist aggression resulted in the exodus of more than a quarter of a 
million of its Arab inhabitants from their homes and in taking refuge in the 
neighbouring Arab countries. The events which have taken place in Palestine 
have unmasked the aggressive intentions and the imperialist designs of 
the Zionists, including the atrocities committed by them against the peace-
loving Arab inhabitants ... (Arab League 1948 [emphasis added]). 
Therefore, in their statement upon the Declaration of the State of Israel Arab states compelled 
to intervene in Palestine "to help its inhabitants restore peace and security" (Arab League 
1948). Thus, a few days after the state of Israel was proclaimed, six Arab League members 
launched an attack on the State of Israel. The coalition of Arab states decided to go to war 
against Israel and explicitly stated the destruction of the newly-formed Jewish state as their 
goal. The war ended in February 1949. The defeated Arabs signed separate armistice 
agreements with Israel. It is remembered by the two sides under different names: Israelis refer 
to it as the 'War of Independence (Ha'atzma'ut'), for Palestinian Arabs the war marked the 
beginning of the events referred to as 'Catastrophe (AI Nakba)'. During the war around 750,000 
Palestinian Arabs transferred out of the villages, towns and cities, which came under Israeli 
control. Thus, thousands of Palestinians were exiled and continued their lives in refugee camps 
on the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan and elsewhere (Guyatt 1998:6). 
Israel did not accept any active responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem during the 
1948 war. It was claimed that by launching the war and by encouraging Palestinians to leave, it 
was the Arabs who were responsible for the refugee issue. 
The number of the Arabs who before the UN Resolution lived in the area 
allocated to the Jewish State by the UN, and who left it voluntarily or at the 
orders of their leaders, is not larger than the number of the Jewish refugees 
from the Arab countries, so that what has taken place is an unplanned, but de 
facto exchange of populations, and there is no practical possibility or moral 
justification for putting the clock back (Ben-Gurion 1961). 
The responsibility, however, for the fact that Arabs became refugees must 
squarely lie with those who, instead of accepting the verdict of the United 
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Nations, went to war to undo it and perpetrated the aggression of 15 May 1948 
against the State of Israel. Large numbers of the refugees left the country at the 
call of- the Arab leaders, who told them to get out so that Arab armies could in 
(Meir 1961). 
According to this claim, since Palestinians left voluntarily because of the war, Israel has no 
moral or practical responsibility for the consequent situation. For Prime Minister Ben-Gurion 
there was only one practical and fair solution to the problem of the Arab refugees: to settle 
them among their own people. 
As Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch argues, this narrative prevailed in the political and historical 
arguments from 1948 until the 1990s (2007: 242). The repatriation of thousands of 
Palestinians is perceived as a threat to Israel since the return of a large number of Palestinians 
would change the demographic balance and threaten the Jewish character of the State of 
Israel. Hence, for the Israeli leadership the return of Palestinian refugees was not acceptable 
under any conditions: 
The primary and most decisive consideration is security. A flood of returning 
Arabs is liable to blow up our State from within. ... A mass repatriation of 
refugees without peace with the neighbouring countries would thus be an act of 
suicide on the part of Israel. No State in the world placed in our position would 
think of doing anything of the sort (Sharett 1949). 
The refugees issue made it impossible for Palestinians to acknowledge the State ofIsrael and to 
make any compromise between their claims and those of the Israeli settlers. In his statement in 
13th UN General Assembly in 1958, ten years after the establishment of Israel, come up with a 
radical proposal for the de-Zionisation of Palestine: 
[The solution] lies in a return to the situation which existed in 1947, where the 
legitimate Jewish inhabitants had lived in a flourishing community as fellow 
citizens with the Muslim and Christians of Palestine Shukairy 1958). 
For the de-Zionisation of Palestine, Shukairy proposed a five-steps plan to the UN: the 
restoration of geographic unity of Palestine as part of Arab homeland, the repatriation of Arab 
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refuges in their homes in Palestine and the Jewish new-corners to their former countries, the 
constitution of Palestine as a democratic state, the demilitarisation of the whole country whose 
neutrality is guaranteed by the Security Council and the appointment of a representative to 
report to General Assembly (Shukairy 1958). Shukairy's this proposal did not lead any change 
and the situation in Palestine remained same. 
Given the severity of conditions exiled Palestinian Arabs faced, the Palestinian Arab leadership 
had gradually securitised the exile issue and attempted to justify the possibility of the use of 
force against Israel. In his statement in the UN General Assembly in 1961 Shukairy gave 
signals for the possibility of the use of force: " ... to be a refugee .. .in exile means hate ... war, 
and the right to war means defence of your fatherland and what your fatherland stands for ... " 
(Shukairy 1961). 
During this period Israeli governments tried to deal with the Palestinian refugee problem that 
emerged after the 1948 - 49 war based on the assumption that Palestinians formed a part of a 
larger entity, Arab or Syrian, and consequently they could be absorbed into the surrounding 
Arab countries. From the initial days of Zionism, the Zionist elite had denied the existence of 
Palestinian Arabs. However, their existence according to Edward Said "was not simply as an 
inconvenient nuisance, but as a population with an indissoluble bond with the land" (Said 
1980:8). Hence, in spite ofIsraeli rejection of the Palestinian Arabs as a distinct identity, under 
the constant sense of foreign invasion, Palestinian Arabs formed a community. Although 
feeling that they belonged to a large Arab nation, they also believed themselves to belong in a 
land they called Filastuna (our Palestine) (Said 1980: 118). This position is clearly seen in PLO 
leader Ahmed Shukairy's statements in the UN General Assembly in 1958 and 1961 and in the 
Proclamation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (1964). 
The people of Palestine have pre-existed the existence of Israel.. .and no 
sovereignty can be exercised to bar the people from their country. To exclude 
a people from their homeland is no sovereignty - it is banditry (Shukairy 
1961). 
Similarly, the Statement of Proclamation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (1964) 
underlined the link between the Palestinian Arabs and Palestine: 
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[ ... ] the right of the Palestinian Arab people to its sacred homeland Palestine 
and affirming the inevitability of the battle to liberate the usurped part from it, . 
and its determination to bring out its effective revolutionary entity and the 
mobilisation of the capabilities and potentialities and its material, military and 
spiritual forces. 
As a summary, the Palestinian Arabs' rejection of Jewish statehood and the Zionists' rejection 
of Palestinian Arabs as a distinct identity drew the contours of security discourses of the 
political elites of the respective societies during the early years of the State of Israel. During 
this period, while the Zionist leadership had disregarded Palestinian existence as a national 
identity, the Palestinian political elite had attempted to securitise the establishment of the State 
ofIsrael as an existential threat: 
[ ... ] with Zionism there cannot be peaceful co-existence ... when the very 
existence of your people is the question, there cannot be peaceful co-existence. 
Self-defence becomes over-riding and paramount (Shukairy 1961). 
In 1965 al-Fatah was founded under Yasser Arafat's leadership and eventually became the 
most powerful and publicised element within the PLO. Fatah's rhetoric was mainly affected by 
the 1960s' anti-imperialist discourse. Particularly, the branding of the State of Israel and 
Zionism as colonialism lay at the heart of Fatah's and the PLO's discourse as iJlustrated in 
Article 7 and 8 of the Fatah Constitution (1964): 
7. The Zionist Movement is racial, colonial and aggressive in ideology, goals, 
organisation and method. 
8. The Israeli existence in Palestine is a Zionist invasion with a colonial 
expansive base, and it is a natural ally to colonialism and international 
imperialism. 
According to the same discourse, Article 4 of the Fatah Constitution defines "the Palestinian 
struggle [ ... as] part and parcel of the world-wide struggle against Zionism, colonialism and 
international imperialism." Therefore, the Palestinians had the right to use all possible means, 
including terrorist attacks, to resist Israeli colonialism and liberate their fatherland. 
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Table 2.2 Historical Documents and Statements Related to the Palestinian Issue (1948 -
1967) 
The Declaration of the Establishment of the State ofIsrael 14 May 1948 
httQ:llwww.mfa.gov.iIIMFAiPeace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/De 
claration+of+Establishment+of+State+of+Israel.htm 
Statement by the Arab League upon the Declaration of the State ofIsrael 15 May 1948 
http://www.mfa.gov.iIlMFAlForeign+Reiations/lsraels+Foreign+Relations+si 
nce+ 1947/1947-
1974/5+ Arab+ League+declaration+on+the+invasion+of+Pales.htm 
Declaration of All-Palestine Government 28 September 1948 
htlJ:1:lldomino. un.orgLunisQal.nsf/9a798adbfl 22aff3 852561 7b006d8 8d7 162b 18 
67e967323068025648e0041673d iOgenDocument 
Statement to the Knesset by Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett about Arab 15 June 1949 
Refugees 
httQ:llwww .mfa. gOY .iIIMF AIF orei gn+ RelationslIsraels+ F oreign+ Relations+si 
nce+1947/1947-
1974/2+StatemenHto+the+KnesseHby+Foreign+Minister+Sha.htm 
Ahmad Shukairy's Statements made during 13 lli Session of the UN General I October 1958 
Assembly 
httg:llwww.ahmad-
alshukairy.ofgLsgeeches/download/Statements%20made%20during%20the%2 
o 13th%20session%200i''1020the%2 OU nited%20N ations%20General%20Asse 
mbly.gdf 
. 
Ahmad Shukairy's Statements made during 151n Session of the UN General 1961 
Assembly 
http://www.ahmad-
alshukairy.ofgLsgeeches/download/Statements%20made%20during%20the%2 
015th%20Session%20oi"/o20the%20United%20Nation%20Genera1%20Asse 
mbly.pdf 
Statement to the Special Political Committee of the United Nations General 15 December 1961 
Assembly by Foreign Minister Golda Meir about Refugees issue 
htt!):llwww .mfa. gov. iIlMF AIF oreign+Relations/Israels+F oreign+Re lati ons+si 
nce+1947/1947-
19741 14+Statement+to+the+S!)ecial+ Po litical+Committee+of.htm 
Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Ben Gurion about the refugees 27 October 1961 
issue 
httg:llwww.mfa.gov.ilIMFAlForeign+RelationslIsraels+Foreign+Relations+si 
nce+ I 947/1947-
1974/13+Statement+to+the+ Knesset+by+Prime+Minister+Ben-. htm 
Proclamation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation ·1964 
htlJ:1:llwww.llalestine-un.orgLolo/doc three.html 
Fatah Constitution 1964 
htt!):llwww. ipcri.orgLfiles/fatah 1964 .html 
63 
2.3 One's Liberation Fighter was Another's Terrorist (1967 -1987) 
The 1967 Six Day War became a watershed event in the respective securitisation processes in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After the Six Day War, Israel gained control over the West 
Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip (Map 3). 
Map 2.2 Israel after 1967 War 
The Map is downloaded from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
http://www.mfa.gov.ilIMFAlFacts+About+IsraeIIIsrael+ in+ MapslJune+ 1 0-+ 1967-
+ Israel+ After+the+Six+ Day+ War.htm 
Following the end of the Six-Day War, the situation in the Middle East was discussed by the 
UN General Assembly and it was referred the Security Council, which adopted a resolution 
(UNSC Resolution 242) on 22 November 1967. The Resolution affirmed that the 
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establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East requires the withdrawal of Israeli 
armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict. Furtherruore the necessity "for 
achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem" and "for guaranteeing the territorial 
inviolability and political independence of every State in the area" was underlined in this 
Resolution (1967). According to Chomsky (1999, 2003), UNSC Resolution 242 was 
rejectionist by denying the national rights of Palestinian Arabs and referring to them solely in 
terrus of a refugee problem. For this reason, initially the PLO refused to accept the resolution. 
However, this resolution eventually became the cornerstone of Middle East diplomatic efforts 
in the coming decades. 
The Israeli occupation of the West Bank served as a catalyst for Palestinian nationalism. The 
Six Day War made clear to most Palestinians that their struggle with Zionism could not be 
resolved on their behalf by other Arab states. Palestinian resistance had turned the 1967 defeat 
into an opportunity. Before 1967, as a result of the general Arab nationalist trend of that time, 
the Palestinian elite expected that Arab states would unite and eliminate Israel. The new 
circumstances, the defeat of the Arab states which were regarded as champions of the 
Palestinian cause, and Israel's control over the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip -
known among Palestinians as the occupied territories - paved the way for the development of a 
liberation discourse accompanied by the enmity speech acts that refer the State of Israel as an . 
existential threat to the Palestinian nation's rightful existence in Palestine. 
The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council (July 1968) 
repeatedly gives references to Palestinian Arabs' material, spiritual and historical connection 
with Palestine and views the Zionist movement as being "associated with international 
imperialism and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the 
world" (Article 22). Throughout the Charter, the Zionist movement/Zionist 
occupation/Zionist invasion is seen as an existential threat to the Palestinian community. It 
points out that "The liberation of Palestine is a national (qawmi) duty and it attempts to repel 
the Zionist and imperialist aggression against'the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination 
of Zionism in Palestine" (Article 15). In the Charter, the word "liberation" is repeated 29 
times. The Charter also has several references to armed struggle for liberation: -"struggle for 
liberation" (Article 8 and 22), "liberation through arrued struggle" (Article 8), "arrued 
struggle and armed popular revolution for the liberation" (Article 9), "Palestinian popular 
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liberation war" (Article 10), "national struggle" (Article 10) and "war of liberation" (Article 
27 and 30). 
As discussed in Chapter 1, security utterances operate as instructions for the construction and 
interpretation of a security threat. It is the securitising actor who conveys a self-referential 
practice using discourses of existential threats. Given this internalist view of the context, in 
order to win an audience, security statements must be related to an external reality. That is to 
say, the success of securitisation rests on whether the historical conjuncture renders the 
audience more sensitive to its vulnerability (Balzacq 2005:182). In the Israeli-Palestinian case, 
the occupation of the Palestinian territories after the 1967 war had triggered the events leading 
to securitisation processes. In particular, Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO, underlined 
the threat posed by the Zionist State of Israel to the existence of the Palestinian Arabs in their 
homeland. The Israeli occupation was securitised as a threat to the Palestinian people's 
survival. The goals of the Palestinian movement were to weaken the State of Israel and 
delegitimise it in the eyes of Jewish people and international society. 
As far as the interactions between audience and securitisingactor are concerned, the 
securitising actor's ability to identify with the audience's feelings, needs and interests plays an 
important role in a successful securitisation. The audience's identification with the securitising 
actor's security statements can cause some sort of cognitive and behavioural change to occur 
amongst the audience. In this case, PLO statements were relatively successful in terms of 
mobilising the audience, the Palestinian people, around their cause: liberation of Palestine. 
Between 1969 and 1985, outside the Occupied Territories a number of attacks against Israeli 
Jews were committed by different Palestinian groups, including the Black September attack at 
the 1972 Olympics in Munich while in the West Bank and Gaza, a resistance movement arose. 
This pattern of civic resistance developed in a short time and persisted for the next twenty 
years, consisting of strikes, demonstrations, the display of Palestinian flags and slogans calling 
for independence (Peretz 1990:7). 
Both the attacks outside Israel and the resistance in the Territories paved the way for the 
'security trauma' in Israel. The Palestinian liberation movement's anti-Zionist discourse and 
the attacks on Israeli citizens and institutions were seen as the incarnation of the threat to the 
Jewish State. The kidnapping and the murder of eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team 
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during the 1972 Munich Olympics by armed militants from Black September, a faction of PLO, 
was the last straw. 
Prime Minister Meir's statements following the attacks at the Munich Olympics were full of 
negative definitions of Arabs as terrorists, murderers and so on, and the war on Arab terrorism 
was defined as vital for survival. Throughout her speech, she use terror-related words 30 times, 
12 of which directly refer to "preventing terrorism", "war against terror" and "war against Arab 
terrorism". Another theme that prevailed throughout the speech was "security". Meir skiIIfully 
used the security speech act to point at Palestinian terror as the security threat. The speech ended 
by highlighting the inevitability of the use of extraordinary means - war against Arab terrorists, 
operations against the terrorists' bases and stamping out terrorist organisations - to guarantee 
the security and the survival of the Jewish people of Israel as a last resort: 
Our war against the Arab terrorists is a vital mission demanding devotion and 
concentration. From its very nature, it carmot be limited to defensive means, to 
safeguarding and self-defence, but must be active in all that has to do with the 
detection of murderers, of their bases, their actions and operations, to foil their 
designs and, in particular, to stamp out the terrorist organisations (Meir 1972). 
We have no choice but to strike at the terrorist organisations wherever we can 
reach them. That is our obligation to ourselves and to peace. We shall fulfil 
that obligation undauntedly (Meir 1972). 
As part of the ongoing Zionist rejection of Palestinians as a distinct community apart from 
Arabs in general, Meir used "Arabs" and "Arab terrorism" throughout her speech. This 
rejectionist position towards Palestinian identity and the possibility of a sovereign Palestinian 
Arab state was also repeated in Prime Minister Meir and Foreign Minister Eban's statements 
on the Palestinian issue in the Knesset in 1973. 
The process of labelling an organisation or a group as a terrorist organisation constitutes an 
act of securitisation. If the securitising actor can successfully attach the label 'terrorist' to a 
group, and persuade others to adopt this point of view and use all possible means to stop the 
'terrorist group', the acts of the particular group would be successfully securitised (Coskun 
2007: 11). As a response to the Black September attack, Israeli warplanes bombed Palestinian 
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military bases, killed many militants, but also took the lives of civilians and children. When 
Germany released the three Black September guerrillas who survived the Munich massacre, 
the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir launched a secret operation, known by some as "Wrath 
of God", to kill those responsible for Munich (Independent 2006). The attack and the nature 
of the Israeli response, brought the Israeli-Palestinian crisis to the forefront of world attention. 
According to securitisation theory, the success of the securitising actor is based on the 
distribution of capabilities and powers within the system. The more power a securitising actor 
has, the more likely this actor will succeed in attempted securitisation and gaining the consent 
of the audience (Buzan et al. 1998:27). In the Israeli-Palestinian context, Israel, with the 
support of the US, had securitised Palestinian attacks on Israeli and Jewish civilians as an 
existential threat to the Israeli state and society and identified the Palestinian movement with 
terrorism. The worldwide attention and sensitivity towards international terrorism after the 
Black September attacks in Munich served as an important external facilitating condition for 
the Israeli securitisation of Palestinian terror. During the 1970s, special bodies were set up by 
individual states to fight terror and security measures were intensified. In 1972, the President 
of the US, Richard Nixon, set up a committee at ministerial level to combat terror. The US 
administration has also intensified its fight on terror on the international scene. In the UN, the 
US administration even proposed international penalties against countries harbouring 
terrorists (Associated Press 2005). 
Black September's attack led to the West turning against the Palestinians and labelling those 
within the Palestinian movement as terrorists. The Israeli-Palestinian case illustrates the 
classic rhetorical dilemma of "one's freedom fighter is another's terrorist." In his address to 
the UN General Assembly in November 1974, Arafat highlighted this dilemma and defended 
the acts of the PLO and underlined the difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist. 
He denied the charges of terrorism and presented the PLO as the legitimate representative of 
the Palestinians: 
The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for 
which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the 
freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the 
colonialists, cannot possibly be called terrorist (Arafat 1974). 
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Those who call us terrorists wish to prevent world public opinion from 
discovering the truth about us and from seeing the justice on our faces. They 
seek to hide the terrorism and tyranny of their acts, and our own posture of 
self-defence (Arafat 1974). 
In this speech, Arafat portrayed Zionism and Israel as imperialist, colonialist and racist; the 
Palestinians were the victims of oppression, violence and racial discrimination. 
Throughout the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s Arafat and PLO gained 
international recognition as the representative of Palestinian liberation movement. Within this 
context, Palestinian cause succeeded to get UN General Assembly's open support. During the 
1970s, the UN was dominated by the Soviet Bloc and third-world countries, which pursued 
anti-Western and anti-imperialist policies. This antagonism was fuelled by the war in Vietnam 
and Apartheid policies of South Africa. Through the votes in the General Assembly, National 
Liberation Movements were supported politically. Within this context, a broad international 
consensus had taken shape that advocated a political settlement along the pre-1967 borders. 
As a consequence of this consensus, the United Nations invited Yasser Arafat to address the 
General Assembly. Shortly after his speech on 22 November 1974, the UN General Assembly 
passed Resolution 3236 to recognise the Palestinian people's "right to self-determination 
without external interference", "right to national independence and sovereignty" and 
reaffirmed "the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from 
which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return" (UNGA 1974a). 
Another resolution (3237) was also passed on 22 November 1974 to invite the PLO "to 
participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of all international conferences 
. convened under the auspices of the United Nations" (UNGA 1 974b). Furthermore, a UN 
General Assembly Resolution (Resolution 3379) was passed to condemn "Zionism as a threat 
to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist 
ideology" and to determine that "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination" was 
passed (UNGA 1975). 
Despite its international recognition, the US and Israel refused any direct contacts with the 
PLO on the grounds of its unwillingness to accept Resolution 242 and rejected the idea of a 
Palestinian state. According to Chomsky, US-Israeli rejectionism had consistently blocked the 
achievement of a comprehensive settlement during this period (Chomsky 1999). As PM 
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Menachem Begin, who came to power in 1977, stated during the Camp David peace 
negotiations with Egypt,12 a Palestinian State on the West Bank was considered as a 'mortal 
danger' to Israel. According to Begin, such a state would become a Soviet base. Jerusalem 
would be under crossfire 'from three directions': Jordanian, Palestinian and Soviet (Gilbert 
1988:481). 
At the end of the Camp David negotiations, Israel signed a peace accord with Egypt to 
implement an autonomy plan for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. With this accord, Israel 
agreed to the establishment of an elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. 
This accord was the first indication of the recognition of the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people by the State of Israel. This was the first time that Israel acknowledged the 
national aspirations of the Palestinians as a people. The acceptance of a Palestinian identity 
and of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people was a major step forward for Israel. 
Despite the peace accord signed by Egypt on behalf of the Palestinians, Palestinians who 
lived in occupied territories were upset that the accord did not mention the sovereignty of the 
Palestinian people and it did not obligate Israel to withdraw from Arab territories (Metzger et 
al. 1983: 212). The severity of conditions in the occupied territories accompanied by the 
. disappointment with the Camp David Accords and the autonomy plan, paved the way for the 
outbreak of civil resistance in occupied Palestinian territory, which was harshly responded by 
the Israeli Defence Forces (lDF) attacks on the PLO's bases in Lebanon. 
To summarise, for two decades following the Six Day War, the Israeli leadership together 
with the US continued the rej ectionist position that denied Palestinian Arabs national and 
sovereign rights in Palestine and securitised the Palestinian Liberation Movement as 
terrorism, while Arafat referred to the Palestinian movement as revolutionaries and accused 
the Israeli government of using the issue of terrorism as a cover for its violent acts against the 
Palestinians. The international environment of the 1960s and 1970s, which was dominated by 
the anti-Western and anti-imperialist discourses of the the communist bloc and the third 
world, was a facilitating factor for the PLO to gain international recognition of their cause for 
12 On 6 October 1973 Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Israel on the Jewish holiday ofYom Kippur. The 
war lasted around two weeks and the Arab alliance was defeated. The Yom Kippur war had significant 
implications regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations even though the Palestinians were not part of the Arab 
coalition. One of the implications was the peace agreement signed between Egypt and Israel in 1977, known as 
the Camp David Accords. 
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liberation. In a short time, the international community's negative opinion of the PLO as 
terrorists after the Munich attacks had changed. In spite ofIsraeli and American rejectionism, 
the PLO was recognised as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian liberation 
movement. The US and Israel were isolated internationally over the Palestinian issue. 
During this period, Israel appeared to be a monolith to outside observers. However, the Israeli 
elites were internally divided concerning the future of the occupied territories and the peace 
solution. In the aftermath of the Six Day War a number of different views were developed 
concerning how to rule Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. On the one hand, 
groups motivated by a romantic vision of Jewish history argued in favour of settlements on 
the West Bank. The discourse of the religious and nationalist extremist groups such as Gush 
Emunim and the Land of Israel Movement was based on biblical references and a romantic 
vision of Jewish history. These groups urged the Israeli government to expand settlements 
throughout historical Palestine and put pressure on respective governments not to 
compromise the entirety of Eretz Yisrael (Gilbert 1988: 470). On the other hand, leftist 
groups, who called for reconciliation with the Palestinians in particular and the Arabs in 
general, argued for the recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination, complete 
withdrawal from the occupied territories and the discontinuation of settlements if they 
presented an obstacle to peace (Metzger et al. 1983:259). This will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis, which analyses desecuritisation processes. 
For almost two decades following the Israeli control over the Palestinian territories after 1967 
war, the PLO in general, and Yasser Arafat in particular, appeared to be the securitising actor 
on the Palestinian side. Arafat's active securitisations based on the societal insecurity of 
Palestinians as a result ofthe Israeli occupation and different fedayeen groups' attacks against 
JewishlIsraeli targets outside Israel resulted in the Palestinian cause being associated with 
terror by Israeli securitising actors. During the 1980s, the disunity of the Palestinian political 
elites became more apparent and gradually local elites arose under occupation in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip as an alternative to the PLO leadership in exile. Until the mid-I 980s, 
the PLO elite in exile made most of the decisions on behalf of Palestinians, so marginalising 
groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. After the mid-1980s, a new generation of national 
and Islamist elites from the territories began to assert pressure to influence Palestinian 
politics. This change was supported by the new generation of Palestinians who had lived 
under Israeli occupation (Jamal 2005:5). At the more radical end of the spectrum, Hamas, 
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fDnnerly Dne Dfthe armed wings Dfthe revivalist Muslim BrDtherhDDd (Ikhwan aI-Muslim in) 
in Gaza, was fDnned during the first year Df the Intifada tD allDw the participatiDn of the 
brDtherhDDd in the Intifada. In August 1988, Hamas published its cDvenant, 'The CDvenant Df 
the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)" and rejected the legitimacy of the PLO as sole 
leader of the Palestinian people. The covenant returned Hamas to the PLO's previous 
uncompromising position, namely that Palestinians should aim for the destruction of Zionism: 
"Our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious. It needs all sincere efforts. It is 
a step that inevitably should be followed by other steps .... until the enemy is vanquished and 
Allah's victory is realised" (The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas] 
1988). In its Covenant, Hamas clearly pointed out the threats posed by the Zionist State of 
Israel to Palestiniah'society and the Palestinians' right to establish their own state. Besides a 
nationalistic dimension, Hamas underlined the religious dimension of their fight against Israel 
and called for Jihad against Zionists. 
This new generation of national elites froin the territories were well aware of Palestinians' 
worries about their livelihoods and economy and articulated a security discourse based on 
human insecurity. For instance, the announcement of the Israeli Water Commission's scheme 
in 1987 to utilize West Bank water in Jerusalem and the surrounding areas caused great 
concern. Arab administrators of the Bethlehem area, which had been already suffering acute 
water shortages, securitised the Israeli scheme as an existential threat to the survival of 
Palestinians. As expressed by Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij: "This plan threatens our 
[Palestinians'] very existence ... (It is) a matter of 'to be or nDt to be' for us" (Freij in Peretz 
1990:29). As was stated by Pastor Rantisi, the deputy mayor of Ramallah: "[t]he Israelis are 
constantly talking about security. We are the ones who need security! There is no security for 
, 
us Palestinians in our own country ... we are fed up with the occupation; we are simply fed up 
with it" (Rantisi in Metzger et al. 1983 :3). 
There is no doubt that Israel was facing serious security problems but evidently the 
Palestinian Arab population had security-related problems in their daily lives under 
occupation. The fact that Palestinians in the occupied territories felt a total absence of 
physical security in their daily lives was successfully securitised by the Palestinian elite in the 
occupied territories. Increasingly marginalised, local Palestinians took matters into their own 
hands and changed the dynamics of the conflict with Israel. Thus, by 1987, an indigenous 
Palestinian struggle, the Intifada, was under way. In December 1987 a traffic accident in Gaza 
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served as the catalyst for riots that quickly erupted into a general uprising throughout the 
occupied territories (Makovsky 1996:7). This struggle was concerned with the immediate 
questions of daily survival. This uprising was developed as a grassroots movement 
independent of the PLO leaders abroad. 
Even though the Intifada was different from the PLO-style struggle, the Intifada discourse 
consisted ofthe central themes of the PLO such as the expansionism of the Zionist movement 
and the victimisation of the Palestinians, with a few new additions: heroism and martyrdom. 
As commented by Mubarak Awad, founder of the Palestinian Center for the Study of 
Nonviolence and Daud Kuttab, the weJl-known Palestinian journalist, not just political groups 
but aJl sections of Palestinian society were involved in this struggle. Influenced by Gandhi 
and Martin Luther King, non-violent resistance became the main tactic of the Intifada. It was 
believed that removing the irrational fear of' Arab violence', which cemented Israeli society 
together, would contribute to the disintegration of hostile Israeli elements (Awad 1984:25). 
The main goal of the Intifada was to isolate Israel politically and moraJly. It was believed that 
non-violence would increase "any beneficial, public, international attention to [the Palestinian 
cause 1 by revealing the racist and expansionist features of the Zionist movement and denying 
it the justification built on its purported 'security'" (Awad 1984:22-36). Initially, Israeli 
officials viewed the unrest as one of the occasional disturbances. As stated by Makovski, the 
broad participation in the Intifada undermined the Israeli hardliners' claim that Palestinian 
nationalism in the territories was provoked by the PLO and, given a choice, most of the 
Palestinian Arabs from the territories would prefer to remain under Israeli rule (1996:8). The 
Intifada convinced most Israelis that the status quo of occupation was untenable: Even though 
the Intifada did not constitute an existential threat to Israel's existence, it undermined the 
sense of personal security among Israelis. 
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Table 2.3 Historical Documents and Statements Related to the Palestinian Issue (1967 -
1987) 
UN Security Council Resolution 242 22 November 1967 
httQ:llwww.mfa.gov.ilfMFAlPeace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+ 
Process/UN+Securi!),+Council+Resolution+242.htm 
The Palestinian National Charter: 1-17 July 1968 
Resolutions of the Palestine National Council 
httQ:llavalon.law.xale.edul20th centunl/Qlocov.asg 
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's Statement to the Knesset on 16 October 1972 
Black September's Attacks during Munich Olympic Games 
httQ:llwww .mfa. gOY .ilfMF AIF oreig]l+ Relations/Israels+F oreign+R 
elations+since+ J 94711947-
1974/39+Statement+to+the+Knesset+bx+Prime+Minister+Meir.ht 
m 
Statement by the Prime Minister Golda Meir on the Palestinian 12 April 1973 
issue 
htlQ:llwww .mfa. gov. i l/M F AIF oreig!!+ Re lationslIsraels+ F oreign+ R 
elations+since+ 194711947-
197 4/40+Statement+bX+the+Prime+ Min ister+onHhe+ Palestin. htm 
Statement to the Knesset by Foreign Minister Abba Eban on the 18July1973 
Palestinian Issue 
httj:FI/www .mfa.gov .iIIMF AIF oreign+ RelationslIsraels+ F orei gn+R 
elations+since+ 194711947-
1974/41 +Statement+to+the+Knesset+bx+Foreign+Minister+Eb.ht 
m 
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat's Address in United Nations Genera 14 November 1974 
Assembly 
httg:llwww.mideastweb.org/arafat at un.htm 
UN General Assembly Resolutions 3236 and 3237 22 November 1974 
httg:llwww.mideastweb.org/3236.htm 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 10Nov 1975 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
httQ:llwww.mfa.gov.ilfMFAlForeign+RelationslIsrael+and+the+U 
N/Selected+resolutionsIUNITED+NA TIONS+GENERAL+ AS SE 
MBL Y+RESOLUTION+3379+-X.htm 
Camp David Accords 17 September 1978 
htlQ:llavalon .Ia w .xale.edul20th centu!)'/camgdav.asg 
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2.4 Give Peace a Chance? (1988-2000) 
As intended, the Intifada succeeded in drawing international attention to the Palestine and 
enhancing international support in for the Palestinian cause. Hence, it significantly weakened 
the State of Israel and caused Israel's diplomatic isolation. The international attention 
occasioned by the Intifada contributed in the accumulation of international support to the 
Palestinian cause. Yasser Arafat used this opportunity to declare Palestine independent on 
occupied lands on behalf of the Palestinians on 15 November 1988: "The Palestine National 
Council, in the name of God, and in the name of the Palestinian Arab people, hereby 
proclaims the establishment of the State of Palestine on our Palestinian territory with its 
capital Jerusalem (Al-Quds Ash-Sharit)." 
As far as the wording used in the State of Palestine Declaration of Independence is concerned, 
the declaration underlined the hostility to the organised terror of the Israeli forces. The 
document consists of sentences referring to the Palestinians' pain such as "willed 
dispossession and expulsion" and assertions of romantic nationalism like "long years of trial 
in ever mounting struggle" and "one and indivisible in its triumphs" (Declaration of 
Palestinian Independence 1988). Immediately after the declaration, UN General Assembly 
issued a resolution to acknowledge "the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine 
National Council on 15 November 1988" and affirm "the need to enable the Palestinian 
people to exercise their sovereignty over their territory occupied since 1967" (UNGA 1988). 
UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (n) of 29 November 1947, which called for "the 
establishment of an Arab State and a Jewish State in Palestine and its affirmation of the urgent 
need to achieve a just and comprehensive settlement in the Middle East to provide peaceful 
coexistence for all States in the region", encouraged Arafat to take one step forward. A 
historic turn occurred and the PLO indicated its readiness to consider a settlement of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict under UN auspices. Consequently, the PLO stated its willingness 
to consider negotiations with Israel, which meant a dramatic change from the total rejection of 
Israel as a negotiating partner and a revision of the position of rejecting Israel's right to exist. 
In accordance with the terms of the declaration of independence and the political statement of 
the 19th session of the Palestine National Council (Algiers) in 1988, the PLO recognised Israel 
as a state in the region. 
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[ ... ] our people's right to freedom and national independence according to 
Resolution 181 and the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East 
conflict to exist in peace and security and as I have mentioned including the 
state of Palestine and Israel and other neighbours according to the Resolutions 
242 and 338. 
[ ... ] Our statehood provides salvation to the Palestinians and peace to both 
Palestinians and Israelis. Self-determination means survival for the 
Palestinians. And our survival does not destroy the survival of the Israelis as 
their rulers claim. (PLO's statement of the 19th session of the Palestine 
National Council (Algiers) 1988) 
By the late 1980s both the US and Israel found themselves ready to reconsider their positions 
regarding the PLO and the Palestinian issue. The Intifada threatened Israeli control of the 
territories and the PLO's recognition of Israel caused the US administration to consider the 
diplomatic efforts of the PLO and others (Chomsky 2003:185). The PLO's recognition of, and 
its willingness to start negotiations with, Israel also put pressure on the Israeli government. In 
February 1989, the Soviet Union called for an international conference under the five 
permanent members of the Security Council. Pressure was building on Israel to formulate a 
peace initiative. Even though Washington opened the door for dialogue with the PLO, 
Americans were not keen for an international conference to take place (Chomsky 2003: 185). 
To that end, the US encouraged Israel to pursue a peace plan and the Israeli Government 
presented a unilateral peace initiative on 14 May 1989. Prime Minister Shamir and Defence 
Minister Rabin formulated a peace initiative based on the Camp David Accords. This 
proposal presented the principles of a political initiative of the Government of Israel which 
pursued the continuation of the peace process, in other words Israel's conditions for peace: 
"the termination of the state of war with the Arab states; a solution for the Arabs of Judea, 
Samaria and the Gaza district; peace with Jordan; and a resolution of the problem of the 
residents of the refugee camps in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district" (Israel's Peace 
Initiative 1989). While Israel proposed free and democratic elections among the Palestinian 
Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza for their representatives to conduct negotiations 
for a transitional period of self-rule, the Israeli government highlighted their opposition to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state and their opposition to conducting negotiations with the 
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PLO. Only in August 1990 did Foreign Minister Levy propose a two-track negotiation 
arrangement that included a Palestinian track designed to bring about a transition period and 
autonomy but another regional crisis, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, shifted the focus of the 
international community to another regional conflict. 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the First Gulf War changed the political landscape of 
the Middle East and provided necessary facilitating conditions for Arab-Israeli peace in the 
region. The Gulf War neutralised Iraq, which was considered as one of the greatest regional 
threats to Israel's security, divided the Arab states and eroded the position of the PLO who 
supported Saddam Hussein. As a result of the PLO's support for Saddam, financial and 
political support from the Gulf States dried up. Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait cut payments to the PLO. The US saw the political upheaval in the 
region as an opportunity to advance the peace process and, together with the Soviet Union, 
launched a diplomatic initiative based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 
that resulted in the Madrid peace conference in 1991 (Makovski 1996:11). 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union drastically changed the balance of power in the Middle 
East. The Gulf War, on the other hand, consolidated US hegemony and weakened the 
viability of the PLO. All these changes in regional dynamics and the US' policy change 
regarding the Arab-Israeli peace in general and Israeli-Palestinian peace in particular served 
as external facilitating conditions that led to a historic shift in Israeli foreign policy. However, 
the political composition of the Labour govermnent elected in 1992 constituted the internal 
facilitating condition for a rapprochement between Israel and the PLO. Despite the initial 
rejection of talks with the PLO in 1992, with the return of the Labour Party to power and the 
formation of a dovish Cabinet, Israel agreed to resume an official dialogue with the PLO 
(Aranoff and Aranoff 1998). 
In his speech to the Knesset presenting his govermnent, Yitzhak Rabin gave signals of the 
new government's readiness to resume the peace process with its Arab neighbours, including 
the Palestinians. Even though Israel's willingness and determination to make peace with its 
Arab neighbours was underlined by Rabin, alongside "peace" the word "security" was the 
recurring theme of his speeches, in most of which the words peace and security were used 
together. Even in the context of speeches and statements about peace, the security speech acts 
had continued to dominate the Israeli political discourse on the Palestinian issue: 
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This Government is determined ... to do everything necessary, everything 
possible, and more, for the sake of national and personal security, to achieve 
peace and prevent war '" We shall do so based on the recognition by the Arab 
countries, and the Palestinians, that Israel is a sovereign state with a right to live 
in peace and security ... The Government presented here today sees itself as 
responsible for the security of every one of Israel's citizens, Jews and Arabs, 
within the State of Israel, in Judea, in Samaria and in the Gaza District (Rabin 
1992a [emphasis added]). 
[ ... ] peace constitutes a very important component as a factor to guarantee the 
security of the State oflsrael, [since] a peace without security is meaningless 
to me. However, a true peace increases the security of the State of Israel ... 
the Government indeed tries to extract the chance to achieve peace that will 
provide security for the State ofIsrael ... I believe that the chance exists in the 
promotion of the realisation of peace in the format of the framework of the 
Madrid Conference and its consequences, in different settings that will guarantee 
the peace and achieve security for the State of Israel (Rabin 1992b [emphasis 
added)). 
Rabin also urged Palestinian in the territories "to give peace a chance" and "to cease all 
violent and terrorist activity" (1992a). In order to sustain peace and security (mostly security), 
Rabin underlined Israel's determination to end terror. 
The continuation of talks that led to a peace process between the Israeli government and the 
PLO representatives caused an intensification of the activities of Hamas, a group opposed to 
the recognition of Israel. It challenged the PLO's reconciliatory turn and, together with 
Palestinian fedayeen groups and Hezballah from Lebanon, attacked Israeli soldiers. Well 
aware of Israeli sensitivities regarding terror, the objective of these attacks against Israeli 
targets was to spoil the ongoing peace process. 
In his speech to the Knesset following the attacks, Rabin repeated Israel's determination to 
achieve peace with Arab countries and the Palestinians in the territories "despite the 
murderous acts and the terror" (Rabin 1992c). While underlining Israel's commitment to seek 
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peace, Rabin made clear that this was not to be peace at any price: "Before any decisions are 
taken and certainly before any signing, the security of the state will stand before our eyes. 
Only when we have security, will there also be peace" (Rabin 1992c). Once more, Israel's 
preference for security over peace was underlined. 
In a short time the Rabin goverurnent effectively securitised Hamas and Islamic Jihad as a 
threat to both Israel and the peace process. 
This Goverurnent is serious, sincere, and true in its ... determination to bring 
peace to Israel. Nevertheless, with the same degree of willingness and 
determination ... this Goverurnent will fight any manifestation of violence and 
terror, and will not permit, and will not allow, neither Hamas nor the Islamic 
Jihad, to harm citizens of the State of Israel - and it will take all legal steps at its 
disposal, to battle murderous terrorist organisations ... the battle for peace and 
the battle against terror. In both we shall be victorious (Rabin 1992d). 
Within this context, the Israeli goverurnent took harsh measures against Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad. Hamas was accused of killing an Israeli Sergeant and this incident used as a pretext for 
the Israeli goverurnent to deport 415 Hamas members and supporters from Israel and to 
include Hamas and Islamic Jihad on the list of terrorist organisations (Cabinet Declaration 
1992). The Cabinet decision to deport Hamas activists was criticised by the UN and Arab 
states. As a result, the peace talks were interrupted in December 1992 and continued until 
April 1993 when all parties met in Washington and, after the exchange of letters between 
Arafat and Rabin, a Declaration of Principles that signalled both sides' agreement for an 
interim arrangement until the permanent solution negotiations were to commence in two years 
was signed on 13 September 1993. 
In his letter to Yitzhak Rabin, Arafat reaffirmed the PLO's recognition of "the right of the 
State of Israel to exist in peace and security." Moreover, the letter continued "the PLO 
renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over 
all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and 
discipline violators" (Arafat, 1993). 
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Following the Declaration of Principles, in 1994 the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) 
was founded, after which thousands of PLO leaders returned to the territories. Consequently, 
the tension between the national elite that emerged in exile and the elite groups in the 
occupied territories took a new form. With the establishment of the PNA, Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad became central opponents of the peace process and sought to block negotiations 
between Israel and the Palestinians (Jamal 2005:2). 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad were not alone in their efforts to spoil the peace process. Radical 
elements within Israeli society also organised attacks to spoil peace. On 25 February 1994, in 
Hebron a Jewish settler opened fire on Moslem worshippers killing 29 and wounding 90. The 
response was a suicide bomb attack organised by Hamas. Such attacks either from Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad or from radical Jews threatened the peace process. 
Despite the efforts of Israeli and Palestinian peace spoilers, several agreements were signed 
between the PLO and Israel: the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of 
the State of Israel and the PLO (29 April 1994), an agreement on the Gaza Strip and the 
Jericho Area (4 May 1994) and the Agreement on the Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities 
(24 August 1994). Finally, on 28 September 1995, the Interim Agreement, also known as 
Oslo 11, between the government of Israel and the PLO was signed. Even Rabin's 
assassination by a radical right wing Orthodox Jew on 4 November 1995 did not halt the 
Israeli withdrawal and transfer of powers to the Palestinian Authority in six cities in the West 
Bank. 
Following the withdrawal and the yielding of power to the Palestinian Authority, Shimon 
Peres' government, which had succeeded that of Rabin, facilitated the first-ever national 
elections in the West bank and Gaza. This development was considered as the highest point in 
the struggle for peace (Rosenblum 1998:37). But the hopes were dashed when military units 
of Hamas and Islamic Jihad launched several suicide bombings in Jerusalem, Ashkelon and 
Tel Aviv. These attacks once again resulted in the Israeli Government's linking of additional 
Israeli withdrawals to security-related moves on the Palestinian side. Peres demanded that 
Arafat and the Palestinian Authority should wage war against Palestinian terrorism. In 
addition to these demands, the Peres government imposed a total closure on the West Bank 
and Gaza that stopped all movement of people and goods into Israel from the Palestinian self-
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governing areas. At this point, the peace process was subordinated to the issue of Israelis' 
personal security. 
Since March 1993, the Palestinians had already been experiencing the closures, which were 
detrimental for Palestinians and did not help to achieve the expected improvement in Israelis' 
personal security. Closures resulted in a sharp decline in Palestinian living standards and the 
Palestinian Authority's revenues that led to a severe social crisis and strengthened Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad. Their suicide attacks in major Israeli cities triggered an Israeli security 
retaliation that had devastating social and economic consequences for the West Bank and 
Gaza. 
The suicide attacks allowed Binyamin Netanyahu, who had been elected as Prime Minister in 
1996, to securitise the Palestinian terrorism once again and gave signals for the possibility of 
extreme measures that would be taken to stop these attacks. 
In the last years, the security situation has deteriorated throughout the country 
and its borders. To stop this deterioration we will have to wage a continuous 
battle against terror: The participants in terror should know that they will 
encounter a harsh response. I refer not only to the terrorists themselves but 
also to their patrons and those who sent them, to their operators and 
collaborators (Netanyahu, 1996a [emphasis added]). 
With Netanyahu 'the war against (Palestinian) terror' reassumed a prominent place in the 
Israeli security discourse. Furthermore, the suicide attacks were widely interpreted as proof of 
the inability of the Palestinian leadership to stop the terrorist activities of Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad. Arafat was accused of being unable to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel. This was 
one of the justifications for delaying the withdrawal from the occupied territories. Netanyahu 
insisted that peace should not be sought at the expense of security and suggested that what 
Israel needed was less peace and more security (Guyatt, 1998:39). In the Guidelines of the 
Government (1996), the Likud government under Netanyahu repeated their commitment to 
achieve peace with Israel's neighbours while safeguarding national and personal security. It 
was also clearly stated that "the Government will negotiate with the Palestinian Authority, 
with the intent of reaching a permanent arrangement on condition that the Palestinians fulfil 
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all their commitments." However, security remained the precondition for peace. During 1996 
and 1997, in his speeches and statements Prime Minister Netanyahu repeatedly highlighted 
that security was essential for a stable and lasting peace (1996a, 1996b). Another recurring 
theme in his speeches was the 'reciprocal implementation of commitments.' Throughout his 
period of office, Netanyahu criticised the Palestinian Authority in general, and Arafat in 
particular, for not "honouring their commitments" and not preventing Palestinian violence 
against Israeli targets. 
The Netanyahu government's security discourse that swung between the securitisation of 
'Palestinian terror', with a particular emphasis on Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and normalisation 
efforts by reiterating its commitment to peace, reflected the chasm between external and 
internal facilitating conditions. Externally, the US administration and the international 
community had put pressure on Israel to move forward to achieve the final status agreement. 
As a reflection of internati;nal pressures on the question of Palestine and the peace process, 
fifteen UN General Assembly Resolutions (51/23, 51126, 51127, 51129, 51/82, 51/124-51/130, 
51/131,51/133,511134 and 511150) were passed in the first half of December 1996. On the 
other hand, internally the government was under pressure from the security hawks who 
dominated the Knesset and government, as well as from the public concerns regarding 
personal security. 
The Israeli government's one-sided preconditions that required the Palestinian Authority to 
become fully compliant with obligations, threatened the essence of peace-making. In fact it 
was not just the Palestinians who did not fulfil their obligations, the Israeli government also 
violated some of its commitments in the Oslo agreements such as delaying Israeli withdrawal 
from Hebron, not freeing female prisoners, not providing safe passage between Gaza and 
Jericho and placing road blocks in forbidden places (Rosenblum 1998:55). Furthermore, the 
development ofIsraeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem had continued during 
the peace process, which raised doubts about Israeli leaders' commitment to a permanent 
settlement. Between 1993 and 2000, Israel had built over 20,000 housing units in the 
Occupied Territories. The Jewish population living in the territories increased from about 
110,000 in 1993 to close to 200,000 in 2000. According to Gordort (2003:41), these numbers 
suggest that Israel was employing the rhetoric of peace while changing demo graphics to 
create an irreversible situation on the ground. 
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In slDDmary, the capacity to mobilise security expectations depends on the position, status and 
authority of the would-be securitiser. As securitisation can be pushed by powerful securitising 
actors, who use security to pursue their own ends, the success of securitisation is dependent 
on the power and capabilities of the securitising actor. The same assumption is also valid for 
the transition from securitisation to normalisation. As has been illustrated in the Israeli-
Palestinian context, both internal and external facilitating conditions play a significant role in 
persuading the securitising actors to pursue policies for returning securitised relations to 
normal politics. Moreover, normalisation of the relations with the other - at least returning the 
issues from the security sphere to the political sphere - depends on the consensus within their 
respective societies and the leaders' monopoly over the use of legitimate force. Despite the 
external conditions that accommodate normalisation between Israelis and Palestinians through 
a peace process, the fragmentations in the respective audiences challenged the return to the 
political sphere. Jewish radicals in Israel and militant groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad on 
the Palestinian side effectively spoiled the chances of returning Israeli-Palestinian relations 
into the realm of normal politics. 
Besides, the existence of obvious spoilers from both sides, the consequences of Arafat and 
Netanyahu's pragmatic approaches to the peace process to secure their leadership had caused 
opposition to both men. In 1999, a protest movement against Arafat's rule began. Twenty 
prominent West Bank and Gaza Palestinians signed a petition condemning the Palestinian 
Authority's corruption and abuse of power. In a short time the protests escalated and new 
elections were demanded. According to Said, this was a direct consequence of the despair at 
the inequities and injustices of the Oslo Process (Said 2000:xx). For Said, the Oslo agreement 
was merely a reflection of the colonial spirit. Israel and the US just gave Palestinians the 
symbols of sovereignty and withheld the essentials of real sovereignty: the right of return for 
Palestinian refugees and independence (Said 2000:xx). The disillusiomnent created 
throughout the Oslo Process, despite some symbols of peace and limited Palestinian 
autonomy, grew from the failure to address the acute issues of conflict such as the return of 
Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem. Israeli settlements continued to be built; 
closures had become part of the daily lives of Palestinians. Furthermore, the policies of the 
Palestinian Authority were far from satisfying the expectations of Palestinians from the peace 
process. According to Chomsky (1999), since the Oslo Process was based on the convergence 
of interests between Arafat and the Israeli state, the Israeli-Arafat agreement, as Chomsky 
puts it, was destined to fail. 
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Table 2.4 Historical Documents and Statements Related to the Palestinian Issue (1988 -
2004) 
The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 18 August 1988 
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonlmideatlhamas.htm 
Palestinian National Council political statement and declaration of 14 November 1988 
independence 
httg:llwww .mfa. gov. i I/MF AIF orei gn%20 Relations/lsrae Is%20 F orei gn%2 0 
Relations%20since%20 194711984-
1988/396%20Palestinian%20National%20Council%20Qolitical%20stateme 
PLO Statement 7 December 1988 
httQ:llwww.mfa.gov.iIIMFAlForeign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20 
Relations%20since%20 194711984-J 988/408%20PLO%20Statement-
%207%20December%201988 
Yasser Arafat's Speeches/Statements 
- Statement in the General Assembly 
httQ:llwww.m fa.gov. i I/M F AlF orei gn%20 Relations/lsrael s%20F orei gn%20 13 December 1988 
Relations%20since%20 1947/1984-
I 988/414 %20 Statement%20by%20Arafat%20in%20the%20General%20As 
sembly-%201 
- Statement recognizing Israel and renouncing terror 14 December 1988 
httg:llwww.mfa.gov.iIIMFAlForeign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20R 
elations%20since%20 194711984-
1988/4 I 9%20Statement%20by%20Yasser%20Arafat-
%2014%20December%201988 
UN GA Resolution A-RES-43-177- Question of Palestine 15 December 1988 
httQ:llwww.mfa.gov.iIIMFAlForeign+Relations/Israel+and+the+UN/Selecte 
d+resolutionslUN+GA +Resolution+A-RES-43-177-
+Question+of+Palesti.htm 
Israel's Peace Initiative 14 May 1989 
httg:llwww.mfa.gov.iI/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/[ 
srael-s+Peace+lnitiative+-+May+ 14-+ 1989.htm 
Letter OfInvitation To Madrid Peace Conference 30 October 1991 
h!!g:llwww.mfa.gov.i[/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Processl 
Madrid+Letter+of+lnvitation.htm 
I 
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Table 2.4 Historical Documents (1988 - 2004) 
Yitzhak Rabin's Speeches and Statements 
- Address to the Knesset Presenting his Government) 13 July 1992a 
httl1:llwww.mfa.gov.iIIMFAlForeign%20RelationslIsraels%20Foreign%20R 
elations%20since%20194711992-
1 994/1 %20%20Address%20to%20the%20Knesset%20b):%20Prime%20Mi 
nister%20Rabin 
- Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin 14 Septemberl992b 
h!ill:llwww.mfa.gov.iIIMFAlForeign%20RelationslIsraels%20Foreign%20R 
elations%20since%20 194711992-
1994113 %20Statement%20in%20the%20Knesset%2 Obx'Yo2 0 Prime%20M ini 
ster%20Rabi 
- Statement in the Knesset 26 October 
h!m:llwww.mfa.gov.ilIMFAlForeign%20RelationsfIsraels%20Foreign%20 1992c 
Relations%20since%20 194711992-
1994/22%20Statement%20in%20the%20Knesset%20b),%20Prime%20Min 
ister%20Rabi 
- Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin 21 Decemberl992d 
httl1:llwww.mfa.gov.iI/MFAIForeign%20Relations/[sraels%20Foreign%20R 
elations%20since%20 1 94711 992-
1 994/45%20Statement%20in%20the%20Knesset%20b),%20Prime%20Mini 
ster%20Rabi 
- Statement on the Removal of Hamas Activists 20 December 1992e 
h!!Jl:llwww.m fa.gov. i IIMF AIF oreign%20 Relations/Israels%20F oreign%20 
Relations%20since%20 1 94711 992-
1994/44%20Statement%20b):%20Prime%20Minister%20Rabin%20on%20t 
he%20Remova 
Cabinet Declaration on Removal of Hamas Activists and Inclusion of Three 16 December 1992 
Organisations as Terrorist Organisations 
httl1:llwww .mfa. gOY. i IIMF AIF orei gn%20Relations/Israels%20F orei gn%20 
Relations%20since%20 1947/1992-
1994/41 %20Cabinet%20Declaration%200n%20Removal%200fUIo20Hamas 
%20Activis 
Israel-PLO Recognition - Exchange of Letters between PM Rabin and 9 September 1993 
Chairman Arafat 
httl1:llwww. mfa.gov. i IIM F AlPeace+ Process/Guide+to+the+ Peace+Processf[ 
srael-PLO+Recognition+-+Exchange+of+Letters+betwe.htm 
Declaration of Principles on Se If Government Arrangements 13 September 1993 
httl1:llwww .mfa.gov.i IIMF AIPeace+ProcessIGuide+tO+the+Peace+Processl 
Declaration+of+Princil1les.htm 
. 
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Table 2.4 Historical Documents (1988 - 2004) 
Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government ofthe State of 29 April 1994 
Israel and the PLO 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFAlForeign%20Relations/lsraels%20 F orei gn%20 
Relations%20since%20 194711992-19941181 %20Israel-
PLO%20Economic%20Agreement-%20Paris-%2029%20Apri1 
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area 4 May 1994 
http://www.mfa.gov.ilIMFAlPeace%20ProcesslGuide%20to%20the%20Pea 
ce%20Process/Gaza-Jericho%20Agreement%20Annex%20IV%20-
%20Economic%20Protoco 
Agreement on Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities 24 August 1994 
http://www.mfa.gov.iIlMFA/Peace%20Process/G u ide%20to%20the%20 Pea 
ce%20Process/ Agreement%200n%20Preparatory%20Transfer%20of'1020P 
owers%20and%20Re 
Interim Agreement 28 September 1995 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfallleace+process/ gu ide+to+the+peace+process/the 
+israeli-palestinian+interim+agreement.htm 
Guidelines of the Government ofIsrae1 17 June 1996 
htt!l:/ /www.mfa.gov.iIIMFAlForeign%20RelationslIsraels%20F orei gn%20 
Relations%20since%20 194711996-
1997/2%20Address%20in%20the%20Knesset%20b)'%20President%20Wei 
zman%20on%20t 
Binyamin Netanyahu Speeches/Statements 
- Address in the Knesset presenting his government 18 June 1996a 
htt!l://www.mfa.gov.ilIMF A/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20 
Relations%20since%20 1947/1996- . 
1997/4%20 Address%20 in%20the%20Knesset%20b),%20Prime%20 Ministe 
r-elect%20N 
3 November 1996b 
- Comments on the security situation and political negotiations 
, 
http://www.mfa.gov.ilIMFAlForeign%20Relatiolls/Israels%20Foreigll%20 
Relations%20since%20 194711996-
1997 /32%20Comments%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20N etanyahu%20o 
n%20the%20sec 
86 
2.5 Conclusion: The Vicious Circle of Israeli and Palestinian Securitisations 
The origins of today's Palestinian conflict are rooted in a series of political and historical 
events that occurred at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Historical and political events like the emergence and development of Zionism as a result of 
the persecutions of the Jews in Eastern Europe, British involvement in Palestine after the end 
of World War I and the Holocaust during World War II, brought the Jews to Palestine and 
constituted milestones in the conflict formation in Palestine. According to Parkes, the "[two 1 
communities .. , in Palestine ... each emphasizing one of two totally different histories of the 
same country; each fearing to be a minority under the other; each legitimately determined to 
secure its own rights ... " (Parkes 1940: 16) were destined to conflict. 
Since the beginning of their encounter in the land of Palestine, both Israelis and Palestinian 
Arabs have entrapped themselves in a vicious circle. The actions of the Israelis have 
reinforced the Palestinian view of Israelis, which has resulted in the Palestinians feeling 
threatened both communally and nationally. On the other hand, the Palestinian discourse and 
the liberation movement have served to reinforce the Israeli securitising actors' belief that 
Palestinians threaten the existence of the State of Israel and the well-being of the Jewish 
people. Thus, the gradual threat construction has resulted in extreme measures that are taken 
by Israel, which the Palestinians have tried to prevent through posing further threats to the 
existence of Israel. Through continuous securitisations both sides generated security 
dilemmas and vicious circles. This makes it extremely difficult to move back into normal 
politics. 
As each community denied the other's legitimacy as a collective, a perpetual conflict has 
prevailed. Yet this delegitimisation has been vital for both sides as it has enabled them to assert 
the distinctiveness of their own claims. Since it has been a question of survival, the securitising 
actors (leaders of the Palestinian Arab and Israeli societies) have claimed their right to use 
extraordinary means to ensure the survival. 
After decades of securitisation, the 1990s witnessed Israeli and Palestinian efforts for 
normalisation. The changing global and regional dynamic following the end of the Cold War 
served as external facilitating conditions for the return of normal politics in Arab-Israeli 
relations. The external dynamics were supported by changes in domestic politics in Israel. As a 
87 
consequence of these changes in internal and external facilitating conditions, at least Israel and 
the PLO recognised each other and opened channels for dialogue. At the end of the day, the 
social and political conditions were not conducive to securing a resolution to the problems of 
the area and the normalisation ofIsraeli-Palestinian relations. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Analysing Post-Oslo Israeli and Palestinian Securitisations 
(September 2000 - January 2007) 
In Chapter 2, the historical events through which particular issues became constructed as 
threats in the Israeli-Palestinian context were presented. As a result of Israel's occupation of 
Palestinian territories, for a long time both Israeli and Palestinian securitising actors rejected 
any dealings with each other in the context of normal politics except during the short period 
of the peace process. Following the collapse of the peace process the rise of Palestinian 
factional infighting, accompanied by poverty and the tremendous gap between Palestinians 
and Israelis in terms of per capita income caused further hostility to Israel. In parallel, the 
Israeli political elite has rejected dealing with Palestinian political movements diplomatically. 
As a result of Palestinian armed resistance, Israeli securitising actors have moved from 
normal politics to emergency politics. 
This chapter involves a detailed analysis firstly of post-Oslo securitisations as well as 
normalisation attempts by Palestinian and Israeli political elites, second how particular 
policies and actions were affected by ongoing securitisations and third public opinion 
regarding the Palestinian and Israeli securitising actors' securitising moves. The continuities 
and changes in securitisation processes in the Israeli-Palestinian context will also be analysed. 
Throughout this chapter, both security and enmity speech acts that led to the most recent wave 
of securitisations in the Israeli-Palestinian context and the facilitating conditions that made 
securitising moves possible/impossible will be explored. Furthermore, the position of the 
Israeli and Palestinian publics (the audience) regarding the threats that were securitised will 
be discussed. The analysis is based on both Israeli and Palestinian political elites' public 
speeches and declarations. The US administration of President George W. Bush was 
committed to a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which would be 
signed before the end of Bush's second term. During this period, the US exerted pressure on 
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both Israeli Prime Ministers and the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority. Hence, the 
analysis, particularly in the second and third sections, involves a consideration of Israeli 
Prime Ministers Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert's and the Palestinian National Authority's 
Chairman Mahmoud Abbas' speeches, statements and official declarations made in front of 
their constituencies as well as the ones made in the US, including official and public speeches 
and press conferences on Israeli-Palestinian relations. Furthermore, both sides' opposition 
leaders' public speeches and interviews with the local and international media will be 
explored. As noted previously, since securitisation is a social phenomenon, its effectiveness 
depends on its acceptance by the target audience. Hence, the success or failure of 
securitisation depends on the constituencies' (in securitisation language: the audience) level 
of acceptance of the securitising actors' claims regarding security threats. Here it is assumed 
that public opinion and election results may reflect the audience's level of acceptance with 
regard to securitisation moves. 
The first section of the chapter briefly covers the political and diplomatic developments of the 
period from the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000 to the death of Yasser 
Arafat on 11 November 2004. The outbreak of the second Intifada and the collapse of peace 
process brought Israeli-Palestinian relations at the brink of conflict formation. The period 
marked by suicide attacks, closures, house demolitions, assassinations and the use of lethal 
military force against civilian populations. The period following the death of Arafat -and the 
election of Mahmoud Abbas as President of the Palestinian National Authority- reflects the 
normalisation and conflict management attempts of the then Prime Minister, Arie1 Sharon, 
and Palestinian Authority's Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. The second section will focus on the 
period following the death of Arafat to the election of Hamas-Ied government in February 
2006. The last section covers the period of the Hamas-Ied government in Palestine (February 
2006 - January 2007), the formation of which caused an escalation of tensions between, on 
the one hand Hamas, which has not recognised the State ofIsrael's right to exist and, on the 
other, the new Israeli government, which had replaced that of Arie1 Sharon. The ups and 
downs of this period have been reflected in respective securitisation attempts. 
3.1 The Second Intifada and the End of Peace Process (2000-2004) 
Since the early twentieth century, both Israelis and Palestinians have operated in accordance 
with their quest for identity and security. Zionism transformed the Jews' needs for identity 
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and security into a political project and succeeded in establishing the State of Israel at the 
expense of the national rights of Palestinian Arabs. The Palestinian national movement also 
transformed Palestinians' needs for identity and security by securitising the establishment of 
the State of Israel in Palestine. The search for ways to accommodate the Israeli and 
Palestinian quest for national identity and security had been addressed in the peace process. 
However, the failure of the Oslo Process to touch on the most critical issues of Israeli-
Palestinian conflict formation, namely Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, the Jewish 
settlements in the territories, the borders of the Palestinian State and the widening gap 
between the vision of peace and the grim reality of violence and suffering, paved the way for 
a second Palestinian uprising. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Oslo agreements were repeatedly challenged by intragroup 
oppositions who criticised Israeli and Palestinian leaders' stand on the peace process. In 
Israel, the right wing opposition challenged the legitimacy of the Rabin government and the 
peace process. Similarly, the Palestinian opposition, which included not only Islamic and 
leftist fractions but also some members of the Arafat's Fatah, also rejected the Oslo accords 
and attempted to obstruct the peace process by launching attacks on Israel. 
The culmination of public dissatisfaction with the Oslo process and the opposition groups' 
efforts to spoil the peace process ended up with the outbreak of a second Intifada. The 
Palestinian Authority's ill-management combined with accelerated. Israeli settlement activity, 
by-pass roads and check points negatively influenced Palestinians' support for the peace 
process. ArieJ Sharon's visit to al-Aqsa compound in September 2000 triggered the second 
Intifada. This second Intifada, which was identified with suicide bomb attacks targeting 
Israeli civilians, was followed by aggressive Israeli responses throughout 2001 and 2002. 
The cycle of violence led Israelis to perceive an existential threat to their state and society 
posed by the suicide bombers and the Islamic terrorists. On the other hand, Palestinians feared 
that Israel would expel them from their homes (Said 2003:2). 
During the second Intifada, Hamas became even more active, both politically and militarily. It 
joined with the Fatah and al-Aqsa brigades in several suicide attacks, and also began plotting 
to usurp the leadership of the Palestinian Authority from the PLO. Following the Palestinian 
attacks in order to destroy the terrorist networks, strict curfews were enforced by Israeli forces 
91 
-I 
in Palestinian areas and shops were demolished by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). 
Palestinians considered these actions as collective 'punishment against innocent Palestinians 
(BBC News 2003). As a result of the continuous attacks of the IDF, the popularity of Hamas 
increased among Palestinians. In towns and refugee camps besieged by the Israeli army, 
Hamas organised clinics and schools that served for Palestinians' welfare. 
The 9111 attacks and the following war on terror have increased the global intolerance 
towards terrorism and provided pretext for regional governments to eradicate militant groups 
operated against the governments. US-led global securitisation of terrorism also served as an 
external facilitating condition for Israeli governments for their use of force in the West Bank 
and the Gaza to eradicate Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups. During this period, as a 
part of global war on terror, Hamas. and Islamic Jihad were listed as terrorist group 
internationally. In securitising Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups as terrorist 
organisations, the Israeli government was very successful. The ongoing global war on terror 
also put pressure on the Palestinian Authority to abandon and to combat manifestations of 
armed resistance. The Palestinian Authority found itself in a difficult position between 
pleasing its constituency whose support was sliding towards Hamas and trying to manage the 
violence to maintain international legitimacy. Despite the Palestinian Authority's attempts to 
curb violence according to PSR Survey Research Unit's public opinion poll conducted in 
December 2001 the level of (hypothetical) support among Palestinians for different types of 
armed attacks was high: 92 percent for attacks against soldiers, 92 percent for attacks against 
settlers, and 58 percent for attacks against civilians inside Israel. Furthermore, 61 percent of 
respondents believed that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian national 
rights in ways that negotiations could not (PSR Survey 2001). \3 
A similar turn occurred among Israeli public and the support for hard-line policies was 
increased. Arid Sharon was elected as Prime Minister in February 2001 and re-elected in 
January 2003. Sharon came to power under the slogan of 'peace and security'. He declared 
his government's readiness to deliver the 'painful compromises' necessary to achieve peace. 
In reality, Sharon demanded dismantling of the terror infrastructure, extensive reforms in the 
n The opinion poll was conducted by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research in December 2001. 
The poll dealt with the ceasefire, immediate return to negotiations, support for Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation, 
and domestic affairs. The total sample size of this poll was 1357 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 
851 in the West Bank and 506 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error was ± 3 percent and the non-response rate 
was 3 percent. 
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Palestinian Authority and the removal of Arafat from political scene. The escalating violence 
was used as pretext by Sharon to postpone any meaningful political negotiations with 
Palestinian Authority. 
Mostly as a result of the increasing internal opposition to the continuation of the peace 
process, Arafat and Barak left Camp David without reaching a final agreement. The Clinton 
Administration's further efforts to persuade Israel and the Palestinian Authority to sign the 
permanent agreement in Taba (January 2001) failed again. Once more, internal considerations 
(coming general elections in Israel) blurred the peace process. As stated in the joint 
declaration following the Taba talks "the sides have never been closer to reaching an 
agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the 
resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections" (Joint Declaration 2001). In mid 
2003, in the wake of several failed attempts to end the renewed cycle of violence between 
Israelis and Palestinians,. the US administration announced a Roadmap for a peaceful solution 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Roadmap, which was also sponsored by the Middle 
East Quartet of the United States, Russia, the United Nations and the European Union (see 
also UNSC Resolution 1515) proposed a two-state solution that was defined as 'performance-
based' and which stipulated a gradual peace process whereby the implementation of each step 
would be a condition for launching the next (US Department of State 2003). However, for PM 
Sharon, peace was impossible without the full eradication of Hamas and other resistance 
movements: "Without the achievement of full security within the framework of which terror 
organisations will be dismantled it will not be possible to achieve genuine peace ... This is the 
essence of the Roadmap" (Sharon 2003). Even though Sharon supported the Roadmap, he 
underlined the lack of a "partner to advance peacefully towards a settlement" in his letter to 
President George Bush (Sharon 2004a). 
For the first time, a practical and just formula was presented for the achievement 
of peace, opening a genuine window of opportunity for progress toward a 
settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, involving two states living side-
by-side in peace and security ... We are committed to this formula as the only 
avenue through which an agreement can be reached. We believe that this 
formula is the only viable one (Sharon 2004a). 
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Once again in this letter Sharon identified terrorism as the main obstacle to the achievement 
of peace and repeated his claim that the Palestinian Authority was unable to eradicate 
terrorism. Sharon also underlined Israel's right to take action against terrorism. This position 
was also repeated in Sharon's Knesset speech on the Disengagement Plan: 
The Palestinian Authority under its current leadership has taken no action to meet 
its responsibilities under the Roadmap (Sharon 2004a). 
The attempts at attacks, the terror, the violence and the incitement have not 
ceased during this period, even for a day, and the leadership on the Palestinian 
side has not taken any steps to stop these actions ... They have not done 
anything: they made no arrests, did not fight, did not confiscate weapons, did not 
even bother to try and stop the horrible incitement in the media, education 
system and mosques under their control which call for the genocide of Jews, not 
even for a moment ... The Palestinians must understand that the only way they 
will live in security and peace will be if they fight the terror, violence and 
. incitement which originate in their area. There will be no peace; there cannot be 
peace, before terror is defeated (Sharon 2004b). 
Official Israeli policy advocated not just the destruction of the armed elements of the 
Palestinian resistance but also the eradication of the entire organisation. This position was 
backed by the Bush administration within the context of the global war on terror. 
At this point in time, the Israeli government gave up hope of a negotiated settlement to the 
conflict and pursued a unilateral policy of physically separating Israel from Palestinian 
communities by beginning the construction of the separation wall on 16 June 2002. Whereas 
the non-violent protests of the first Intifada had earned global sympathy for the Palestinian 
cause, the violence of the second Intifada proved counterproductive and caused the 
Palestinians to lose the rights they had gained over the previous decade. The al-Aqsa Intifada 
provided the context for Israeli securitising actors to build the separation wall, to intensify 
checkpoints, roadblocks and closures and to issue special permits for Gazans and West 
Bankers who wanted to enter Israeli land, including East Jerusalem. Israeli securitising actors 
claimed that such a barrier was necessary to prevent Palestinian attackers from entering 
Israeli cities. It was claimed that these measures were merely 'defensive actions' aimed at 
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preventing Palestinian terror: "Whenever we relax the restrictions on the Palestinians, the 
terrorists strike on Israelis," said Mark Regev, a spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry 
(Amayra 2005). These Israeli security measures were, of course, received very differently by 
Palestinians for whom the barrier separating Palestinian communities from each other and the 
plan for the construction of the separation wall was a de facto armexation of Palestinian 
territory. Palestinians have defined Gaza as 'a single huge prison' and the West Bank as being 
divided into dozens of wards (Amayra 2005). 
In sum, after the collapse of the peace process in 2000, the Israeli goverrunent had argued that 
as long as Arafat continued to lead the Palestinians they would refuse to negotiate. Arafat was 
perceived as being indirectly responsible for terrorist attacks and suicide bombings inside 
Israel. Besides the Roadmap, which was drafted by the US Administration, Saudi King 
Abdallah also drafted an Arab Peace Initiative. Both the Roadmap and the Arab Peace 
Initiative did not persuade Sharon's goverrunent. The Israeli government rejected any 
resumption of negotiations with Arafat who was held responsible for the collapse of the Oslo 
Process. The lack of a partner with whom to negotiate paved the way for Ariel Sharon, the 
then Israeli Prime Minister, to carry out unilateral conflict management policies including a 
disengagement plan, which was approved by the Israeli Cabinet on 6 June 2004 and by the 
Knesset on 25 October 2004. 
Having reached the conclusion that, for the time being, there exist no Palestinian 
partner with whom to advance peacefully toward a settlement and since the 
current impasse is unhelpful to the achievement of our shared goals, I have 
decided to initiate a process of gradual disengagement with the hope of reducing 
friction between Israelis and Palestinians. The Disengagement Plan is designed 
to improve security for Israel and stabilize our political and economic situation. 
It will enable us to deploy our forces more effectively until such time that 
conditions in the Palestinian Authority allow for the full implementation of the 
Roadmap to resume (Sharon 2004a). 
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Table 3.1 Documents and Statements (2000 - November 2004) 
Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David 25 July 2000 
htt!):llwww.mfa.gov.ilIMFAIMFAArchive/2000 2009/2000I7lTrilateral+St 
atement+on+the+Middle+East+Peace+Summ.htm 
Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement (Taba) 27 January 2001 
htt!):llwww.mfa.gov .ilIMF AIMF AArchive/2000 2009/200 IIIIIsraeli-
Palestinian+loint+Statement+-+27-Jan-2001.htm 
Arab Peace Initiative 22 March 2002 
htt/:1:llwww.m fa. gov. illMF AlPeace+ Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Processl 
Beirut+Declaration+on+Saudi+Peace+lnitiative+-+28-.htm 
Roadmap 30 April 2003 
htt!):llwww .mfa. gOY .ilIMF AlPeace+Process/Guide+to+the+ Peace+Processl 
A+Performance-Based+RoadmaQ+to+a+Permanent+Two-Sta.htm 
UN Security Council Resolution 1515 19 Nov 2003 
htt/:1:lhV\vw.mfa.gov.iIlMFA/Peace+ProcessiReference+DocumentslUN Se 
curin: Council Resolution 1515 19-Nov-2009.htm 
Israeli Disengagement Plan -General Outline 18 April 2004 
http://www.mfa.gov.iIIMFAlPeace+ProcessiReference+Documents/Disenga 
gement+Plan+-+General+Outline.htm 
Prime Minister Arie1 Sharon's Speeches and Statements 
- Speech at the Herzliya Conference 18 December 2003 
hnn:l1www.mfa.gov.iIIMF NGovernment/SQeeches+by+lsraeli+leaders/200 
3/Address+by+PM+Ariel+Sharon+at+the+Fourth+Herzliya.htm 
_ Knesset speech on Disengagement Plan 
hnn:llwww .mfa. gov.i IIMF A/GovernmentlSQeeches+by+Israeli+leaders/200 15 March 2004(b) 
4/PM +Sharon+ Knesset+SQeech+ I 5 -Mar-2004. htm 
- Letter from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to US President George W. Bush 
htt/:1:llwww.mfa.gov.iIIMFAlPeace+ProcessiReference+Documents/Exchan 14 April2004(a) 
ge+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+ 14-Allr-2004.htm 
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3.2 The New Palestinian Leadership and Gaza Disengagement: Give Peace 
One More Chance? 
Following the death of Yasser Arafat on 11 November 2004, on 9 January 2005 Mahmoud 
Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, was elected as his successor as Chairman of the 
Palestinian Authority with a majority of 62 percent (CNN 200Sa). As aforementioned, Arafat 
was accused of encouraging violence by Israel and the US and regarded as an obstacle to 
peace. In this regard, the death of Arafat and the election of Mahmoud Abbas, who was 
widely regarded as a more moderate figure among the Israeli and American political elites, 
had left the Bush administration and the Sharon govermnent no alternative but to empower 
the new Palestinian Chairman who seemed committed to ending the violence and the 
resumption of peace negotiations. In a statement, Bush called Arafat's death "a significant 
moment in Palestinian history" and stated his "hope that the future will bring peace and the 
fulfilment of their aspirations for an independent, democratic Palestine that is at peace with its 
neighbours" (CNN 2004). In a similar vein, Tony Blair pointed out that the death of Mr 
Arafat meant that the Middle East could be entering a new era in which progress could be 
made with a new Palestinian leadership (Telegraph 2004). It was expected that with the 
support of the majority of Palestinians, Mahmoud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) would be able to 
revive the political process and bring an end to violence. According to Arie1 Sharon, "with 
new leadership there is a new possibility to discuss issues together" (cited in The Sunday 
Times 2004). 
As was expected, Mahmoud Abbas started his Presidency by declaring the Palestinians' 
readiness to resume negotiations with Israel and presented themselves as a partner for peace. 
This can be seen through Mahmoud Abbas' earlier statements and speeches: 
We extend our hands to our neighbours. We are ready for peace, peace based 
on justice (Abbas quoted in The Guardian 2005). 
It is ... a basic step, an important step that provides a new opportunity for 
restoring the peace process and its momentum and so that the Palestinian and the 
Israeli peoples restore hope and confidence in the possibility for achieving 
peace. I believe that we all understand our big responsibilities and joint 
responsibilities to consolidate this opportunity. This can be achieved through an 
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urgent work of restoring the spirit of partnership and reciprocity and to avoid 
unilateral steps (Abbas 2005a). 
We are calling for a Palestinian-Israeli partnership for the sake of creating a 
better future for the entire region that can end decades of wars, occupation, and 
open the doors wide open. We were promised peace, independence and freedom, 
and we hope that all of this will be achieved (Abbas 2005c). 
Abbas made it clear that he sought to build a political culture of responsibility. He said that 
violence is counterproductive to Palestinian aspirations. 
We have worked and we will continue to work to continue to ensure the calm 
and maintain it. We are also intensifying our work in the field of security. We 
have taken active steps in imposing the rule of law and public order and banned 
armed demonstrations (Abbas 2005c). 
The main challenge for Abbas was the uncompromising position of the Palestinian Islamist 
movements (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) and factions belonging to Fatah itself (the al-Aqsa 
Martyrs ' Brigades). These Islamist groups had their own agenda and their vision was 
inherently interlinked with the rejection of the legitimacy of the State of Israel. Within this 
context, after his election, militant groups in the Gaza Strip warned Abbas to reserve the 
option of armed struggle since they saw Israel's disengagement plan as a culmination of their 
achievements. As was stated by Khaled Batch, a spokesman for Islamic Jihad, militants 
succeeded where moderates had failed. "The resistance ... has convinced the occupation to 
change its ideology" (cited in The Guardian 2005). Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad stated that 
they were keen to give Mahmoud Abbas a chance to establish a Palestinian state according to 
UN resolutions, with East Jerusalem as its capital and the right of Palestinians to return to 
Palestine. 
During this period, Hamas challenged Chairman Abbas' normalisation attempts. The Hamas 
leadership continued its uncompromising stand against Israel and the occupation. This period 
was marked by competing discourses of Mahmoud Abbas and the Hamas leadership 
regarding peace with Israel. As discussed previously, since its formation in 1988 during the 
first Intifada, Hamas had rejected the legitimacy of the State of Israel and aimed at the 
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destruction of Zionism. For the Hamas leadership, the Palestinian moveme!1t is a resistance 
movement against Zionist occupation. During the last two decades, Hamas has become the 
dominant force in denouncing Israeli occupation and enhancing welfare and health services 
for the Palestinian population. Hamas' popularity increased among Palestinians in towns and 
refugee camps besieged by the Israeli army, Hamas has provided social and welfare services 
and gained public support. They have even managed to find supporters for the martyrdom 
operations as the best way to avenge their own losses and counter Israel's settlement-building 
in the West Bank. 
Even in his speech to the Palestinians on Nakba Day, Abbas did not follow traditional the 
N akba speech that blames Israel for Palestinian sufferings. Instead he underlined the 
Palestinians' desire for peace and independence: 
Peace, security and stability in the Middle East hinges on finding a just solution 
for a just cause based on international legitimacy, the right of our people to 
establish an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital and to find a just 
and agreed solution to the issue of refugees ... (Abbas cited in Jerusalem Post 
2005c). 
On the same occasion, in spite of Abbas' attempts at moderation, Hamas leaders issued a 
statement referring to Israel as a "cancer" and promising to continue fighting until the 
liberation of the last inch of Palestinian land and until the last refugee heads back to his home 
(Jerusalem Post 2005c). 
On the Israeli side, Hamas' continuous attempts to securitise Israeli occupation and their call 
for the end of the State of Israel was underlined as a threat to the State of Israel by Ariel 
Sharon's opponents, particularly by Binyamin Netanyahu. Furthermore, he accused the 
Palestinian people of lacking the strength to challenge these groups. 
Palestinian radicalism defines itself at the heart by the nullification of Zionism. 
It is an integral part of their self-definition. This is the tragedy. The Palestinian 
people are moderate and sensible people but they are weak and they do not 
stand before the combined force of the radicals who are pushing toward a 
gradual elimination ofIsrael (cited in Jerusalem Post 2005b). 
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Gradually the Israeli security discourse regarding the Palestinian issue changed direction. As 
a result of the rise of Hamas as a political actor in Palestinian territories, the Israeli 
government's worries about state security were increased. Hamas' anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli 
discourse paved the way for the Israeli securitisation of the rise of Ham as. 
Albeit Ariel Sharon's stress on Mahmoud Abbas's good intentions, a number of people within 
the Israeli political elite saw the problem as larger than Arafat, one resulting from a 
radicalisation of Palestinian politics. Throughout this period, the importance of fighting terror 
constituted the main theme of the Israeli security discourse. The Israeli political elite wanted 
the Palestinian Authority to combat armed groups and to eradicate the infrastructure of 
terrorism in Palestinian territory. This time the task of fighting terror was assigned to the 
Palestinian Authority by the Israeli leadership. It was underlined that if the Palestinian 
Authority failed in this task the IDF would take action. 
Despite his repeated insistence on his dedication to preventing lawlessness in Palestinian 
territory, the Israeli political and military elites have repeatedly accused Abbas of not being 
able to impose the 'one authority one weapon' rule in Palestine. Specifically, Defense 
Minister Shaul Mofaz and Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu constantly pointed out the 
dangers of trusting the Palestinian Authority. According to Netanyahu, Mahmoud Abbas 
"doesn't dispatch terrorists like Arafat, [but] he does not do anything to stop them ... He 
doesn't start educating his people on the idea that the war is over" (cited in Jerusalem Post 
2005b). 
Statistics published by the Israeli Security Service, Shin Bet, almost one month before the 
disengagement suggested that Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas' rhetoric to return to normal 
politics, and Sharon's and the US administration's support for Mahmoud Abbas' 
empowerment, had not brought an improvement in the level of security for Israelis. 
According to this report of July 2005, Palestinian attacks had reached a record level during 
the previous 18 months (Jerusalem Post 2005g) and seemingly confounded Sharon's 
expectations that Israeli-Palestinian relations could be normalised. 
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The other development that was promoted as an Israeli compromise for advancing peace with 
Palestinians was Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. At the end of August 2005, Israeli 
settlers were evacuated from the Gaza Strip and in the middle of September Israel completed 
its disengagement from Gaza and from the northern West Bank. Responsibility for these areas 
was handed over to the Palestinian Authority in September 2005. The Israeli government's 
willingness to withdraw from Gaza had also raised hopes for an awakening of the sleeping 
roadmap to Israeli-Palestinian peace, further Israeli withdrawals and the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. In order to support Gaza disengagement, President Bush pledged USD 50 
million in direct aid to the Palestinian Authority during President Mahmoud Abbas' visit to 
Washington DC in May 2005. It was the first direct aid the United States had given to the 
Palestinian Authority. Previous donations had gone through non-governmental organisations 
(CNN 2005b). 
While Ariel Sharon's determination to remove Israeli settlements from Gaza was supported 
by the US it paved the way for severe internal criticism in Israel because of the concerns 
regarding the inability of the Palestinian Authority to prevent terrorist activities in the 
Territories a few months before the disengagement. Arie! Sharon's decisive unilateral move 
towards Gaza disengagement was criticised by Israeli radical groups, the Labour Party and 
even by Sharon's very own colleagues in government. 
It was Harnas and other Palestinian factions' insistence on reserving the option of armed 
struggle that was the main worry of the Israeli elite and public. Hence, the withdrawal was 
linked to a new wave of Palestinian terror by the opponents of ArieJ Sharon. The Intifada, 
which was identified with terror and blood in the eyes of Israeli society, had become one of 
the most popular themes of Sharon's opponents' securitising moves. Moshe Ya'lon, Israeli 
Chief of Staff, openly warned Israelis to be ready for new rounds of violence and terrorist 
attacks during and after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in September 2005. Within this 
context, Ya'lon said that the IDF was preparing for a third Intifada that could break out after 
disengagement (Jerusalem Post 200Se). Ya'lon claimed that withdrawal would not bring 
peace and security as promised and Israel must be ready to overcome further threats: "We are 
a society of struggle. Without false belief that we will resolve it with one move or another. It 
will not be resolved" (Ya'lon in Haaretz Magazine 2005b). 
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Political opponents of Arie1 Sharon, such as Labour Party leader Ehud Barak and Sharon's 
Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, also linked withdrawal with a new wave of 
Palestinian terror: 
The Palestinians will interpret the act of disengagement as a victory ... 
Therefore, they will go back to terrorism. There will be another round. We will 
bury hundreds of people in a third Intifada (Barak in Haaretz Magazine 2005a). 
The principal problem with the withdrawal ... is that it may set in Palestinian 
minds the belief that there is a pattern of Israeli behaviour: We received terror 
in Lebanon we withdrew. We received terror in Gaza, we withdrew. We 
received terror in Judea and Samaria, we will withdraw. And then under terror 
the Jews will withdraw from Palestine (Netanyahu in Jerusalem Post 2005b). 
However, Sharon had underlined that the authorities would not show tolerance of any terrorist 
attacks during and after disengagement and reserved Israel's right to use extraordinary 
measures to stop them: "If there are Qassams, there would certainly be a very harsh response" 
(Sharon in Jerusalem Post 2005a). Up to the final days before the disengagement, Israel 
demanded that the Palestinians crack down on terrorists. 
Before the disengagement, Abbas convinced the leaders of militant groups to declare a 
ceasefire for the period of disengagement. Within this context, Hamas declared that they 
would not attack Israeli forces evacuating the Gaza Strip but, as Hamas spokesman Sheikh 
Hassan Yousef clearly stated, that situation did not mean that the resistance had ended 
(Jerusalem Post 2005d). In a statement called the Cairo Declaration, agreed on 17 March 
2005, Mahmoud Abbas and the Hamas leaders emphasised their devotion to the Palestinian 
principles. The wording of the declaration clearly reflected the main themes of the Palestinian 
resistance movement's security discourse which had been underlined through the 
securitisation of the Israeli occupation: continuation of settlements, construction of the wall 
and the Judaization of Jerusalem. 
Those gathered confirmed their adherence to Palestinian constants, without any 
neglect, and the right of the Palestinian people to resistance in order to end the 
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occupation, establish a Palestinian state with full sovereignty with Jerusalem as 
its capital, and guaranteeing the right of return of refugees to their homes and 
properties (Al-Ahram Weekly 2005). 
Mahmoud Abbas's initiative to reach an agreement with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, considered 
terrorist organisations by Israel, was severely criticised by Ariel Sharon: 
Mahmoud Abbas has made things even more difficult for himself by signing 
agreements with the terrorist organisations ... , where he promised that he 
wouldn't seize their weapons and wouldn't dismantle them ... This is going to 
make it very difficult for him to enter into the roadmap phase (Sharon in 
Jerusalem Post 2005a). 
Before and after the disengagement, Israeli security officials particularly underlined the issue 
of the security of Gaza and the security of the Rafah border between Gaza and Egypt. The 
breaches in the border caused fears over the smuggling of arms and the infiltration of 
militants and al-Qaida terrorists into Gaza and Israel. During this period, the Israeli military 
elite often underlined that the IDF would intervene in the Gaza Strip if security conditions 
required it. Israeli officials warned the Palestinian Authority that the. continuation of 
lawlessness in relation to the border crossing would make Israeli military intervention 
inevitable. Within this context, in the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, which is 
an Israeli NGO founded as part of the Israel Intelligence Heritage and. Commemoration 
Center, report in September 2005, Hamas was blamed for taking advantage of the 
uncontrolled Rafah Border: " ... the terrorist organisations, headed by Hamas, took advantage 
of the uncontrolled crossing to smuggle arms and ammunition, (small arms, RPG launchers, 
and maybe more advanced weapons)." Yov Samia, the former Head of the Southern 
Command of the IDF, wamed that "in just a few days more weapons were smuggled into 
Gaza than in years of smuggling through the illegal tunnels in Rafah" (Samia in Jerusalem 
Times 2005). As a response to missiles fired from Gaza and continuous breaches in the Rafah 
border, almost ten days after the Gaza withdrawal the Israeli security cabinet decided to fire 
artillery against the Qassam launchers in the Gaza Strip (Haaretz 2005b). 
Israeli worries over the security situation in Gaza helped shape the classic Israeli security 
argument that the dismantling of terrorist groups operating in Palestinian territories was the 
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main precondition for reconciliation between Israel and Palestine. This securitising move did 
not, however, lead to direct intervention; instead, the Israeli government looked to political 
means first. It argued that it was the Palestinian Authority's responsibility to put an end to 
terror and terrorist infrastructures, if this failed then military intervention would be a necessity 
for Israel to protect its people. In this context, Sharon underlined the significance of 
dismantling groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad for the revitalisation of the roadmap. In his 
address to the UN General Assembly on 15 September 2005, Sharon stated that it was time 
for the Palestinians to prove their desire for peace. Within this context, he argued that "the 
most important test the Palestinian leadership will face is in fulfilling their commitments to 
put an end to terror and its infrastructure and to eliminate the anarchic regime of armed 
gangs" (Sharon 2005a). Accordingly, in his speech to the Saban Forum (Jerusalem) on 13 
November 2005, he stated that: 
Advancing to the second phase of the roadmap will be· done only after the 
Palestinian Authority implements the first phase of the plan - by dismantling 
the terrorist organisations and implementing the comprehensive refonns to 
which they are committed. We cannot accept a situation in which terrorist 
organisations do not disarm, yet gain legitimacy for their existence, under the 
cloak of democracy (Sharon 2005b). 
After the disengagement and as part of the nonnalisation efforts of Ariei Sharon and 
Mahmoud Abbas, some concrete actions were undertaken. These included the opening of the 
Rafah border under the control of Palestinians (though a monitoring mission was given to the 
EU), the setting up of a joint transport office to initiate and plan Israel-Palestinian Authority 
transportation projects and the promotion of cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian 
private sectors. 
However, Abbas' nonnalisation policy with Israel attracted criticism from religious groups. 
As an example, just a few days after the Gaza pullout, the Palestinian Religious Scholars 
Society issued a Fatwa (Islamic religious decree) forbidding nonnalisation with Israel. 
According to this Fatwa, nonnalisation with Israel was considered "like sharing with the 
infidel in his evil deeds" (Jerusalem Post 200Sh). According to this Fatwa, any relationship 
with the occupiers of Muslim lands meant recognition of their aggression. Furthennore, 
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Hamas urged the Palestinian people to escalate their resistance to the Israeli occupation until 
their departure from all Palestinian lands was complete. 
Hamas' calls to escalate resistance reaffirmed the Israeli securitising actors' anxieties. 
Through its statements issued in September 2005, Hamas warned of the evil Israeli schemes 
meant to spark off internal conflicts in the Palestinian lands with the goal of undermining 
national unity (Palestine-info 2005). 
The period following the demise of Arafat could have provided an occasion for the 
normalisation of relations. On the Palestinian side, the election of a moderate leader as 
Arafat's successor by the majority of Palestinians was promoted as a window of opportunity 
for this transformation by Ariel Sharon himself and by the US administration. From the other 
side, Ariel Sharon' s disengagement plan could have provided a concrete step towards 
permanent status negotiations. Both the Palestinian Authority's Chairman, Mahmoud Abbas, 
and the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, underlined that they considered each other as 
partners for negotiation. For the first time since the breakdown of the Oslo Process a 
Palestinian leader's name had been recognised as being a partner for peace by the Israeli 
leadership. 
Within this context, in his speech to journalists during a visit to the US President on 20 
October 2005, Abbas underlined that "[the] time has come to put an end to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. The time has come that the Palestinian people will attain their freedom and 
independence. The time has come to move quickly towards the resumption of permanent 
status negotiations" (Abbas 2005c) 
During this period Abbas almost removed from his speeches statements identifying Israel as 
an existential threat. For example, through his speech at Sharm AI-Sheik in February 2005 
when he announced the ceasefire, he underlined the Palestinian and Israeli leaders' 
responsibility for achieving peace. Moreover, he referred to the Israeli people together with 
Palestinian people. 
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We have agreed with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to cease all acts of violence 
against the Israelis and against the Palestinians wherever they are .... It is ... an 
important step that provides a new opportunity for restoring the peace process 
and its momentum and so that the Palestinian and the Israeli peoples restore 
hope and confidence in the possibility for achieving peace. 
We look forward to that day and hope it will come as soon as possible in order 
. that the language of negotiations will replace the language of bullets and 
carmons and in which neighbourhood and livelihood will prevail instead of the 
war; and in order to provide our grandsons and our future generations, 
Palestinian and Israeli, a different tomorrow, a promising tomorrow (Abbas 
2005a). 
Similarly, in a speech in London on 1 March 2005, Abbas expressed the Palestinians' 
intention to live side-by-side in peace with their neighbour Israel. Briefly he talked about" ... 
ending the occupation which began in 1967 and the emergence of an independent, viable 
Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with our neighbour Israel" (Abbas 
2005b). 
By contrast, in his speeches and statements Sharon often underlined the terror issue. Sharon 
wanted to see Mahmoud Abbas eradicate the infrastructure of terrorism on Palestinian 
territory. For the Israeli political and military elites: 
[i]n order to proceed beyond the disengagement plan - in other words to 
progress to the roadmap - there must be a total end to terror, violence and 
incitement. The terror groups must be dismantled ... Only after all that will we 
able to progress to the roadmap (Sharon in Jerusalem Post 2005a). 
In his speech at the UN on 15 September 2005 mentioned above, Sharon clearly pointed out 
that "[the 1 most important test the Palestinian leadership will face is in fulfilling their 
commitments to put an end to terror and its infrastructure and to eliminate the anarchic regime 
of armed gangs" (Sharon 2005a). 
106 
Both Ariel Sharon and Mahrnoud Abbas had been challenged domestically and had 
difficulties in persuading their opponents of the necessity of normalising relations with the 
other. They failed to secure a return to normal politics. 
In Israel, a few months after disengagement, Sharon resigned from the Likud Party to found a 
new party called the Kadima (in English, 'Forward') Party. The action plan of the Kadima 
reflected Sharon's latest stand regarding Palestine. While it mentions the advancement of the 
peace process, the Kadima Party's action plan still underlines the priority of safeguarding 
Israel's security in the war against terrorism. 
Kadima sees the advancement of the peace process with the Palestinians as a 
primary goal. The party is willing to make major compromises to further the 
path leading to the determination ofIsrael' s permanent borders and peace for its 
citizens - whilst safeguarding Israel's security, continuing to wage an 
unremitting war against terrorism and upholding the country's national and 
security interests. 
Given that Hamas' ongoing securitisations required the nullification of the State ofIsrael, the 
Israeli political and military elites had attempted to securitise Hamas' participation in the 
Palestinian general elections in January 2006. On the brink of these elections, the existential 
threat posed by a Palestinian Authority governed by Hamas, which did not recognise the 
Israeli State's right to exist, was underlined by different Israeli political actors. 
Unfortunately, our Arab neighbours still do not recognise the ancestral right of 
the Jewish people to a country in their homeland - the land of Israel. This 
recognition will be a decisive step towards genuine peace in our region (Sharon 
2005b). 
[ ... ] the external existential threat is the Palestinian threat...a combination of 
terrorism and demography ... [the] ... question marks among us about the 
rightness of our way are a recipe for a situation in which there will not be a 
Jewish state .. .in the end. ... What is now on the agenda is the question of our 
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right of existence as an independent Jewish state. That is what we are still 
struggling for (Ya'lon in Haaretz Magazine 2005b). 
Israeli securitising actors thus constantly expressed the view that Hamas' commitment to 
violence was incompatible with participating in elections (Jang News 2005). As a result, the 
Israeli government put a halt to talks on further disengagements and reconciliation until after 
the outcome of the Palestinian elections was known. 
In sum, the post-Arafat period was often seen as a window of opportunity for a return to 
normal politics. Even though a sort of moderation had been seen in the respective leaders' 
speeches, desecuritisation was never attempted. Hence, neither Sharon nor Abbas succeeded 
in normalisation. In spite of positive references to peace, justice, partnership, putting an end to 
terror and truce, they did not convince each other to go back to the negotiation table for the 
permanent status. Given their domestic pressures, both sides clearly underlined firm 
conditions for peace, which proved unacceptable to the other. Albeit the rhetoric of change, 
the Palestinian leadership did not actually compromise its demands: a state with its capital in 
the holy city of Jerusalem, and the right of refugees to return to their homes and their land. 
Palestinian insistence on the total right to return has been considered an existential threat for 
the State ofIsrael. According to General Moshe Ya'lon "(the) implication of this is that there 
will not be a Jewish state here ... The State of Israel is ready to give the Palestinians an 
independent Palestinian state, but the Palestinians are not ready to give us an independent 
Jewish state" (Ya'lon in Haaretz Magazine 200Sb). In this light, Israeli securitising actors 
constantly underlined the requirement of an end to terrorism for reconciliation to occur. 
During this period the importance of the Palestinians' fight with terror constituted the main 
theme of Israeli security discourse. 
According to securitisation theory, through the articulation of danger and an existential threat, 
the securitising actor demands justification from the audience to use all necessary means to 
eliminate the threat. In this sense, securitisation is a process of call and response. In the post-
Arafat Israeli-Palestinian case, the audience found themselves in the middle of a discursive 
battle between the leaders and their opponents, between normalisation attempts and 
securitisation attempts. As far as the Israeli audience's position is concerned during the period 
after the demise of Arafat till the Gaza disengagement, the moderation of the official 
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discourse reflected Israeli public opinion. The disappearance of Arafat from the scene was of 
great significance for the Israeli public since Yasser Arafat had been identified with the 
Palestinian struggle and terrorism in the minds of Israelis while Mahmoud Abbas was 
identified with the cadre of the Palestinian leadership who believed political negotiations to 
be the only way forward. The demise of Arafat and the election of Abbas thus signified for 
many Israelis an opportunity for reconciliation. According to a poll conducted by the Truman 
Institute for Peace Research at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in September 2005 14, 66 
percent ofIsraelis stated that "they [would recognise 1 Palestine as the state of the Palestinian 
people after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all 
issues in dispute" (Joint Israeli and Palestinian Public Opinion Poll, September 2005). This 
shift demonstrated a growing Israeli recognition that only the two-state solution could resolve 
the conflict. Furthermore, according to a Peace Index Poll of October 2005 15, 49 percent of 
Israeli respondents believed in the idea that the "basic idea of the Oslo process - ceding 
territories for peace - is today part of the Israeli national consensus." However, the general 
pessimism was apparently ascribed to the gloomy predictions regarding the revival of terror 
and a third Intifada on the eve of disengagement. This led an overwhelming majority (74 
percent) of Israelis to think that, even if Israel withdrew from all the territories beyond the 
Green Line and the occupation was to end, Palestinian violence would not stop and could 
even intensify. 
In the post-Arafat period, the two leaders attempted to articulate the political will for 
normalisation. However, their normalisation attempts were challenged by other influential 
securitising actors from within their respective societies. The domestic rivals of both leaders 
further complicated the situation and limited their freedom of action. On the Palestinian side, 
Abbas was challenged by Hamas. In opposition to Abbas' non-violent strategy, Hamas 
claimed that it was violence that pushed Israel out of Palestinian . lands. In spite of Hamas' 
14 The Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in RamaUah and the Harry S. Truman Research 
Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem conducted a joint survey of 
Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in September 2005. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with 
a representative sample of 499 Israeli Jews and a representative sample of 451 Israeli Arabs. The Israeli sample 
was properly weighted according to the proportion of the respective sectors in the population to produce the 
overaUlsraeH estimates (overaU sampling error of 3.9 percent). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, 
Arabic and Russian between September 11 and 19. 
15 The Peace Index Project is conducted at the Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace Studies and the Evans Program 
for Conflict Resolution Research ofTel Aviv University. The telephone interviews were conducted on October 
31 - November I, 2005 and included 585 interviewees who represent the adult Jewish and Arab population of 
Israel (including territories and kibbutzim). The sampling error for a sample of this size is about 4.5 percent in 
each direction. 
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ongoing securitisations of Israeli occupation, the majority of the Palestinian people came to 
the same conclusion as Abbas regarding the use of violence against Israel. As far as the 
Palestinian audience' position was concerned, on the eve of disengagement, 84 percent of 
Palestinian respondents saw the withdrawal as a victory for armed resistance and 40 percent 
gave Hamas most of the credit for this. However, 62 percent of Palestinian people declared 
their opposition to continued attacks against Israelis from the Gaza Strip and 60 percent of 
respondents stated that they supported the collection of arms from armed groups in Gaza. 
Moreover, 73 percent of respondents supported the idea of the establishment of a Palestinian 
State in the Gaza Strip that would gradually extend to the West Bank 16 (The Palestinian 
Public Opinion Poll September 2005). According to another opinion poll which was 
conducted two months after the disengagement, 41.1 percent of Palestinians thought a peace 
with Israel was somewhat likely and 7.3 percent thought it very likelyl7 (The Palestinian 
Public Opinion Poll November 2005). 
After the death of Arafat, Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas appeared ready to 
resume cooperation as a prelude to negotiations. Sharon offered a number of relief measures 
to ease the conditions under which Palestinians lived and to empower Mahmoud Abbas. 
Evidently, the efforts of Sharon and Abbas were supported by their respective constituencies 
despite the ongoing securitising attempts of their opponents. According to a public opinion 
poll conducted after the disengagement, 67 percent of Israeli Jews and 63 percent of Israeli 
Arabs supported mutual recognition ofIsrael as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as 
the state of the Palestinians. A parallel poll by the Palestinian Research Institute found a 
similar rate of support (63 percent) among Palestinians in the territories. However, neither the 
Israeli nor the Palestinian public had been persuaded by their leaders' normalisation efforts. 
Only 37 percent of Israeli and 30 percent of Palestinian respondents stated their belief in the 
other side's willingness for a comprehensive solution. A majority of Israelis (50 percent) and 
Palestinians (53 percent) stated that if an agreement was reached, Sharon had the power to get 
the Israeli public to approve it. In contrast, while half of Palestinians believed that Abbas was 
strong enough to persuade Palestinians to support the necessary compromises, only 18 percent 
of Israelis believed that the Palestinian public would stand behind Abbas (Peace Index, 
16 The opinion poll was conducted at The Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion (PCPO) during the period from 
7-9 September 2005. A random sample of 1368 adult Palestinians from the West Bank (892) and Gaza Strip 
(476) were interviewed. 
I? The opinion poll was conducted by PCPO during the period of 5 - 8 November 2005. A random sample of 
825 adult Palestinians over 18 years old representing the various demographic groups from the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip were interviewed. 
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October 2005). These results showed that the ongoing securitisation of the Palestinian terror 
remained an obstacle to peace and reconciliation and had negatively affected Israeli public 
opinion. The Palestinian Authority's inability to control armed groups and Hamas' 
decisiveness in participating in democratic elections led the Israeli public to lose its faith in 
peace with the Palestinians. 
III 
Table 3.2 Documents and Statements (November 2004-February 2006) 
Cairo Declaration 17 March 2005 
h!(Q:ffweekly .ahram.org.egL200 5173 Sfre l.htm 
Agreement on Movement and Access and Agreed Principles for Rafah 15 November 2005 
Crossing 
httl1:ffwww .mfa. gov. i IfM F AfPeace+Process/Reference+ Documents! Agreed 
+documents+on+movement+and+access+from+and+to+Gaza+ 15-Nov-
2005.htm 
Kadima Party Action Plan 2005 
httQ:ffkadimasharon.co.ilfI5-enfKadima.asQx 
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abhas' Speeches and 
Statements 
- Speech at Egypt Summit (Sharrn el-Sheik) 8 February 2005a 
httll:ffwww.cnn.comf200SfWORLDfmeastf02f08/transcril2l.abbas!index.html 
- General Delegation Statement at the London Meeting I March 2005b 
httQ:f!www.unison-scotland.org.uk/internationail!)alestine J 6.html 
- Speech to journalists during his visit to the US President Washington DC 20 October 200Sc 
htt[1:! Iwww.whitehouse.gov/news!releases/2005/10/20051020.html 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Speeches and Statements 
- Statement at the Sharrn el-Sbeikh Summit 8 February 2005c 
h!(Q:llwww.mfa.gov.ilfMFAfPeace+ProcessfKey+SQeeches/Statement+b)!+ 
PM+Sharon+at+Sharm+el-Sheikh+Summit+8-Feb-2005.htm 
-Speecb at tbe United Nations Assembly 15 September 200Sa 
htt!):llwww .l2mo. gov. i IIPM 0 EngLCommunication/PMSQeaks/speech I 50905. 
htm 13 November 200Sb 
- Speech to the Saban Forum, Jerusalem 
httll:!lwww .Qmo.gov.iIIPMOEng/CommunicationlPMSpeaks!SQeecb 1311 OS. 
htm 
3.3 The Hamas-Ied Government: Two Steps Backward? 
Israel considered the issue of Hamas' participation in elections as a security threat to Israel 
since Hamas had not recognised, and continued to threaten, the State ofIsrae!' Given Hamas' 
decision to participate in the parliamentary elections in Palestine, the Israeli political and 
security elite constantly expressed the incompatibility of engaging in violence and 
participating in local elections. The Israeli elites were frustrated with the possibility of 
international recognition of Hamas if it was elected (Haaretz 27 May 200Sa, Jerusalem Post 
200Sf). Moreover, the actions of Hamas were shown as evidence of their commitment to the 
destruction of the Israeli state. Given the fears of the possibility of removal of Hamas from 
the international terrorist organisations list, the Israeli govemment warned the international 
community that it would harm the global war on terrorism, undermine Palestinian Authority 
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Chairman Abbas and set the diplomatic process back. The Israeli elite used the position of 
Hamas as a terrorist organisation and the threats it could pose in case of its election as 
govermnent. 
In spite of Israel's opposition, on 27 January 2006 Hamas was declared the winner of the 
elections. The election results put Hamas, listed as an international terrorist organisation, in 
charge of the Palestinians' political future, and put at least a temporary halt to efforts to restart 
peace talks. It posed a great challenge to acting Prime Minister Ehud OImert and his 
ministers. 
With the formation of the Hamas-Ied government in Palestine, the question of Hamas' 
ideological position of not recognizing the State of Israel raised questions about the future of 
Israeli-Palestinian relations. Even under the threat of international sanctions, Hamas leaders 
reiterated their position vis-it-vis the existence of Israel. In an interview with MEMRI on 8 
May 2006, Moussa Abu Marzouk, Deputy Head of Hamas' Political Bureau, stated that: 
One of Hamas' founding principles is that it does not recognise Israel. We 
[participated in] the elections and the people voted for us based on this 
platform. Therefore, the question of recognizing Israel is definitely not on the 
table ... How can we be expected to recognise an occupying entity when 
millions of our people are refugees, and thousands of others are prisoners? 
Despite these kinds of statement, in its 39-point government programme (2006) Hamas did 
not call for the destruction of, or an end to, negotiations with Israel. But the programme 
included statements to underline the uncompromised demands of the Palestinians. In its 
programme, the putative Hamas-Ied Palestinian Government pledged to: 
Remove the occupation and settlements and demolish the apartheid-separation 
wall; establish an independent, fully sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem 
as its capital; and reject all partial solutions, dictated policies, and faits 
accomplis; 
Uphold Palestinian refugees' Right of Return to their homes and properties, as 
an individual and general right on which there is no compromise; 
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Uphold the belief that resistance in its various forms is a legitimate right of 
Palestinians to bring an end to the occupation and to secure their national 
rights. 
The main themes of the programme reflect the ongoing securitisation themes of the Hamas 
leadership regarding the Israeli occupation. In this document the State of Israel is referred to 
as the "occupier" and an "apartheid state". Moreover, the Palestinians' right to resistance was 
underlined as their legitimate right to act against occupation. 
The enmity speech act was dominant in Prime Minister Ismail Hanieh's statement presenting 
his goverrunent programme to the Palestinian Council. From the start, Hanieh underlined the 
harsh conditions Palestinians were facing as a result of the Israeli occupation and asserted the 
Palestinians' right to resist the occupation: 
I was hoping that this council would convene under better conditions and that we 
could meet all in Jerusalem, the capital of our independent Palestinian state, but 
this condition where the various parts of our homeland are fragmented gives a 
clear proof on the harshness and oppression of the occupation; we can see how the 
occupation is launching a vicious war against our unarmed people and we can see 
how they incite against their democratic choice and how the occupation insists on 
keeping the region in this vicious circle of this bloody conflict. ... Council 
convenes today to witness the birth of a new Palestinian goverrunent which is the 
tenth government as the occupation and aggression continue and as the numbers of 
martyrs and injured increases along with the continuation of the policies of 
assassinations, arrests, and siege and the land confiscation and the construction of 
the apartheid wan and the Judaization of Jerusalem (Hanieh 2006a). 
"The occupation and its ugly measures against the land, the human being and the holy sites" 
was defined as the first of the main challenges that awaited the new Palestinian government 
Hanieh also stressed his determination "to protect the right of our people in defending 
themselves in confronting the occupation and removing the settlements and the apartheid wall 
and to continue their struggle towards the establishment of the independent Palestinian state 
with full sovereignty ... and to reject the partial solutions and the temporary borders and the 
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status quo policy ... such as the disengagement plan that aims to transform our homeland into 
cantons that will close the path in front of the establishment of a viable Palestinian state" 
(Hanieh 2006a). 
The formation of a new Palestinian government by Hamas meant for Israel the loss of its 
partner for peace. This became the main theme of Olmert's speeches and throughout his term 
Olmert underlined the need for a government change in Palestine. Furthermore, by supporting 
Mahrnoud Abbas against the Hamas-led government, the Israeli government deepened the 
divisions within Palestinian politics. 
A Palestinian Government led by terrorist factions will not be a partner for 
negotiation, and we will not have any practical or day-to-day relations .... The 
State of Israel is prepared to wait for this necessary change in the Palestinian 
Authority. We will closely follow the conduct of the Authority. We will 
continue to strike at terror and terrorists. We will not hesitate to reach terrorists, 
their dispatchers and operators anywhere - I repeat - anywhere, but we will give 
the Authority an opportunity to prove that it is aware of its responsibilities and 
willing to change (Olmert 2006a). 
In his address at the opening of the Knesset Winter Session on 16 October 2006, Prime 
Minister 01mert stated that: 
[ ... ] this [Hamas] government does not fulfil the minimal preconditions 
outlined by the international community, which would enable it to become a 
possible partner for negotiations. As long as the Hamas government fails to 
recognise the State of Israel, accept and implement the agreements signed 
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and act to terminate violence and 
eradicate terrorism, including attacks on our southern communities, we cannot 
conduct dialogue with it (Olmer! 2006c). 
Thus, in this period, a revival of securitisation processes at governmental level occurred. For 
the Israeli political and military elites, having Hamas as the legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian Authority was the worst-case scenario. Consequently, a Palestine governed by a 
'terrorist organisation', which is determined to destroy the State of Israel has become one of 
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the themes of the Israeli security discourse. The Hamas government was an object of 
securitisation discourse and its deligitimisation became one of the priorities of the Israeli 
government. During this period the Israeli government maintained its contact with President 
Abbas whom they considered as the legitimate leader of the Palestinians, whereas they did not 
have any contact with the Hamas-Ied government. 
Before becoming directly involved in Palestinian politics to overthrow the Harnas 
government, the Israeli government kept the door open for political and diplomatic means: 
imposing sanctions, diplomatic isolation and seeking the Palestinian Presidency's support 
against the Hamas government. The continuous missile attacks launched on Israeli settlements 
and military positions scattered around the Gaza Strip, accompanied by the kidnapping of an 
Israeli soldier, triggered an Israeli reaction. On 25 June 2006 two Israeli soldiers were 
murdered, four were wounded, and one soldier was abducted after a Palestinian attack at 
Kerem Shalom IDF base. Israel considers the Palestinian Authority and its Hamas 
government to be fully responsible for the Kerem Shalom attack and for the fate of the 
kidnapped soldier, Gilad Shalit. The securitisation of Hamas terror resulted in a military 
operation in Gaza. Even though Hamas was not the only group launching attacks on Israeli 
settlements Hamas became the subject of Israeli securitisations and Hamas government was 
deliberately delegitimised. 
Three days after Gilad Shalid was kidnapped, the National Conciliation Document of the 
Prisoners (2006) was presented. Basically, the document proposed an exchange of Gilad 
Shalid in return for the release of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons. Besides the 
exchange proposal, the document listed the conditions required for an independent and free 
Palestinian state. The document repeated the classical enmity speech acts that held Israeli 
"occupation" and "apartheid policies" responsible for the suffering of Palestinians. 
Hamas' proposal to exchange the kidnapped soldier in return for the release of Palestinian 
prisoners was not accepted by the Israeli government. Rather, it caused rage and frustration on 
the Israeli side as expressed by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in his address to the 
Knesset on 17 July 2006: 
When missiles are launched at our residents and cities, our answer will be war 
with all the strength, determination, valour, sacrifice and dedication which 
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characterise this nation. On the Palestinian front, we will conduct a relentless 
battle until terror ceases, Ghilad ShaHt is returned home safely and the shooting 
of Qassam missiles stops (Olmert 2006b). 
The kidnapping of Ghilad Shalit provided a pretext for the IDF intervention in the Gaza Strip. 
As Prime Minister Olmert pointed out in the same speech, the terrorist attacks had reached 
boiling point: "[w)e are at a national moment of truth. Will we consent to living under the 
threat of this Axis of Evil or will we mobilize our inner strength and show determination and 
equanimity?" (Olmert 2006b). Particularly after the US-led global war on terrorism, the 
Israeli political and military elites have linked Palestinian terror with global-level terror to 
justify their actions vis-a-vis Palestinian militant groups. By labelling the Palestinian militant 
groups as part of the Axis of Evil, the Israeli government is clearly seeking a pretext to justify 
its actions against Hamas and the other fedaayen groups. Furthermore, in order to get public 
support fDr the rightness of a military operation in Gaza against Hamas militants, Olmert 
chose words that wDuld be emotive to Israeli sDciety. 
Citizens of Israel, 
There are moments in the life of a nation, when it is compelled to look directly 
into the face of reality and say: no more! 
And I say to everyone: no more! 
Israel will not be held hostage - not by terror gangs or by a terrorist authority 
(Olmert 2006b). 
Olmert concluded his speech by underlining the inevitability of defending Israeli citizens and 
the measures they would need to take to destroy terrorist infrastructures: 
We will search every compound, target every terrorist who assists in attacking 
the citizens of Israel, and destroy every terrorist infrastructure, everywhere. 
We will persist until Hezbollah and Hamas comply with those basic and decent 
things required of them by every civilised person. Israel will not agree to live 
in the shadow of missiles or rockets aimed at its residents (Olmer! 2006b). 
Olmert's speech indicated a dead-end for overcoming the security threats posed by Hamas 
with normal politics and pointed out what kind of extraordinary measures they would have to 
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take to stop the terrorist attacks. Finally, on 8 November 2006, an IDF artillery shell intended 
to disrupt the launching of Qassam rockets landed in a residential area in Beit Hanoun and 
killed 23 Palestinians. The military operation in Gaza was an affirmation of the determination 
of Israel regarding the terror issue. 
For its part, the military operation in Gaza re-affirmed Hamas' enduring securitisation of the 
Israeli occupation as an existential threat to Palestinian society. Meanwhile, given the Gaza 
Strip residents' sufferings as a result of the violence between Hamas and IDF, the Israeli 
leadership attempted to persuade Palestinian society of the economic and humanitarian costs 
of the Hamas-led government for Palestinian society. As Olmert made clear in his address at 
the opening of the Knesset Winter Session on 16 October 2006: 
We do not wish the Palestinian people to continue suffering. On the 
contrary we prefer a thriving Palestinian society, free of humanitarian hardship 
- a society which enjoys economic welfare and which operates in cooperation 
with the State ofIsraeI (Olmert 2006c). 
Israel's undermining of the democratically elected Hamas government caused internal 
tensions and created a chasm between the internally legitimate government and the 
externally recognised Presidency. The clashes between Hamas supporters and those of 
Abbas paved the way for the worrying possibility of a civil war. Moreover, through 
blocking international finance and aid to the Hamas-Ied Palestinian government and 
isolating it diplomatically, the Israeli government and military tried to show Hamas that 
they were trapped. International sanctions and the isolation of the Hamas government had 
become destructive in terms of the lives and livelihoods of Palestinians, particularly 
Gazans. Ultimately, this strategy would be successful if it persuaded Hamas at least to 
join the sought-after unity government with Abbas but it did not resolve the conflict. 
Through an article he wrote for the Washington Times on I I July 2006, Ismail Hanieh, 
the Palestinian Prime Minister, blamed both Israel and the US for the deterioration of the 
political and humanitarian situation in Gaza. According to Hanieh, the current Gaza 
invasion was "only the latest effort to destroy the results of fair and free elections held 
early this year" and it was "the explosive follow-up to a five-month campaign of 
economic and diplomatic warfare directed by the United States and Israel" (Hanieh 
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2006c). At the end of his article, Hanieh sent a message to Israel which summarised the 
classical Palestinian enmity speech acts directed at the State ofIsrael: 
If Israel will not allow Palestinians to live in peace, dignity and national 
integrity, Israelis themselves will not be able to enjoy those same rights. 
Meanwhile, our right to defend ourselves from occupying soldiers and 
aggression is a matter of law, as settled in the Fourth Geneva Convention. If 
Israel is prepared to negotiate seriously and fairly, and resolve the core 1948 
issues, rather than the secondary ones from 1967, a fair and permanent peace is 
possible (Hanieh 2006c). 
As a result of the increasing number of civilian casualties and suffering, Palestinian Prime 
Minister Ismail Hanieh agreed to negotiate with Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud 
Abbas to form a National Unity Government, which could end international sanctions and 
isolation. At the end of November 2006, the Palestinian Authority announced a ceasefire in 
Gaza on behalf of all Palestinian factions. Palestinian Prime Minister Ismael Hanieh asserted 
that "contacts with the political leaders of factions were made and there have been assertions 
to commit truce. The entire matter is hostage to halting Israeli aggressions against the 
Palestinian people" (Hanieh 2006b). Considering its meaning for Islam, declaring a ceasefire 
(in Arabic, 'Hudna') was a significant step for Hamas. Hudna is recognised in Islamic 
jurisprudence as a legitimate and binding contract and refers to something beyond the 
Western concept of cease-fire. It obliges the parties to use the period to seek a permanent, 
non-violent resolution to their differences. It refers to a period of non-war, a partial resolution 
of a conflict. As stated by Ahmed Yousef, a senior adviser to the Palestinian Prime Minister, 
in his editorial in The New York Times "[when] Hamas gives its word to an international 
agreement; it does so in the name of God and will therefore keep its word" (New York Times 
2006). 
The ceasefire was immediately reciprocated by Israel. In his address at the Memorial 
Ceremony for David and Paula Ben-Gurion on 27 November 2006, Ehud Olmert performed 
one of the most conciliatory and far-reaching discursive gestures of any Israeli leader in 
recent years: "I extend my hand in peace to our Palestinian neighbours, hoping that it will not 
be rejected." However, even in this speech Olmert underlined the terrible consequences of 
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terrorist attacks and called upon' Palestinians to put an end to the terror, violence, murders and 
incessant attacks against the citizens of IsraeL 
The terror, violence, murders and incessant attacks against the citizeus ofIsrael 
are liable to lead us closer to a new and painful wave of terrible violence, The 
uncompromising radicalism of your terror organisations did not bring you 
closer to attaining the goal which I am convinced many of you share - the 
establishment of a Palestinian state, which will guarantee you a future of 
prosperity and which will exist in good neighbourly relations side-by-side with 
the State of Israel (Olmert 2006d). 
His wording was more conciliatory than normal in the official positions of IsraeL However, 
his message was not drastically different from previous Israeli official stands. By using 
'your' (possessive form) for indicating the possession of terror organisations he pointed out 
that the Palestinians as people were responsible for the end of terror against Israeli citizens. 
That is to say, he wamed Palestinians about the consequences of their continuous support for 
radical groups and kept open the door for possible Israeli military intervention in Palestinian 
territories if terror attacks continued. 
As far as the Israeli and Palestinian audiences' positions regarding ongoing securitisations and 
normalisation efforts, the Israeli public was in favour of returning to normal politics and 
negotiations with the Palestinian national unity government, even though it included Hamas. 
According to the Joint Israeli Palestinian Public Opinion Poll conducted by The Harry S. 
Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Palestinian Centre for 
Policy and Survey Research in September 2006,18 67 percent of the Israelis stated their 
support for negotiations with a Palestinian national unity government'which included Hamas 
if that is what was needed to reach a compromise agreement. Even where a Hamas-led 
government was concerned, an increased moderation among Israelis, 56 percent support, was 
observed regarding talks with a Hamas government if needed in order to reach a compromise 
agreement with the Palestinians. This audience position resembles that of Ariel Sharon and 
IS The total Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 
127 randomly-selected locations between September 14 and 16.2006. The margin of error was 3 percent. The 
Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with a representative sample of 500 Israeli Jews and a 
representative sample of 40 I Israeli Arabs. The Israeli sample was weighted according to the proportion of the 
respective sectors in the population to produce the overall IsraeIi estimates (overall sampling error of 3.9 
percent). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian between September 10 and 19. 
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his successor Ehud Olmert regarding normalisation. However, according to the same survey, 
some hardening was observed among Palestinians in this regard. Before Israel's intervention 
in Lebanon and Gaza, 70 percent of Palestinian respondents thought that a Hamas-led PA 
should negotiate with Israel and 26 percent believed it should not; after Israel's military 
interventions in Lebanon and Gaza, support for negotiations with Israel dropped to 59 
percent. On the other hand, as far as the abduction of Israeli soldiers for exchange with 
Palestinian prisoners was concerned, 75 percent of the Palestinians supported such operations 
compared to 23 percent who opposed them. Despite the militant views of the Palestinians in 
the aftermath of the war in Lebanon, 77 percent of the Palestinians supported the call for a 
ceasefire between Palestinians and Israelis and 74 percent believed that Palestinians cannot 
depend on armed action only and must reach a political settlement (Joint Israeli Palestinian 
Public Opinion Poll September 2006). 
Despite Ehud Olmert's conciliatory rhetoric, Palestinians continued to perceive Israel as a 
state that does not want fully-fledged reconciliation. But the percentage of Palestinians who 
believe that there is a peace partner for Palestinians in Israel increased from 13 percent in 
April 2006 to 36 percent in November 2006 (NEe Monthly Bulletin 2006).19 By contrast, 
Israeli expectations that the ceasefire would lead to calm in the region were very low (27 
percent), apparently because of the prevailing view in the Israeli-Jewish public that the 
Palestinians would most likely violate the truce. It was commonly believed that Israel agreed 
to the ceasefire because the military measures that were taken did not stop the Qassam fire. At 
the same time, a clear majority (57 percent) rejected the idea that Israel should reoccupy the 
Gaza Strip even if this was the only way to end the shelling. Moreover, there existed broad 
support among the Israeli public for holding talks with the Palestinian Authority despite the 
fact that only a minority believed it would eventually lead to a peace agreement (Peace Index 
November 2006).20 As public opinion polls show, both Israeli and Palestinian audiences were 
convinced by the normalisation discourse. Given the negative effects of ongoing violence and 
destructions to their lives, both the Israeli and Palestinian publics were keen on returuing to 
normal politics. Even after the Israeli military intervention in Lebanon to eliminate the 
I9 NEe's Monthly Bulletin on Palestinian Perceptions towards their political, economic and social conditions, 
November 2006. 
20 The Peace Index, November 2006 - The telephone interviews were conducted in 28-29 November 2006, and 
included 598 interviewees who represent the adult Jewish and Arab popUlation of Israel (including the territories and 
the kibbutzim). The sampling error for a sample of this size is about 4.5 percent. 
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Hezbollah leadership, the Palestinian public showed their preference for a ceasefire. 
Considering the audiences' position in favour of nonnalisation, the call of the securitising 
actors has not received a positive response by the respective audiences. In this case, the 
extraordinary measures taken by the Palestinian Islamist elite and the .Israeli military elite " 
continuous firing of rockets into Israeli settlements and the Israeli military interventions in 
Gaza " have not been legitimised in the eyes of the respective audiences. That is to say the 
extraordinary measures regarded as necessary by the securitising actors have been taken 
without the audiences' consent. 
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Table 3.3 Documents and Statements (February 2006-January 2007) 
Hamas Government Programme 17 March 2006 
httg:llwww. i gcri.org/fiJes/hanieh-march I 7-07. html 
The full text of the National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners 28 June 2006 
httl1:llwww .iQcri.orgifilesll1risoners2 .html 
Statement by the Council of the European Union on the Middle East 17 July 2006 
httg:llwww.mfa.gov.iIIMFAIMFAArchive/2000 2009/2006/Statement%20b 
y%20the%20Council%200:f%20the%20Eurogean%20Union%20on%20the 
%20Middle%20East%2017-Jul-2006 
Statement by Group of Eight Leaders - G-8 Summit 2006 
httg:llwww.mfa.gov.iIIMF A/MF AArchive/2000 2009/2006/Statement%20b 16 July 2006 
y%20Groul1%20ofO/020Eight%20Leaders%20-%20G-
8%20Summit%202006%20 16-Jul-2006 
Statement by the Middle East Quartet 20 September 2006 
httg:llwww.mfa.gov.iIlMFAlPeace+ProcesslReference+DocumentslStateme 
nHby+the+Middle+East+Quartet+20-Seg-2006.htm 
Statement by the Middle East Quartet 2 February 2007 
httQ:llwww.mfa.gov.iIIMFAlPeace+Process/Reference+DocumentsIStateme 
nt+by+the+Middle+East+Quartet+2-Feb-2007.htm 
Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Ismail Hanieh's Speeches and 
Statements 
-The ministerial statement of the new government in front of the PLC 27 March 2006a 
httg:llwww. iJ)cri .orgifiles/haniyehmarch2 7 -06 .html 
- Statement regarding ceasefire (hudna) with Israel October 2006b 
httg:llwww.iJ)c.gov.gs/igc new/englishldetails.asg?riame=17694 
- "Aggression under False Pretences" in the Washington Post 11 July 2006c 
httg:llwww. washing!:ongost.com 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's Speeches and Statements 
- Presenting the New Government to the Knesset 4 May 2006a 
httg:llwww.gmo.gov.iIIPMOEngiArchive/Sgeeches/2006/0S/sj)eechkness04 
OS06.htm 
- Address at the Knesset 17 July 2006b 
httg:llwww.gmo.gov.iI/PMOEngiCommunication/PMSgeaks/sgeechknessetl 
70706.htm 
I . _ Address at the Opening of the Knesset Winter Session, 16 October 2006c 
httg:llwww .gmo.gov. i IINRlexeres/S CA 080CD-2D A 7 -44 72-BCF3-
A46E6CC2CE27,framele 
- Address at the Memorial Ceremony for David and Paula Ben-Gurion, 27 November 2006d 
httj):llwww.gmo.gov.iIIPMOEngiCommunicationIPMSgeaks/sl1eechdavid2 
71106.htm 
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3.4 Post-Oslo Israeli and Palestinian Securitisations 
As discussed in Chapter 1, for the Copenhagen School, the language of security politics is a 
performative activity that makes certain issues visible as a threat. Within this context, Wrever 
argues that security is a specific way of framing an issue and security discourse is 
characterised by dramatizing an issue as having absolute priority (1996:108). Positing an issue 
as an existential threat requires a move from normal politics to emergency politics. Thus, the 
securitising actor claims a special right to handle the issue using extraordinary measures and 
to legitimise the political action. 
Depicting certain phenomena as security threats can confer legitimacy on the state and/or 
government, by portraying it as being able to protect its people from such threats. As a result, 
securitisation can justifY introducing security practices and technologies. In the Israeli-
Palestinian context, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories has been constructed as a 
threat to the existence of Palestinian society. The occupation has been used by different 
Palestinian political elites to legitimise their acts against Israel. In parallel, Palestinian terror 
has been securitised as an existential threat to the Israeli state and society. This situation did 
not change in the post-Oslo period. The attacks launched by Palestinian factions such as 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah's military wing al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade were effectively 
securitised and used as a pretext for the IDF's interventions in Gaza. Particularly after the 
death of Arafat, Israeli discourse has changed from securitising Palestinians as an existential 
threat to the Israeli state and society to the securitising of Palestinian terrorist groups such as 
Hamas as an existential threat to both the Israeli state and society, and the peace process. 
During this period Israeli government sought to eliminate potential threats, in Wrever's term 
they pursued policies of security management. The period following the death of Arafat era 
clearly shows the characteristics of security management. Instead of reviving the peace 
process and initiating a normalisation process, both Ariel Sharon and his successor Ehud 
Olmert preferred to manage the security situation. In this regard, the security measures that 
can be taken for the sake of risk management, like check points, strict security controls, 
regimes of identification and preventive detentions, cover both the discursive and practical 
aspects of securitisation. These practices are ranged across domestic and external security 
practices, most of which are among the daily practices of the Israeli state in order to protect its 
citizens from terrorist attacks. 
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Throughout the period after the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004 until the beginning 
of 2007, both Palestinian and Israeli security discourses showed some signs of normalisation, 
which marked a slight change from previous security discourses. However, as a result of the 
rise of Hamas, the Israeli government's worries about state security increased. Hamas' anti-
Zionist, anti-State of Israel discourse paved the way for the Israeli securitisation of the rise of 
Hamas and of terror. During this period, first Hamas as a terrorist organisation and later 
Hamas as a Palestinian government that does not recognise the State of Israel were identified 
as security threats. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in cases of societal security, security is about defending 
established identities and establishing boundaries with the other as has been experienced in 
the Israeli-Palestinian case. For Israeli securitising actors the right to exist is the main concern 
and the security discourse has developed around this theme. Within this context, Abbas' 
rhetoric recognizing the State of Israel makes him a friend of Israel. Consequently, Israeli 
governments have empowered Abbas against Hamas, the enemy. 
The Palestinian securitisation ofIsraeli occupation is propagated mainly by Hamas, which has 
a vested interest in depicting Israel as a security threat. As was assumed by securitisation 
theory, securitising an issue can help the securitising actor to justify harsh approaches, which 
are reflected in the Palestinian case as attacks against Israeli settlements and military targets 
in order to resist the occupation. Through its security discourse, Hamas attempted to 
legitimise the use of violence against Israelis. Hamas' leaders have securitised the 
continuation of the Israeli occupation by successfully operationalising the resistance 
discourse, which has been among the core themes of the Hamas movement since its 
foundation. In this sense, securitisation provided a site of struggle between the Zionist Israeli 
State and the Islamist Palestinian movements. Even though Palestinian society is not purely a 
Muslim society, Hamas and other militant groups have developed their security discourses 
around Islamic themes like martyrdom and Jihad. Hamas has continued to securitise Israeli 
security measures as apartheid policies and used them to legitimise the so-called resistance 
against Israeli occupation. Constructing a boundary between 'us and them' along national 
lines, Hamas leaders have attempted to construct a community around the ideal of a liberated 
Palestinian state, by making the Israeli occupation the major theme of a security discourse. 
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As far as the facilitating conditions of the period are concerned, post-Oslo securitisations were 
influenced by external as well as domestic facilitating factors. President George W. Bush 
ambition to resolve Israeli Palestinian conflict by the end of his second term put pressure on 
Israeli government and Palestinian Authority. By introducing Roadmap and gain Quartet's 
support the US administration attempted to encourage Israeli government and Palestinian 
authority Chairman Abbas to turn back to negotiation table. Domestically neither Abbas nor 
Sharon (later Olmert) was in a position to restart negotiations and made concessions 
necessary for permanent status agreement. With Washington the key to delivering Israeli 
agreement on a two-state solution, Abbas saw little alternative but to do what the Americans 
asked of him. But the US and Israel declined to give him the concessions necessary to 
validate his choices in Palestinian eyes, resulting in Abbas' losing even more ground to 
Hamas over the past two years. Similarly, Sharon had to show some political will to resume 
peace talks especially after the death of Arafat. By unilaterally withdrawing from Gaza 
Sharon paid a lip service without really engaging in negotiations. American-led war on terror 
had a significant influence on Israeli security policies and provided pretext for harsh Israeli 
response against Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups. It was also provided pretext for 
Israeli governments to delay peace negotiations with Palestinian government which was led 
by Hamas' political wing. Given their opponents' continuous securitisations both Israeli and 
Palestinian policy-makers were reluctant to normalize the relations. On the other hand, as is 
demonstrated in the following chapter, at the civil society level a number of Israelis and 
Palestinians have assumed a responsibility to initiate a desecuritisation process for conflict 
resolution and reconciliation. Chapters 5 and 6 will consider respective civil society efforts 
for changing the perceptions vis-a-vis the other side and their efforts to initiate a 
desecuritisation process which could lead to reconciliation on the long run. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Development of the Idea of Reconciliation, Cooperation and 
Co-existence in the Israeli-Palestinian Context 
From the very beginning of their interaction there have always been individuals or groups 
whose rhetoric regarding the other challenges the mainstream security discourse. Alongside 
ongoing securitisations, there have been reconciliatory approaches that defend and support 
coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. Moreover, the idea of cooperation and people-
to-people coexistence activities is not a phenomenon developed during the Oslo process 
alone. However, the Oslo process contributed to the development of peace-building projects 
initiated by local organisations in order to improve the relationship between the two sides at 
the community level. 
As was stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis aims to apply the concept of 
desecuritisation. A detailed analysis of the desecuritisation concept in the Israeli-Palestinian 
context will thus be presented in Chapters 5 and 6. Before proceeding, this chapter presents 
the development of the idea of reconciliation and peace between Israel and the Palestinians, 
as opposed to the continuous securitisation processes. 
4.1 The Development in Israel of the Idea of Reconciliation and Peace with 
Palestinians 
On the part of Israelis, the earlier traces of reconciliatory discourse are rooted in the mid-
I 920s. In the wake of the 1929 Arab revolt, a number of Jews from Jerusalem and elsewhere 
in Palestine initiated the establishment of an organisation called Brit Shalom (Peace Alliance). 
Its members were bounded by a common belief in cooperation between the Jews and the 
Palestinian Arabs and were influenced by the seminal Israeli writer Ahad-Haam, who was 
one of the earliest critics of the policies of the Zionist Movement. The title of his essay 'Lo 
zeh ha-derech' (This is not the way), become a slogan of Brit Shalom's criticisms of Zionist 
policies in Palestine. 
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The earliest signs of reconciliation discourse underlining the possibility of coexistence, 
cooperation and peace with the Palestinians are to be found in Brit Shalom's statements. As 
was stated by Judah Magnes, the first president of the Hebrew University, Brit Shalom 
believed that: 
Arab-Jewish cooperation is not only necessary for the peace of this part of the 
world, but that it is also possible. We contend ... that Arab-Jewish cooperation has 
never been made the chief objective of major policy ... We regard this as a great 
sin of omission which has been committed throughout all these years (Magnes in 
ReiseI2001). 
Chaim Margaliut Kalvaryski, one of the early inspirations of Brit Shalom, similarly argued: 
"[w]e must find a way of reconciling the two national movements, the Zionist and the Arab, 
which seem conflicting and mutually exclusive, but which are in reality complementary to 
each other and able to live side-by-side in peace and harmony (Kalvaryski in Reisel 2001). 
The founders and leaders of Brit Shalom often used the words, cooperation, peace, harmony 
and reconciliation. This was in contrast to the Zionist political elite of the early 1930s who 
preferred to think of Palestinian Arabs as just a nuisance in Palestine who would soon leave 
and amalgamate with Arabs elsewhere. Cooperation with Palestinian Arabs or reconciliation 
with their national aspirations was the least ofthe concerns of the Zionist leadership. 
In 1942, Brit Shalom founded a small political party, the Ihud (Union) Association of 
Palestine, and continued to lobby mostly for international support and recognition. Based on a 
belief in Arab-Jewish cooperation, Ihud proposed an Economic Union in Palestine, which 
was supported by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946 and then by the United 
Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947. 
According to Ihud (or Brit Shalom) there could also be a great degree of cooperation albeit 
the differences of opinion between and among the Jews and the Arabs. They believed that 
issues such as economic development, social security, standards of life, trade, agriculture, 
industry, labour and commerce, would draw Jews and Arabs together (ReiseI2001). 
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Brit Shalom's ideas were progressive for the time. With their emphasis on both official and 
people-level cooperation between Jews and Palestinian Arabs, Brit Shalom's proposals 
resemble contemporary ideas of structural and cultural peace-building. Compared to the 
Zionist leadership, Brit Shalom stressed the importance of the recognition of the Arab reality 
for the peace and stability of Palestine. However, despite its initial influence on the Anglo-
American Committee, Brit Shalom was not able to command any serious public support. 
Over the years, the group became marginalised. 
The Israeli radical left had always been a supporter of the principle of Palestinian self-
determination and saw the issue as part of the anti-imperialist struggle. Following the 
establishment of the State of Israel and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, small, mostly Marxist-
Leninist, political factions challenged the policies of the Zionist leadership and continued to 
advocate the national rights of Palestinian Arabs. The most outspoken of those was the Israeli 
Communist Party with its commitment to its anti-Zionist stand (Bar-On 2005:8). From the 
inception of the State of Israel, the Communist Party of Israel appeared as the chief advocate 
of Palestinian national rights. The Communist Party saw the recognition of the right of the 
Jews and the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination and the mutual recognition of these 
rights as the key factors for peace (Kaminer 1996:26). Similarly, the United Labour Party 
(MAP AM) also advocated the idea of a binational state in which Jews and Arabs would live 
side-by-side. Regarding the Palestinian issue, MAPAM advocated compromises and 
reconciliation (Bar-On 2005:9). Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 
confirmed, in the eyes of those movements, the correctness of the Marxist view, which held 
that Zionism was inherently colonialist. In a short time, Communist student cells had 
considerable political presence in Israeli universities. Ideologically driven, determined to 
fight against the government's settlement and annexation policy in the Occupied Territories, a 
student movement was started against the occupation (Kaminer 1996: 1 0-15). 
The ideas of the Israeli radical left constituted the basis for the development of the Israeli 
'peace camp', which refers to movements which claim to strive for peace with the Arab 
neighbours of Israel, including the Palestinians, and encourage co-existence with the Arab 
citizens ofIsrael. 
During 1970s the Israeli Council for Israeli Palestinian Peace (ICIPP) was formed by a group 
of prominent Israeli Zionists in response to signs of moderation in the Palestinian national 
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movement, which the Israeli government was accused of ignoring. In February 1976, the 
founders of the organisation published a Manifesto setting out their belief that Israel should 
challenge the PLO to make peace on the basis of Israeli withdrawal from the territories 
occupied in June 1967. The group attempted to put pressure on the Israeli government to 
initiate peace negotiations with the PLO, a move at that time considered unacceptable by the 
Israeli government. Also innovative, the organisation spoke in favour of a two-state solution. 
In their Manifesto of25 February 1976, ICIPP affirm that: 
[ ... ] the only path to peace is through co-existence between two sovereign 
states, .. , [that] the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state ... should be the 
outcome of negotiations between the government of Israel and a recognised 
and authoritative representative body of the Palestinian Arab people, ... [and 
that] the two states will aim to conduct a continuing dialogue in order to forge 
closer relations between them, to solve cornmon problems in a spirit of 
cooperation (ICIPP Manifesto 1976). 
Following ICIPP, the Peace Now movement was founded in 1978 during the Israeli-Egyptian 
peace talks by hundreds of reserve officers and soldiers from Israeli army combat units. In 
their letter to Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the group underlined that the precondition for 
the true security of Israel was to make peace with its neighbours. With this letter, the group 
called upon the Prime Minister to refrain from taking any steps that might cause further 
conflicts with Israel's neighbours. The group saw the existence of Israeli settlements beyond 
the Green Line as the major obstacle to peace: 
[ ... ] when new horizons of peace and cooperation are for the first time being 
proposed to the State of Israel, we feel obliged to call upon you to prevent 
taking any steps that could cause endless problems to our people and our state . 
... We are aware of the security needs of the State ofIsrael and the difficulties 
facing the path to peace. But we know that true security will only be reached 
with the arrival of peace (Peace Now 1978). 
Gradually, Peace Now has become the largest extra-parliamentary movement in Israel. Since 
the early 1980s Peace Now has been in the fore front of the struggle against Jewsih 
settlements in the Occupied Territories. As opposed to the Israeli government's arguments, it 
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defends the idea that the right of Israel to live within secure borders must not challenge the 
rights of its neighbours, including the right of Palestinians to self-determination. In 1988, 
after the PLO's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and the principle of the 
two-state solution, Peace Now led a massive demonstration calling on the government to 
negotiate with the PLO. Peace Now has consistently continued to press all Israeli parties in 
power to initiate steps to bring about an end to occupation and to pursue peace negotiations. 
Although Peace Now is an Israeli movement, it has also been engaged in dialogue and joint 
activities with Palestinians in the occupied territories. The largest such activity was a massive 
demonstration called Hands Around Jerusalem in 1989 in which some 15,000 Israelis and 
15,000 Palestinians called for peace. 
Even though Peace Now has become one of the generic names of the Israeli peace movement, 
Peace Now's positions on several issues, particularly the group's acceptance of the Jewish 
state paradigm and its position that sees an undivided Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel, have 
been criticised (Kaminer 1996, Gordon 2003). 
Besides the activist peace groups, other kinds of initiatives also exist. For example, after the 
outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a peace coalition, composed of political and public figures 
as well as grass-roots activists from both the Israeli and Palestinian mainstream, was 
established in July 2001. On the Israeli side were 24 civil society groups, including Peace 
Now as well as the parliamentary opposition, represented by Meretz, and the left wing of the 
Labour party involved in the Coalition. On the Palestinian side, the Coalition involved the 
main secular/nationalist actors. The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Coalition engaged in 
demonstrations against occupation as well as public diplomacy and peoples' diplomacy 
activities. The Coalition proposed a framework for peace and appealed for the nonnalisation 
of relations. The Peace Coalition's proposal was based on the idea of peace from below and 
the necessity to start negotiation on the real issues, such as settlements, the right to return, 
Jerusalem and terrorism, for a peaceful settlement (Said 2003). 
The Geneva Initiative (2003), a peace proposal similar to the one proposed by the Israeli-
Palestinian Peace Coalition, was initiated by Israeli politician Y ossi Beilin, one of the 
architects of the Oslo agreements, and fonner Palestinian Authority minister Yasser Abed 
Rabbo. The Geneva Initiative, which is an extra-governmental, therefore unofficial, peace 
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proposal, seeks to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The proposal suggests a Palestinian 
concession on the right of return to lands within the State of Israel in exchange for 
sovereignty over the Temple Mount. The plan also calls for an Israeli withdrawal from most 
of the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip (Geneva Initiative 2003). 
The Geneva Initiative's proposal was prepared by some of the Israeli and Palestinian 
negotiators who had actively participated in the Oslo process. The draft was written in simple 
language and the Preamble of the Geneva Accord contained specific statements underlining 
the most ideal peace situation between Israel and the PLO. This Preamble (Draft Permanent 
Status Agreement), published in October 2003, underlined the need "to put an end to decades 
of confrontation and conflict, and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security 
based on a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace and achieving historic reconciliation" and 
frequently refers to both sides' "right to peaceful and secure existence within secure and 
recognised boundaries" (Geneva Initiative 2003). Throughout the document, words and 
phrases such as "cooperation", "the commitment to live side-by-side" and "good 
neighbourliness" are used. 
According to Jacob Shamir, the Geneva Initiative illustrates the role that NGOs can assume in 
conflict resolution processes by modifying public discourse and preparing public opinion for 
compromise when the political elite is unwilling or unable to do so (2007:8). The draft has 
not, however, attracted much official support. The Ariel Sharon government accused the 
Israelis involved in the initiative of trying to act in place of a democratically-elected 
government (Haaretz 2004). On the Palestinian side, both Yasser Arafat and Palestinian 
Prime Minister Ahrned Qureia declared that the Palestinian participants represented neither 
the PLO nor the Palestinian government (Haaretz 2003). 
Another Israeli politician who initiated the establishment of an independent, non-profit NGO 
is Shimon Peres, former Israeli Prime Minister and President of the State of Israel. Shimon 
Peres, who was one of the Nobel Peace Laureates in 1994, founded the Peres Centre for 
Peace in 1996 to "build an infrastructure of peace and reconciliation by and for the people of 
the Middle East that promotes socio-economic development, while advancing cooperation 
and mutual understanding" (Peres Centre 2006). The Peres Centre has been involved in 
several peace-building projects with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan and Egypt. The Peres 
Centre's peace-building activities are based on four main pillars, all of which require 
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cooperation and encounters with counterparts: people-to-people dialogue and interaction, 
capacity-building through cooperation, nurturing a culture of peace in the region's youth and 
humanitarian responses. 
The Oslo process has encouraged NGOs and independent, non-profit groups working for 
different aspects of peace and reconciliation. Currently, there are hundreds of Israeli NGOs 
and non-profit organisations on the ground who claim that they make up the 'other Israel' and 
point out that there are not simply two sides - Israelis and Palestinians - but there are Israelis 
who join with Palestinians in working for a future of reconciliation and peace built on a 
foundation of justice (Carey and Shainin 2002). The spectrum of groups stretches from 
religious groups like Rabbis for Human Rights, which was founded in 1998, in response to 
serious abuses by the Israeli military authorities in the suppression of the Intifada, to groups 
that oppose and resist demolition of Palestinian houses in the Occupied Territories like the 
Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions and to women's groups such as New Profile 
and Bat Shalom. Albeit the differences regarding their focus, Israeli peace movement 
organisations are united on a number of core positions: almost all of them criticise the 
security policies of the Israeli government and have oriented themselves around a common 
goal: a sovereign independent Palestinian state based on the principles of equality, justice and 
freedom (Levin 2005:91). 
The ideas of peace and reconciliation have also prevailed in Israeli public opinion. According 
to the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Public Opinion Research project, since mid-2001, more than 50 
percent ofIsraelis have supported the dismantling of Jewish settlements which had been built 
on Palestinian territories (Shamir 2007:29). The same project also indicates that, despite the 
ongoing securitisations, in 2006 79 percent of the Israeli public stated their support for 
reconciliation. Only 40 percent expected reconciliation to actually take place within the next 
decade (Shamir 2007 :40). 
As explored in this section, since the end of the 1920s, the idea of peace and/or reconciliation 
with Palestinians has gradually been developed particularly through non-governmental 
groups. Particularly after 1967, a peace movement emerged as a response to both religious 
nationalist movements like Gush Emmunim which viewed the 1967 victory as a divine 
directive to expand the State of Israel (Hermaon and N ewman 1992) and secular nationalists 
who viewed the occupied territories as necessary for security. By insisting on the importance 
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of mutual recognition of rights and freedoms, the two-state solution and reconciliation the 
Israeli peace camp has introduced an alternative set of values and ideas into Israeli society. 
4.2 The Development of the Idea of Reconciliation and Peace with Israel 
among Palestinians 
As discussed in Chapter 2, since the influx of Jews after the 1897 Basel Zionist Conference's 
decision to reclaim Palestine as the historic home ofthe Jewish people, the native Palestinian 
population has felt threatened by Jewish immigration. Particularly during the British Mandate 
period, friction between Arab and Jewish communities grew. Administratively, the only area 
common to Jews and Arabs under the Mandate was municipal government in mixed cities 
such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Tiberias. During the Mandate period, despite of their 
absence from decision-making processes, Arabs were still the dominant group in municipal 
governments throughout Palestine. The development of the Jewish-Arab conflict underlined 
the importance of the municipal administration since it was considered as an institution to 
accumulate political power in mixed cities. During the Mandate period, albeit the general 
resentment among Palestinian Arabs against Jewish participation in municipal activities, the 
Mayor of Haifa, Hasan Bey Shukri, insisted on the necessity of integrating Jews into 
municipal activities in the cities with both Jewish and Palestinian communities. 
Hasan Bey Shukri believed in cooperation with Jews for the benefit of the city's 
development. He formed the municipal couucil with the participation of Jews together with 
Arabs, he appointed Jewish clerks, which had not been previously allowed, and initiated the 
gradual introduction of Hebrew into municipal operations (Ooren 2006:24). Contrary to his 
Arab counterparts in the municipalities of Jerusalem and Safed, Shukri succeeded in 
separating the municipal affairs of the city from political matters and laid the foundations of 
cooperation between Arabs and Jews in Haifa. Shukri argued that Jews and Arabs living 
together would provide a basis for making peace. Based on this idea, and despite the 
intensification of violence in Palestine, members of Haifa municipal council continued to 
work in cooperation till Hasan Bey Shukri died in 1940 (Ooren 2006:33). In this detailed 
work on Hasan Bey Shukri, Ooren identifies him as one of the first of the Palestinian elite to 
underline the necessity of cooperation between Arabs and Jews for a peaceful settlement in 
Palestine. His ideas and rhetoric challenged the mainstream Arab discourse of the time, which 
was based on the securitisation of Jewish immigration into Palestine. 
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Between Hasan Bey Shukri and the Oslo process there was little obvious development among 
Palestinians of the idea of reconciliation and cooperation with Israelis. After the 
establishment of the State of Israel, Palestinians, together with other Arabs in the region, 
securitised the State of Israel as a threat to their existence. Palestinian frustration mounted 
with Israel's occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank after the 1967 war. The first 
Palestinian NGOs were established after the June 1967 in order to prevent and raise 
international awareness of human rights violations. 
During the first Intifada, Palestinian NGOs grew into a self-reliant driving force and worked 
in the absence of an elected authority (Hassasian and Kaufman 1999). Despite the existence 
of NGOs to raise awareness among the public of human rights, women's rights, democracy 
and transparency, NGOs that support the peace process were established only very recently. 
Particularly during the Oslo process, organisations sprang up in the West Bank and Gaza 
whose aim was to build peace and reconciliation between the two sides. However, 
coexistence has never been a popular term amongst Palestinians who are involved in peace-
building. According to Hassasian and Kaufman (1999), since a Palestinian state has not yet 
come into existence, any efforts towards any other solution are considered to be insufficient. 
Hence, coexistence within undefined borders is perceived as a false normalisation. 
From the Palestinian point of view, Palestinians have shouldered the sufferings going all the 
way back to the refugee crisis of 1948. Given the difficulties they have faced as a result of 
occupation, it is difficult for Palestinians to believe in peace. For most Palestinians, Israel 
must be the one to make concessions and initiate peace-building and reconciliation. 
Palestinians who work on peace projects with Israelis have faced the risk of being labelled 
collaborators by some sections of Palestinian society. 
Yet in spite of these material and psychological barriers, quite a number of Palestinian 
individuals and groups have initiated and continued peace-building efforts. The Palestinian 
peace movement can be classified in accordance with the aims of these organisations and 
groups. First of all, most of the works done by Palestinian peace NGOs have focused on 
raising awareness regarding the Palestinian cause. These groups mainly aim at gaining 
international recognition for the Palestinian cause based on historical narratives and the 
securitisation of Israel as an occupier. A second category involves groups focused on 
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democratisation and peace within Palestinian society. The third category covers all individual 
and organisational efforts for integrating Palestinian peace-building efforts with Israelis. 
Within this context, there exists a range of groups and individuals working as the Palestinian 
partners of Israel in people-to-people projects. Some examples from this third category will 
be taken into consideration below. 
Compared to the established peace bloc tradition in Israel, the idea of reconciliation and peace 
with Israel has remained underdeveloped in Palestine. In Palestine the idea of peace-building 
(peace and reconciliation with Israel) has developed at the civil society level after the Oslo 
process. Since then a number of NGOs and individuals have continued to cooperate with 
Israelis in order change the perceptions of the other. The continuation of joint peace-building 
efforts helps Palestinians to retain their faith in reconciliation. As shown by the Joint Israeli-
Palestinian Poll project, for the period 2000 to 2006, general support for reconciliation among 
Palestinians has oscillated between a minimum of 65 percent and a maximum of 81 percent. 
However, it is understandable that when the respondents were asked to estimate when this 
reconciliation would be achieved, no more than one-quarter of Palestinians believed that it 
would be within the next decade or the next few years (Shamir 2007:39). 
Table 4.1 Documents and Staements Related to the Development of the Idea of 
Reconciliation, Cooperation and Co-existence in the Israeli-Palestinian Context 
Israeli Council for Israeli Palestinian Peace Manifesto, 25 February 1976 
h!!Q:llotherisrael.home.igc.orgimanifesto.html 
Israeli Officers' letter to Prime Minister Menachem Begin March 1978 
httl2:llwww.Qeacenow.org.il/site/en/Qeace.asQ?Qi=43&docid=62&Qos=1 
Press Release by the General assembly of Palestinian NGO Network 22 October 2000 
The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Coalition Draft Peace Agreement July 2001 
The Israeli Forum for People-to-People Organisations' ads to counteract the 3 July 2001 
growing entrenchment of Israeli public opinion after the outbreak of 
Intifada 
Geneva Accord October 2003 
httl2:llwww.geneva-accord.orgisiQ storagelfiles/0/40.rtf 
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4. 3 Oslo and after: Israeli - Palestinian Peace-building 
Within the Israeli-Palestinian context, the respective civil societies have been actively 
involved in the peace movement and initiated joint practice-oriented projects. While before 
the Oslo agreements, peace-based NGOs initiated cross-society contacts and put pressure on 
their respective leaderships to start negotiations, since the peace process, NGOs have focused 
on helping to prepare their societies for coexistence and cooperation. 
In general, civil society cooperation builds "constituencies for peace from the ground up, 
[involving] conflict resolution, learning the political narrative of the other, bringing people 
into creative interaction and learning from each other" (Baskin and al-Qaq 2004:544). While 
academic and intellectual projects and contacts have been developed since the first Intifada, 
most of the dialogue and cooperation programmes have started after 1993 through the people-
to-people peace-building initiatives of the Oslo process. In the Oslo Peace Accord, a 
provision was inserted to support the undertaking of people-to-people activities. By bringing 
together Israelis and Palestinians for dialogue and cooperative schemes, the aim was to create 
the relational infrastructure necessary to advance the official peace process. Since the signing 
of the Oslo Peace Agreements in 1993, numerous programmes aimed at cultural and 
structural peace-building have, therefore, been conducted. These programmes have ranged 
from one-time, single events to long-term and continuous series of meetings, and from youth 
encounters to dialogues among schoolteachers, university students and professors 
(Kupermintz and Salomon 2005). 
Since agents of civil society involving peace-building activities are indigenous to the societies 
in which they operate, they are open to the influences of external events, particularly adverse 
circumstances of violence, human suffering and the escalation of tensions. Hence, during the 
al-Aqsa Intifada, Israeli NGOs involved in pursuing peace-building activities with Palestinian 
partners experienced a dramatic and traumatic change in the nature and frequency of the 
activity they undertook (Baskin and al-Qaq 2004:544). In the immediate aftermath of the 
outbreak of the violence, the Israeli Forum for People-to-People Organisations placed ads in 
Israeli and Palestinian newspapers to counteract the growing entrenchment of Israeli public 
opinion. On 3 July 2001, Israeli NGOs specialising in people-to-people encounters called for 
an end to the use of the language of violence, racism and intimidation. 
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We, the Israeli Organisations who work to advance Israeli-Palestinian 
cooperation, dialogue and peace between the two peoples ... call upon the sides 
to stop all incitement and to end the use of [the ] language of violence, racism 
and intimidation. In these days, we are also working to convene peaceful 
encounters between Israelis and Palestinians through dialogues which are 
based upon equality, mutual recognition and respect, in order to bring the two 
peace camps closer together (IPCRI 2002:77 [Emphasis original]). 
The outbreak of the second Intifada caused a decline in the legitimacy of peace-building 
efforts in Israel and the Israeli public had lost faith in Israeli-Palestinian peace-building. 
Consequently, civil society agents involved in peace-building have been relegated to the 
unavoidable role of simply advocating the basic legitimacy and relevance of their positions, 
while continuing to maintain the web of communication and cooperation with their 
Palestinian colleagues (IPCRI Report 2002:8). On the Palestinian side, Palestinian civil 
society cautiously, and usually discreetly, chose to reconsider the strong anti-normalisation 
line in Palestinian society, which has incrementally enabled a growing re-engagement of 
Palestinian civil society with their former or new Israeli partners for the continuation of 
peace-building efforts (IPCRI Report 2002:9). 
Even though peace-building activities did not prevent the outbreak of violence, they produced 
positive results at the micro level. According to follow-up studies, peace-building activities 
succeeded in terms of improving the mutual attitudes of Israeli and Palestinian participants 
(Adwan and Bar-On 2000, Chaitin et al. 2002). Another indicator of the success of people-to-
people peace-building activities is the number of peace-building activities that have continued 
even following the collapse of the peace process. The peace-building activities that have 
successfully continued their work are those operated jointly with a process of joint decision-
making involving Israelis and Palestinians in accordance with the principles of partnership in 
project implementation, joint operations and ownership (Baskin & Qaq 2004:552). Through 
insisting on the idea of reconciliation and cooperation, these civil society efforts have tried to 
contribute to a change of direction from negative relations to an improving one. 
The first case that is analysed here to illustrate the Israeli-Palestinian civil society'S peace-
building efforts is water management. Water management is one particular issue that is 
susceptible to a normal political process. As a consequence of this, water management has 
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become part of both peace-making during the Oslo negotiations and structural peace-building. 
Although control over, and access to, water resources is one of the conflict-causing issues 
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, it was the first issue agreed upon by the two 
conflicting parties. In order to facilitate the water allocation issues and water-related projects 
and improve the efficiency of water systems, especially in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
a Joint Water Committee was established between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. 
During the Oslo process, besides the establislunent of the Joint Water Committee, several 
projects dealing with shared water resources between Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
were also launched. Even though most of these projects were coordinated by international 
environmental NGOs andlor international agencies like the Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA) and the US Aid Agency (USAID), the project teams consisted 
of Palestinian and Israeli experts. Through this process, besides the international NGOs, local 
Palestinian and Israeli environmental NGOs initiated cooperation projects aimed at improving 
the quality and quantity of shared water resources. As a natural result of such 
interdependency, these water management proj ects have been instrumental in providing 
grounds for cooperation and reconciliation between adversaries. It is assumed that working 
together with the other for the improvement of valued natural resources like water will 
contribute to a re-definition and re-evaluation of relations with the other, and thus positively 
influence the desecuritisation process. 
Following the analysis of water management as a means for desecuritisation, in Chapter 6, 
among the successful civil society efforts that are involved in cultural peace-building 
activities, peace education activities of the Israeli-Palestinian civil societies will be analysed. 
IPCRI, PRIME and Windows have become involved in joint Israeli-Palestinian peace 
education as part of cultural peace-building activities and have thereby aimed to transform 
perceptions and language relating to the other, thereby contributing to the initiation of a 
desecuritisation process. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Cooperation over Water Resources as a Tool for Desecuritisation: 
the Israeli - Palestinian Case 
Water is vital to human survival and concerns regarding quality, quantity and the allocation of 
water resources in arid regions are often considered to be issues of water security. 
Considering the vital importance of water for human beings and societies, access to this 
precious commodity has security implications when water-sharing issues are perceived as 
threats to national security. In most cases, the notion of national sovereignty can be 
interpreted as exclusive rights of ownership and use over all water resources within or flowing 
through a state's territory. This may cause tensions between states and societies which share 
the particular water resource. However, the scarcity of fresh water is not always a source of 
conflict and disputes over freshwater access and quality do not generally lead to conflicts. In 
some cases the need to deal with transboundary water issues facilitates cooperation. 
Cooperation takes place on large water-development projects where no other option exists and 
the outcomes are perceived to be mutually beneficial. Within this context, a school of thought 
emerged throughout the 1990s, denying a link between water scarcity and international war. 
According to scholars like I.A. Allan (1992), empirical evidence shows that arid states have 
far more to gain from cooperation than in wars against each other to claim the other's water. 
Based on his extensive survey of water crises and treaties, Aaron Wolf (1998, 1999) claimed 
that water has brought about much more interstate cooperation than conflict. He analysed 
crises among riparian states between 1918 and 1994 and identified only a few cases where 
water issues contributed to the dispute. 
The strength of Allan's opinion is supported by the Israeli-Palestinian case, which has 
transformed from conflict formation over fresh water resources to conflict management with a 
decade of conflict resolution efforts in between. During the peace process, water management 
was considered as one of the key issues that facilitated conflict resolution in other areas. This 
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chapter views Israeli and Palestinian environmental NGOs' cooperation over shared water 
resources as means of desecuritisation that will contribute to a fully-fledged desecuritisation 
process in the long run. 
The first section provides a review of points of conflict over fresh water that have arisen 
between Israelis and Palestinians after the establishment of the State of Israel. The second 
section discusses the place of water as part of the peace-making and peace-building processes 
in the Israeli-Palestinian context. The final section is an analysis of water management as a 
means of desecuritisation. In this connection, three joint Israeli-Palestinian NGOs concerned 
with water management projects, IPCRI, Friends of the Earth Middle East (FoEME) and the 
Arava Institute for Environmental Studies along with one Palestinian NGO in collaboration 
with Israelis in water management, the Water and Environmental Development Organisation, 
were taken into consideration for the analysis. Data was gathered from websites and printed 
material provided by these NGOS as well as the project reports that they produced. In addition, 
three semi-structured interviews were conducted with Gershon Baskin, Co-Director ofIPCRI; 
Robin Twite, Programme Coordinator of IPCRI Water and Environment Programs and Nader 
al Khateeb, Regional Coordinator of FoEME (Bethlehem) and General Director of the Water 
and Environmental Development Organisation. The interviews provided background 
information about the water issues in the Israeli-Palestinian context and gave insights into 
water cooperation as it affects water resources shared by Israelis and Palestinians. 
5.1 Water in the Israeli - Palestinian Context: From Conflict Formation to 
Conflict Management 
Israel is considered as a water stressed country according to the World Health Organisation's 
(WHO) standards, which define water stress as existing where average per capita 
consumption is less than 500m3• A rising birth rate, 17.71 birthslJ,OOO population in 2007 
according to CIA estimates (The World Factbook 2007), and immigration have led to 
population growth and an increase in the demand for drinking water. The concentration of 
settlementS, the rising standard of living of Israeli society and economic activities have 
resulted in growing demand for water. 
Israeli water problems are not limited to considerations of scarcity. Lonergan and Brooks 
regard them as being the result of three interrelated and interacting crises. The first is the 
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water supply and demand crisis while the second involves the deterioration in water quality. 
The third issue is about the geopolitical dimension of the water problem due to the fact that 
around one-third of the water consumed in Israel comes from the West Banle The dependence 
of both Israelis and Palestinians on the same water has led to a zero-sum game (Lonergan and 
Brooks 1994:8). 
During the initial stages of the Zionist movement, territorial aspirations were guided by 
economic criteria. Thus, a secure supply of fresh water was among the priorities of early 
Zionists. Even before the creation of the State of Israel, the Zionist movement made the quest 
for water a priority. It was argued that without sufficient water supplies, the dream of 
returning to the Jewish homeland could not be fulfilled. This concern was specifically 
expressed at the World Zionist Organisation's Paris Peace Conference in 1919: "The 
economic life of Palestine, like that of every other semi-arid country depends on the available 
water supply. It is, therefore, of vital importance not only to conserve and control them [sic] 
at their sources" (quoted in Lowi 1995:40). 
The quest for the development and acquisition of water resources continued to play an 
important role in the definition of national policy after independence. For instance, Levi 
Eshkol, the third Prime Minister of the State of Israel, referred to water as "the blood flowing 
through the arteries of the nation" (Eshkol in Rouyer 2000:80). Since agriculture was 
considered vital in the early stages ofIsraeli statehood, irrigation and cultivation of the Negev 
Desert was an ideological and economic priority for successive Israeli governments. As a 
consequence, the agricultural sector had the lion's share of total Israeli water demand 
compared with domestic and industrial uses (Rouyer 2000). 
The Israeli public has always been aware of its vulnerability to water shortages. Both of 
Israel's main political parties, Labour and Likud, use water for propaganda purposes. Water 
has even been used as a pretext for Israel's continued occupation of the Palestinian 
Territories. Raphael Eitan, Minister of Agriculture between 1988 and 1991, ran a full-page 
advertisement in the Jerusalem Post in the late 1980s arguing that Israel had no choice but to 
maintain occupation of the West Bank to secure its access to water: 
This intense interdependence and the scarcity of water supplies accentuate even 
more the severity of the problem ofauthority .. .It is important to realise that the 
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claim to continued Israeli control over Judea and Samaria is not based on 
extremist fanaticism or religious mysticism but on a rational, healthy, and 
reasonable survival instinct (Reproduced in Wolf 1995,233-234). 
Water is regarded as strategic and important foreign policy concern by Israeli governments 
since water is viewed important to state security. It is argued that water is ideologically 
important to Israeli state and society (see Galnoor 1980 and Rouyer 2000). The importance of 
water for Israel is also seen as a product of the specific pattern of Israeli state formation. 
Selby argues that the contention between Israel and the Palestinians can be explained with 
certain historically emergent features of the Israeli politics and political economy. Within this 
context Selby discusses the rise and fall of agricultural activity parallel to changing dynamics 
of Israeli political economy which has been influential in dynamic of Israeli water policies 
(Selby 2003a and 2005). 
As far as Palestine is concerned, it is by far the most water-stressed of the co-riparians to the 
Jordan River. As we can see in Map 4, most of the water resources in the Palestinian 
Territories come from the three water aquifers in the West Bank and the costal aquifer in the 
Gaza Strip. Generally, Israel's policies to control the West Bank's water resources are seen as 
the main reason for the gap between water supply and water demand in Palestinian territories 
(Abu-Eid 2007:297). 
143 
Map 5.1 Major Water Resources in Israel 
Mountain and Coastal Aquifers 
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Prior to the Interim Agreement, Palestinians claimed that the flow of the western and eastern 
sectors of the mountain aquifer derived from rainfall over the West Banle Consequently it 
was argued that it is Palestinian water and should be allocated for their use (Shuval 2000:40). 
Furthermore, Palestinians also had concerns regarding the growing demands of the 
agricultural lobby in Israel for more and more water, which resulted in the depletion of the 
Palestinian share (Shuval 2000). Both Israelis and the Palestinians have supported their claims 
by referring to the principles of the 1966 Helsinki Rules and the 1997 UN Watercourse 
Convention. The Palestinians have claimed that water flows from the West Bank that end in 
the mountain aquifer should be allocated for their use. The Palestinian argument is based on 
the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty and the social and economic needs of the 
Palestinian people, which they argue are more acute than the Israelis'. The argument behind 
this claim is not just the high level of inequity in per capita water consumption but also the 
nature of economic developments (Rouyer 2000). By contrast, based on the prior use 
principle, Israel has insisted on its historic use of the water from the mountain aquifer. 
Israel's dependency on water supplies that originate in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
has been a source of internal and international criticism. Elmusa (1993) has argued that about 
half of the issues raised over Israeli-Palestinian water use derive from the problems of 
occupation. However, two developments changed the course of Israeli-Palestinian conflicts 
over water relations. First of all, during the 1990s in Israel the primacy of agriculture and 
agricultural independence policy gradually lost its relevance. Secondly, both Israeli and 
Palestinian leaders were engaged in the peace process. Water was one of the five issues being 
treated in separate multilateral peace negotiations that paralleled the bilateral negotiations 
between Israel and the Palestinians (Elmusa 1993). 
In his seminal book Rivers of Eden: The Struggle for Water and the Quest for Peace (1994), 
Daniel Hillel pointed out the catalytic role that water can play in reconciliation and 
cooperation in the Middle East: 
[ .. ] water in nature can be either a bearer of life or an agent of death, so in a 
desperately thirsty region the issue of water can either bring the parties together 
or set them apart ... The hydrological imperative thus presents a challenge and 
an opportunity. Water can catalyse and lubricate the peace process, smooth the 
edges and soften the transition to regional cooperation ... (1994:283, 287) 
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In the Israeli-Palestinian case, achieving long-tenn cooperation III transboundary water 
management has become imperative for the benefit of all riparian states. However, it has been 
subordinated to higher political factors. As an earlier example, the US-mediated efforts during 
the 1950s to construct a water regime in the Jordan basin can be given. The US government 
proposed the Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley. According 
to the Eisenhower administration, cooperation in sharing and managing water resources could 
inspire a political settlement (Lowi 1995b). Within this context, in 1953 the United Nation 
Relief and Works Administration (UNRWA) commissioned a report for a basin-wide project 
which was named after the US envoy, Eric Johnston, who was sent to the region to mediate a 
settlement over the Basin allocations (Jagerskog 2003). The plan was objected to both by the 
Arab states and the Israelis, thus they prepared their own alternative plans. The only positive 
outcome of the plan was the infonnal but regular meetings between technical experts from 
Jordan, Israel and the West Bank. These infonnaI meetings were called 'Picnic Table Talks' 
and constituted the basis for the Oslo accords between Israel and Jordan as well as between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Elhance 1999). As stated by Lowi, the US attempts to 
promote cooperation over water during the 1950s and 1970s had failed since they did not 
address the high politics: "States that are adversaries in the 'high politics' of war and 
diplomacy do not allow extensive collaboration in the sphere of 'Iow politics' centred around 
economic and welfare issues" (Lowi 1995:196). 
The water allocation issue has been considered to be extremely important for Palestinians 
because a future Palestinian State cannot be viable without a reliable and secure source of 
water. Control of water was thus central to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the 
Oslo Process. At the beginning of the bilateral negotiations, Israel refused to discuss 
Palestinian water rights, preferring instead to discuss cooperation on future water needs. On 
the other hand, during the negotiations, the Palestinians stated that the restrictions on well-
drilling and imposition of quotas were a reflection of Israel's denial of the principle of 
reasonable and equitable shares. Furthennore, the Palestinians accused Israel of causing 
significant harm by over-pumping the mountain aquifer and drilling deep wells for Jewish 
settlements (Rouyer 2000). 
In spite of these initial disagreements, Israel and the Palestinian National Authority signed the 
Interim Agreement on 28 September 1995. Topics related to water and waste water were 
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addressed by Annex III (The Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs) and Appendix I, Article 40, 
entitled Water and Sewage. The agreement entailed recognition by Israel of the existence of 
Palestinian water rights in the West Banle Under the Interim Agreement, Israel agreed to 
provide an additional 28.6 mcm of water a year to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip and to the establishment of a Joint Water Committee (JWC) to coordinate management 
of water and waste water in the West Bank during the interim period. 
As stated in Article 40 of the Interim Agreement, a JWC was established with the aim of 
implementing the undertakings of the parties. The Committee was to be composed of an equal 
number of participants from each side and to reach decisions through consensus. Due to the 
fact that the JWC is not an independent, non-governmental committee, water remains a 
feature of high politics between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. 
After the establishment of the JWC, Palestinians have continued to criticise the Israeli 
occupation regarding water shortages in Palestinian territories (Trottier 1999). Despite the 
Palestinian water authorities' insistence on the Palestinian water rights issue, they have not 
rejected the necessity of joint efforts. As expressed by Marwan Haddad, one of the leading 
Palestinian water experts, a joint Palestinian Israeli water utility operating and serving both 
peoples along this line has been considered to be a the most feasible option for resolving the 
water conflict (Haddad 2005). 
As far as the implementation of the Interim Agreement is concerned, from the very beginning 
there have been delays in decisions. Palestinians have attributed these problems to Israeli 
unwillingness, whereas Israelis have insisted that they have hydrological reasons for turning 
down Palestinian proposals (Jagerskog 2006). Even though various problems have hampered 
the implementation of the agreement, both Israelis and Palestinians have acknowledged the 
importance of the continuation of the work of the JWC. After the outbreak of the second 
Intifada, in 2001 a joint Israeli-Palestinian call to protect water supplies was concluded at a 
meeting of the JWC, which aimed at keeping the water infrastructure out of the cycle of 
violence. The document declared that: 
The two sides wish to bring to public attention that the Palestinian and Israeli 
water and wastewater infrastructure is mostly intertwined and serves both 
populations .... We call on the general public not to damage in any way the 
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water infrastructure, including pipelines, pumping stations, drilling equipment, 
electricity systems, and any other related infrastructure (Joint Israel-Palestinian 
CaU to Protect Water Supply, 2001). 
After the declaration the JWC has continued to meet, yet irregularly. With the failure of the 
peace process, both sides wanted to avoid the destructive effects of the resumption of 
violence on shared water resources thus they ensured that they were jointly managed. 
Through official and non-official means both sides attempted to prevent/control violence 
regarding water resources by adopting a certain degree of coordination and cooperation (Bar-
Siman-Tov 2007:11). 
There are, however, contrasting views regarding the success of the JWC. The Interim 
Agreement and the establishment of the JWC are seen by some water experts as a turning 
point by which responsibility for the water sector was given to the Palestinian Authority (see 
Jagerskog 2003, Rouyer 2000, Shapland 1997). According to Rouyer, for example, the 
Interim Agreement contained the first explicit and unequivocal recognition of Palestinian 
water rights in the West Bank. In addition, it stimulated a formal system for the coordinated 
management of the West Bank's water resources, supplies and systems and established teams 
for supervising and monitoring the joint water-management system (Rouyer 2000). On the 
other hand, scholars like Mark Zeitoun and Jan Selby view the development of cooperative 
mechanisms for managing the West Bank's water resources as a reflection of asymmetric 
power relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. 
Zeitoun and his colleagues who have participated in the Hydro-Hegemony Workshops argue 
that the signing of the agreement does not reflect a reciprocity. Rather, it was inevitable due to 
the great power asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Zeitoun 2008a). 
Zeitoun argues that power asymmetries have caused the weaker side of the conflict, in this 
case the Palestinians, to lose out to the strong. According to Zeitoun, the advantageous 
position achieved by Israel through its access to power has resulted in its securitisation of 
access to water resources even without resorting to violent conflict to achieve its goals 
(Zeitoun 2008b). 
Similarly, Selby argues that the patron-client relations between Israel and Palestinians during 
the pre-Oslo period were repackaged and represented as instances of Israeli-Palestinian 
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cooperation during the Oslo period. (Selby 2003a, 2003b, 2006). Selby argues that the water 
regime established under Oslo is a recipe for 'joint mismanagement' of the water sector 
(Se\by 2006). For example, Selby criticised the JWC system as the formalisation of a 
"discriminatory management regime that was, for the most part, already in existence" (Selby 
2006:325). According to Selby, the Oslo water regime did not change either the water 
structure or the distribution and monitoring system which had been constructed during the 
course of the occupation. In other words, the water regime of the Oslo agreements just 
formalised the existing supply management system, hence it was not 'joint' and 'coordinated' 
as presented. The Oslo agreement enabled Israel to transfer the burden for improving 
Palestinian water supplies from the Israeli water agency, Mekorot, to the Palestinian 
Authority (Selby 2006). Furthermore, the establishment of the JWC, Joint Supervision and 
Enforcement Teams (JSETs) and the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) means "extra layers 
of bureaucracy which had few powers, and which ... served to symbolise and dissimulate 
Palestinian authority." In this regard, Selby sees the water regime established during the Oslo 
Process as "[dressing] up domination as cooperation" (Selby 2003b). 
Interviewees also expressed contrasting views regarding the JWC. According to Robin Twite, 
coordinator of the IPCRI Water and Environmental Programme, the JWC is the first political 
mechanism between Israelis and Palestinians and it was affected less by the outbreak of the 
Intifada than by the formation of the Hamas government in 2006 (Twite 2007). By contrast, 
Nader al-Khateeb, General Director of the Water and Environmental Development 
Organisation, defines the JWC as a political committee not a technical one, and thus a body 
not functioning as intended (Khateeb 2007). As stated by Khateeb, particularly within the 
Israeli-controlled West Bank, Palestinians' well-drilling proposals were turned down while 
almost all of the proposals from the Israeli side were approved. Khateeb (2007) underlined 
that the constraints set by the JWC on Palestinian development projects, including the 
construction of new water supply systems in the West Bank, leave Palestinians with an old 
infrastructure and cause significant disruptions to water supplies. 
5.2 Water Management as Part ofIsraeli-Palestinian Peace-building 
Of all the issues in the Israeli-Palestinian context, access to fresh water has been one of the 
most visible since water is considered an issue of vital importance to both sides. Therefore, 
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water was seen as an issue in negotiations that has the potential for resolution. It has also 
provided opportunities for peoples from both sides of the conflict to work together. 
Even before the signing of the Interim Agreement and the establishment of the JWC, Israeli 
and Palestinian environmental experts were well aware of water-related problems. Within this 
context, the IPCR! initiated a meeting called Our Shared Environment in December 1994. 
This conference was particularly important since it was the first time that Israeli and 
Palestinian civil society and water experts from governmental level had met in an informal 
context to discuss their mutual concerns. During the conference, both Israeli and Palestinian 
delegates pointed out the need for cooperation on water management and linked 
environmentalism to the structural peace-building process (1994: 1-2). Referring to the 
importance of sustainable water systems, Yoram Avnimelech from Haifa University Faculty 
of Agricultural Engineering pointed out the necessity for Israelis and Palestinians to work 
together by saying that " ... this problem of water quality knows no borders. Israelis and 
Palestinians share the same watersheds and aquifers and have to deal with this together" 
(1994:29). As an example of Palestinian views, Karen Assaf from the PNA Ministry of 
Planning underlined the importance of overcoming the lack of trust between the two sides 
when dealing with water-related problems by saying that "there is a problem of conflicting 
entities and the attitude over the years that either we use it (water) or lose it. In essence, as 
Palestinians and Israelis, we have to get over this lack of trust and begin to coordinate and 
work positively" (1994:57). 
In general, civil society can play a key role in transboundary water management. The 
Transboundary Water Management Report from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(2001) underlines the roles of civil society in water management as follows: 
The initiation of civil. diplomacy between neighbouring groups; moving towards 
dialogue through networks of civil society groups, 
The development of networks to feed into policy development and data collection, 
Capacity building, independent monitoring of process; assistance in feedback of ideas 
and impacts from local communities, 
Implementation and co-funding, provision of technical expertise in development 
management works including social and environmental impact analysis (2001 :66). 
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The report goes on to underline the strengths of various lobbies that have affected particular 
politicians and parties and have had major repercussions for water use (2001 :xi). As far as 
civil society is concerned, it was after the initiation of the Oslo Process that Israeli-Palestinian 
environmental NOOs developed and performed the duties outlined in the above-mentioned 
report. Particularly in Israel, civil society has been an integral and powerful part of the 
political scene and has had a considerable impact on water management policy. 
Even though civil society is supposed to supplement governmental work in the water 
management area, particularly after the collapse of peace process, civil society has taken the 
initiative in project development and implementation in the water sector (Twite 2007). Water 
departments of Israeli and Palestinian universities and NOOs, for example the IPCRI, 
FoEME, and the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, have cooperated in the Israeli-
Palestinian water sector. 
During the early 1990s, Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in the environmental field in general 
and water management in particular was viewed as a means to support the peace-making 
efforts. Hence, parallel to the bilateral and multilateral peace-making efforts during the Oslo 
peace process, numerous joint Israeli-Palestinian NOOs were created to deal with 
environmental issues, including water-related problems. These NOOs became complementary 
to the peace-making efforts during the peace process by supporting policy development in the 
water management area, offering technical expertise, developing capacity-building and 
implementing transboundary water projects. 
Most of the joint Israeli-Palestinian environmental NOOs are funded from the Israeli side or 
from international partners such as the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID); the EU and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), although all of 
them claim to be equally Israeli and Palestinian in their orientation and focus. All of them 
conduct their work primarily in English and all have faced crises associated with the Intifada. 
In spite of the violence that erupted in 2000, most of the joint Israeli and Palestinian 
environmental NOOs survive and continue to contribute to Israeli-Palestinian transboundary 
water management. These projects have faced several challenges and obstacles after the 
collapse of the peace process in 2000, such as restrictions on movement, social legitimacy and 
funding. 
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Despite these challenges, in October 2004 a second Israeli-Palestinian International 
Conference on Water for Life was held. Editors of the conference proceedings, Hasan Dwiek 
from AI-Quds University and Hillel Shuval from the Hebrew University, opened the 
conference with the following call: 
[oo.] resolving the water issues through a much needed and much wanted long-
term peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians is far from 
encouraging ... through this Conference the delegates have participated in the 
process of promoting peace through dialog among scientist in what is called 
"second track diplomacy" (2006:7-8). 
As stated by Michael Zwirn (2001), the success ofjoint environmental NGOs depends on the 
creation of lasting institutional and personal ties between Israeli and Palestinian partners, such 
as those created in the above-mentioned conferences. These networks have maintained and 
withstood the security and political crises that erupt every so often between Israelis and 
Palestinians. Among all the conflicting issues, fresh water has linked Israelis and Palestinians 
both at the governmental and societal levels. In the next section these cooperation and 
coexistence activities will be analysed by reference to the notion of desecuritisation. 
5.3 Water Management as a Means of Desecuritisation in the Israeli-
Palestinian Context 
As was discussed in Chapter 1, securitised issues can be managed or transformed through 
desecuritisation. Desecuritisation refers to a process through which violence ceases to be a 
legitimate option regarding a previously securitised issue. 
W rever views desecuritisation as the best option when it comes to particular issues such as 
environmental threats (1995:57). In the Israeli-Palestinian case, a joint recognition of the 
futility of zero-sum thinking regarding water resources led to the transformation from 
conflict formation to conflict resolution during the 1990s and transboundary water 
management between Israel and the Palestinian Authority became part of both peace-making 
and peace-building processes. With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, the peace 
process collapsed but civil-society-Ievel cooperation and official-level-coordination over 
water-related issues continued. In the absence of political will for conflict resolution, on their 
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own, Israeli and Palestinian environmental NGOs' structural peace-building efforts have not 
succeeded in desecuritising the relations between Israelis and Palestinians. However, their 
efforts have led improvement in their relations concerning the water sector. 
The ultimate goal of desecuritisation is the achievement of a situation in which the issue in 
question is no longer seen as threatening, and thus is no longer defined in security terms. 
Several different factors can encourage desecuritising moves. In the Israeli-Palestinian water 
management case, a number of internal and external factors affected the development of an 
environment conducive to cooperation. First, following the drought of 1990-91, a major shift 
in Israeli water policy occurred and water re-emerged in the public agenda. After the drought, 
Israeli water experts underlined the importance of, and to the threats to, water quality. This 
shift towards the importance of water quality has constituted the basis for the many calls by 
professionals for joint management of the shared aquifers (Feitelson 1996, Rouyer 2000). The 
second was reconciliatory atmosphere of the peace process which changed Israeli views 
regarding the Palestinians' water rights. Within this context, the notion that all people have a 
right to a basic minimal water allocation for domestic use gained popularity among the Israeli 
public and consequently a human rights perspective has been added to the Israeli-Palestinian 
water relations (Shuval 1992, Rouyer 2000). As Feitelson found out, despite the disparate 
perceptions of the water issues within Israel, a dominant view emerged during the 1990s in 
favour of cooperation with the Palestinians (2002:315). The widespread acceptance of this 
discourse was seen in the statements made by Israeli officials even during the Netanyahu 
administration and it was admitted that Palestinian domestic water use has a priority over 
Israeli agricultural water use.2l When the conflicting sides showed signs of readin~ss to 
cooperate this reflected in govemmenta1level policies by the establishment of a management 
structure between Israel and Palestinian Authority, including the JWC, JSETs and PWA with 
the Interim Agreement in 1995. 
As was discussed in Chapter 1, changing negative perceptions and initiating a desecuritisation 
process is not easy. In most cases, realisation of common interests eventually facilitates a 
degree of working trust. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, interdependencies regarding the water 
resources have served as a catalyst to finding a formula on which the parties can agree, which 
could alter their hostile perceptions and mutual fears and hence contribute to the 
21 For the quotations from various interviews and newspaper reviews see Rouyer (2000: 195,207 and 242). 
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desecuritisation of their mutual relationship. Gradually, competing claims and accusations 
regarding the access and control of water have been replaced by securitisation of conflict as a 
threat to shared water resources by Israeli and Palestinian water experts and environmental 
NGOs. From this perspective, the issue is seen as more than a zero-sum game but rather a 
situation where both Israelis and Palestinians stand to lose if they do not carefully manage the 
aquifers they share. As a reflection of this shift in the Israeli-Palestinian water context in 
favour of cooperation over shared water resources, several Israeli-Palestinian environmental 
NGOs were established to institutionalise cooperation between the two sides. Since then, 
water experts and civil society from both sides have been working together. Currently, there 
are several bi-national and/or regional environmental NGOs dealing with transboundary water 
management (Table 5.1) and several Palestinian agencies collaborating with Israelis on water 
projects (Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.1 Joint Israeli-Palestinian NGOs with Water Management Projects 
Research 
(IPCRI)" 
and Information and the IPCR! Water and policy and training level with 
Environment programme was the goal of developing 
founded in 1992. 
Friends of Earth Middle East FoEME was in I 
(FoEME)23 
Institute for Environmental 
Studies'4 
as an umbrella organisation, 
representing a number of 
environmental NOOs in 
Palestine, Jordan, Egypt and 
Israel. 
Arava was founded in 1996. 
capacity in a range of 
management issues. 
of 
water resources in the Middle 
East, lobbying about water 
quality protection. 
Arava is not a typical ISr,aell-
Palestinian joint organisation 
since its key role is to educate 
Palestinian environmentalists. 
Table 5.2 Palestinian NGOs in Collaboration with Israelis in Water ManagemeneS 
Soil, Water and Environment Institute Water, wastewater and soil analysis. 
Water and Environmental ""IUt';' Centre water, wastewater 
Water 
Organisation 
Development 
and soil. 
and studies in the environmental field, 
consultancy, training and education. 
As an example of the work of these bodies, FoEME launched the Good Water Neighbours 
Project in 2001, despite the outbreak of the second Intifada. This project aimed "to foster 
22 IPeR!, About the Environmental Programme, http://www.ipcrLorg//projects and programs//Environmental 
Programs 
23 FOEME, Friends of Earth Middle East. http://www.foeme.org! 
24 Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, http://www.arava.org! 
2S Fida Obeidi (2001) Report: The Impact of the Palestinian Israeli Conflict on the Environment and the Role of 
the Palestinian NGOs in Protecting the Environment Beit Jallah: PRIME 
http://www.vispo.comIPRlME/enviro.htm 
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information-sharing, dialogue and cooperation among communities regarding water and 
environmental issues... An essential component of the project is to advance the peace 
dividend - the peace building potential created through the trust developed by community 
partnerships and cooperative ventures" (FoEME 2005:6). Good Water Neighbours invested in 
peace-building at the community level to create the necessary foundations for a long-lasting 
peace. It is argued that "while at a national level a conflict can prevent progress in problem-
solving, at the community level there can remain a willingness to cooperate. This is often the 
case concerning water supply and pollution problems" (FoEME 2005:38). Within this 
context, five Israeli, five Palestinian and one Jordanian community have participated in Phase 
I of the project (2001-2005). Six additional communities have been included in Phase II (2005 
- present). As was stated in its project report, FoEME encouraged the participation of 
Palestinians as well as Israelis and Jordanians to promote cooperation between conflicting 
sides but avoided the use of words like 'antagonists', 'foes' etc.: 
In a conflict area, it is important to have staff members that are representative 
of the different peoples involved in conflict. 
Through a carefully planned and implemented program, individuals can be 
encouraged to lead their communities, take actions that will improve 
livelihoods and deal with the urgent needs of their community through 
working with the' other' side. Water issues are an excellent bridge to promote 
cooperation between neighbouring communities (FoEME 2005:37-8). 
Through Good Water Neighbours project FoEME also managed to bring Israeli and 
Palestinian local authorities together to cooperate over shared water resources. Within the 
context of the FoEME's Good Water Neighbours project the Mayors of the Palestinian town 
of Baka el Sharkia and the Israeli city of Baka el Gharbia-Jat signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding in 19 July 2007. The mayors agreed to strengthen cooperation between their 
municipalities in order to preserve the natural heritage in the region in respect to environment 
and water concerns. With this memorandum the Mayors declared their commitment to the 
protection of the Mountain Aquifer, their agreement to connect their sewage networks to the 
new treatment plant in Baka el Gharbia-Jat and the importance of cleaning up Wadi Abu Nar, 
a stream that flows through both municipalities. The Mayors recognised the necessity of 
allocating resources and funding for joint projects between the two towns, to increase 
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exchange visits between officials of the two towns. The social and geographical connections 
that tie both municipalities necessitate increased cooperation for the benefit of the region. The 
agreement between the mayors is significant since most of the towns in the West Bank lack 
waste water treatment plant. Due to the geographic proximity of these two communities and 
their use of the Mountain Aquifer's waters, both Israel and the Palestinian Authority have a 
clear interest in promoting solutions like this for waste water as well as solid waste in the 
West Bank. 
Besides FoEME, IPCRI's Water and Environment Programme almost exclusively focuses on 
the role of water in peace-building. As stated in IPCRI's web site the Environment and Water 
Programme of IPCRI is working to promote effective cooperation between Israelis and 
Palestinians in the field of environment with a special emphasis on water issues. Compared to 
FoEME, IPCRI operates at the institutional rather than the implementation level, with 
participants from environmental NGOs, business leaders and ministries from both sides. 
Besides its participation in regional water management projects such as the Glowa Jordan 
River Project and the OPTIMA (Optimisation of Sustainable Water Management) Project, 
IPCRI is serving to create lasting institutional and personal ties between Israeli and 
Palestinian water experts and activists through organising regular conferences and workshops. 
Given the restrictions on movement to/from areas under the Palestinian Authority's control, 
these conferences and workshops seem to be unique platforms for face-to-face meetings 
between Israelis and Palestinians dealing with water management. As was declared in the 
Joint Statement of the Participants ofIPCRI's Conference on Water for Life, held in October 
2004, both Israeli and Palestinian participants continue to work together to deal with the acute 
water problems of the region. 
[ ... ] the Palestinian and Israeli participants, along with their international 
partners remain committed to solving the many challenges associated with 
water quantity and quality in our region ... Human activities caused most of 
our water problems and [we] can solve them. But this will require coordination 
and cooperation (Twite 2006: 19). 
Gershon Baskin, Israeli co-director of the IPCRI, pointed out that a number of Israeli-
Palestinian joint projects were initiated following the conference. In this sense, the conference 
was extremely successful in terms of the continuation of work in the transboundary water 
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management area. Baskin stated that, even if the conflict goes on, civil society continues 
cooperating, as was the case during the Hamas government's administration. He gave the 
example of Israeli army personals' dialogue with Palestinian municipalities regarding water-
related emergencies despite the temporary freeze in official Israeli dialogue with the 
Palestinian Authority, including the work of JWC. (Baskin 2007). 
The Arava Institute for Environmental Studies' academic programs also provide a platform 
for Palestinian and Israeli networks on environmental issues in general and water 
management in particular. The Arava Institute organises environmental teaching and research 
programme in the Middle East, preparing future Arab and Jewish leaders to cooperate on 
environmental issues. Since the participants in Arava programs spend longer times together-
a minimum of a semester and a maximum of two years - Israeli and Palestinian participants 
develop longer-term relationships. 
On the Palestinian side, a number of Palestinian NGOs have been collaborating with their 
Israeli counterparts in water management either being the Palestinian partner of joint Israeli-
Palestinian projects or providing consultancy for Israeli environmental NGOs. As al-Khateeb 
has put it, Palestinian civil society works with Israeli civil society based on equality and 
mutual respect: "Both Israeli and Palestinians have common interests, particularly when it 
comes to water issues. It is a win-win case otherwise it would be lose-lose" (al-Khateeb 
2007). However, he goes on to point out that, despite the good work done by NGOs from both 
sides in the water sector, "civil society cannot substitute [for] governments. NGOs can work 
for awareness, for education but [are] not able to develop infrastructure, which is the most 
needed thing for Palestinians" (al-Khateeb 2007). As Twite has pointed out, besides financial 
and logistical problems that obstruct joint water management efforts, there is still the problem 
of distrust between Israeli and Palestinian political elites. According to Twite, in the water 
sector one can know all the facts about water but the problem is one of attitude and mind: 
getting people to change their opinions, and think more creatively. In the Israeli-Palestinian 
case, since governments of Palestinians and Israelis do not have the same mentality, neither 
side has considered the needs of the other (Twite 2007). Both al-Khateeb and Twite 
underlined that the uncompromising positions of Israeli and Palestinian governments do not 
serve the good of both peoples. For a more efficient water management, Israeli and 
Palestinian governments have to think differently and develop an understanding of their 
mutual water needs. 
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In order to attract Israeli and Palestinian authorities' attention, Israeli and Palestinian civil 
societies have prepared reports on water as a human right and pressurised the respective 
authorities. To illustrate the necessity for governmental-level cooperation in the water sector, 
in its Environmental Newsletter, IPCRI draws attention to Palestinians and Israelis who do 
not have access to piped water: 
It is a miserable comment on the situation in the region that so many people 
living there go without clean, drinkable water. Resolution is in the interests of 
both Israel and Palestine, and most of all in the interest of those who struggle 
each day to find clean water to drink (IPeRI 2007). 
Palestinian sources claim that these problems are exacerbated by the negative attitude of the 
Israeli authorities dealing with water while Israeli experts claim that the various Palestinian 
authorities hinder positive action by their inefficiency. In the same newsletter, IPCRlcalls for 
cooperation and coordination of Water Authorities on both sides. In their call, Israeli and 
Palestinian NGOs underlined the necessity for the Israeli and Palestinian water authorities to 
take the lead to end "unnecessary suffering to thousands of people who are deprived of their 
basic human right to drinkable water" (IPCRI 2007). 
As discussed in Chapter I, two stages of desecuritisation are identified by Andrea Oelsner, 
the first stage involves a positive change in relations between conflicting sides. These initial 
changes, if developed in a positive manner, will eventually allow a redefinition of the 
relationship. Given the cooperation and co-existence work, those environmental NGOs and 
water management experts have already become an indispensable part of structural peace-
building between Israelis and Palestinians. However, with the lack of a genuine political will 
to initiate a peace-making process, one cannot talk about a fully-fledged desecuritisation 
process. The Israeli-Palestinian situation in general and the Israeli-Palestinian water sector in 
particular remains one of conflict management. Particularly in the water sector, both sides 
have succeeded in managing securitised issues and kept water out of the ongoing conflict. In 
this regard, Israeli and Palestinian civil society efforts illustrate the potential for 
desecuritisation between Israelis and Palestinians in the long run. 
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5.4 Water Management as a Means of Desecuritisation and the Prospects 
and Problems in Israeli-Palestinian Reconciliation 
This chapter has analysed Israeli-Palestinian water management programmes and both sides' 
attempts to re-evaluate and re-define their relations. It has been argued that, parallel to the 
ongoing securitisation processes, the continuous peace-building efforts of Israeli and 
Palestinian environmental NGOs and water experts have appeared as one of the main areas of 
cooperation that has considerable potential for triggering a desecuritisation process. 
As far as the assessment of the extent and quality of the cooperation over transboundary water 
resources is concerned, varying degrees of cooperation are identified by Sadoff and Grey 
(2005 cited in Zeitoun 2008a). They suggest an incremental model from unilateral action to 
coordination, collaboration and to joint action. Similarly, the UNDP 2006 Human 
Development Report identifies the range of cooperation from coordination (such as sharing 
information), collaboration (developing adaptable national plans) and joint action (which 
includes joint ownership of infrastructure assets) (UNDP 2006:224). The reaching of an 
international agreement or establishment of an international regime is generally seen as 
cooperation. But when the components of the agreement are not implemented properly, or 
favour one side at the expense of a collective win, the agreement result in poor cooperation as 
experienced in the implementation of the Interim Agreement. In this regard, it is important to 
move beyond the assessment of conflict resolution in water sector as treaties to a more 
dynamic view of transboundary water cooperation as a non-linear process in which state and 
non-state actors establish, challenge, modifY and legitimize multi-layered governance 
structures (Kistin 2007 cited in Zeitoun 2008a). A similar view was expressed in the 2006 
UNDP Human Development Report: 
Cooperation [over transboundary waters] need not always be deep - in the sense 
of agreeing to share all resources and engaging in all types of cooperative 
ventures - for states to derive benefits from rivers and lakes. Indeed, given the 
different strategic, political and economic contexts in international basins, it 
makes sense to promote and support cooperation of any sort, no matter how 
slight (UNDP 2006: 228). 
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Given the deeper and broader view of conflict resolution in transboundary waters, the work of 
FOEME and other Israeli and Palestinian civil society efforts are acknowledged by the United 
Nations as a positive achievement.. Referring to the FOEME's Good Water Neighbours 
project the UNDP report states that: 
A variety of cooperative programmes have been set up in Jordan, Palestine and 
Israel to promote exchange of information and ideas between different 
communities in the region. These programmes have also furthered the campaign 
to protect the Jordan River, which brings stakeholders from the entire region 
together to work on sustaining the flow of this important river (UN 2006: 380). 
The Israeli and Palestinian civil societies' campaign for the protection of the Jordan River 
through unprecedented transboundary cooperation and the actual cooperation between 
Palestinian and Israeli civil societies played a considerable role in structural peace-building. 
According to the first criterion of the CDA's Reflecting on Peace Practice, which helps to 
assess the effectiveness of peace-building efforts, it is considered as effective if people 
undertake independent initiatives, working in creative ways within their own communities to 
cross lines of divisions or to influence outside constituencies. These efforts should continue in 
the face of difficulty, threats, or other overt pressure. This criterion focuses on the shift made 
by people who are caught in conflict from being supporters, bystanders or victims of conflict 
to being actors and activists undertaking personal efforts to bring about peace (Anderson and 
Olson 2003: 16). The Israeli-Palestinian water projects explored in this chapter in general, and 
FOEME's Good Neighbour Project in particular, are considered as successful examples 
regarding this criterion. Given the political considerations that hinder the effectiveness of the 
JWC in the water sector, Israeli and Palestinian civil society actors resumed responsibility for 
the development and implementation of projects to improve the quality and quantity of shared 
water resources. Particularly, FOEME's Good Water Neighbours project has succeeded in 
bringing I 1 Israeli and Palestinian communities, as well as water experts, together for a 
common solution to water-related problems. The installation of rain water harvesting systems 
in school and municipal buildings of the communities which participated in the Good Water 
Neighbours project, the cooperation between Tulkarem in the West Bank and Emek Hefer in 
Israel to collect the olive mill waste with a truck and take it to Israel for treatment in order to 
prevent the dumping of olive mill wastes into the Alexander River which flows through Emek 
Hefer to the Mediterranean Sea, and Israeli enviromuental activists' cooperation with 
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residents ofthe Palestinian village of Urn m al-Reihan in the northern West Bank on the green 
basin project to purify the sewage water in the village (Haaretz 2008) are a few examples to 
illustrate Israeli-Palestinian joint activities to improve the quality and quantity of their shared 
waters. Besides these technical initiatives, activities exist to raise awareness among Israelis 
and Palestinians. IPCRI's regular conferences and workshops and FOEME's workshops bring 
together Israeli and Palestinian youngsters from the communities involved in the Good 
Neighbours Project in order to overcome language, cultural and political issues and establish a 
basis for working together. These are examples of civil society initiatives in the water sector 
that encourage community involvement in peace-building activities. The most important fact 
of all is that these programmes have continued to be designed and implemented, even in the 
face of severe· challenges and ongoing conflict. 
The second criterion for an effective peace-building activity is if it develops or supports 
institutions or mechanisms to address the specific inequalities and injustices that cause and 
fuel a conflict. Such grievances may include inequity in the administration of justice and 
social benefits, or observance of people's basic rights. Peace-building activities can focus on 
political institutions and address weaknesses or the lack of structures to manage conflicts non-
violently. With regard to this criterion, the scorecard of Israeli-Palestinian NGOs has mixed 
results. In the water sector, at the political level both sides have succeeded in managing 
securitised issues and kept water out of ongoing conflicts. Through the establishment of 
institutions to deal with water-sharing issues between Israelis and Palestinians, a conflict 
management mechanism has been constructed. However, the governmental level efforts to 
keep water out of violence and conflict have hindered the development of conflict resolution 
efforts. Despite the failure of the peace process and the problematic nature of the JWC 
system, Palestinian and Israeli water experts have continued to work together to improve the 
quality and quantity of shared water resources. Based on the belief that they have common 
interests in the water sector, they have attempted to turn water management from a zero-sum 
game into a win-win case. This joint effort has contributed to a re-evaluation and re-definition 
of relations between the two sides. In the absence of governmental level support, Israeli and 
Palestinian environmental NGOs and water experts have developed systems and infrastructure 
to address the water-related issues that negatively affect the quality of Israeli and Palestinian 
livelihoods. For the realisation of these projects they have effectively managed to get financial 
support from international development agencies. In spite of the effectiveness of the NGOs in 
addressing localised, relatively small-scale problems arising the mismanagement of water 
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resources, they are still far from addressing the macro-level structural issues in Israeli-
Palestinian water management that require a restructuring of the joint water management 
regime, as distinct from the ongoing Israeli domination over the existing system, and the 
creation of a well-regulated Palestinian water sector (Selby 2003a, 2006). 
The third criterion, the effectiveness in increasing people's ability to resist manipulation and 
provocation to violence, is not something that could be assessed for structural peace-building 
activities like water management. This can be achieved through programmes that increase 
skills for analyzing, managing, and responding to conflict, or that change values and attitudes 
toward the use of force, which is part of cultural peace-building activities and will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
The last criterion suggests that a peace-building programme is effective if it results in 
concrete reductions in the threat of violence andlor changed perceptions of vulnerability. In 
this regard, the possible contribution of joint water management programmes might be in 
human sector security since the majority of programmes aim at improving water resources 
and waste water systems which have enhanced the quality of Israeli and Palestinian lives. 
This however will be seen as a long-term effect of joint water management efforts. 
In summary, the civil society efforts in the water sector have not been supported politically. 
As the securitising actors are incapable of desecuritisation, as illustrated in the water 
management case, Israeli and Palestinian civil society has been acting as the main 
desecuritising actor. At the official level, Israeli and Palestinian water authorities have been 
acting in favour of conflict management, thus preferring to keep water-related issues in the 
context of normal politics. On the other hand, through cooperation over concerns regarding 
the quality and quantity of shared water resources, Israeli and Palestinian civil society 
organisations and water experts have attempted to contribute to the process of redefining and 
reinterpreting their mutual relationship. As discussed here, to some extent they have 
succeeded in contributing to a moderation of negative perceptions by working together over 
the improvement of the quality and quantity of shared water resources. 
As argued by the analytical framework developed in Chapter 1, desecuritisation requires both 
political level and civil society level involvement and the instruments of civil society do not 
hold power and resources for the realisation of a fully-fledged desecuritisation. In the 
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Copenhagen School's terms, the second facilitating condition, the social conditions regarding 
the position of authority for the desecuritising actor (the relation between desecuritising actor 
and audience), fall short. As stated by Lowi (1995), the 'high politics' of war and diplomacy 
do not allow extensive collaboration in the sphere of 'low politics' as illustrated by the water 
sector. But, by managing cooperation between a number of Israeli and Palestinian 
. communities over shared resources and by securitising the ongoing conflict and violence as 
an existential threat to shared water resources, they have contributed a change in public 
opinion about the necessity for desecuritisation (the third facilitating condition). Through 
encouraging interaction at community level, water management programmes have also 
contributed to a change in the language used to define previously securitised relations (the 
first facilitating condition for desecuritisation). In other words, they proved their potential to 
contribute to the desecuritisation process. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Peace Education as a Tool to Desecuritise the Other: 
the Israeli-Palestinian Case 
As argued in Chapter 4, despite ongoing securitisations and conflict, the idea of peace, 
cooperation and reconciliation has gradually developed in Israel and Palestine. Particularly 
after the Oslo Agreements, cultural peace-building activities were encouraged. Within this 
context, Israelis and Palestinians have started to cooperate to change societal perceptions vis-
a-vis the other side in the conflict, thereby helping initiate a desecuritisation process. 
Reconciliation requires going beyond the traditional focus on peace-making by encouraging 
reconciliation between peoples. It has become evident that formal peace agreements fall far 
short of establishing genuine peaceful relations. In the case of formal peace agreements it is 
likely that the majority of the public may not accept the officially-negotiated compromises. In 
this regard, peace education is considered a means of changing societal perceptions vis-a-vis 
the other side of the conflict, thereby contributing to the success of the formal peace-making 
process. Here it is argued that, if peace education is successful in changing perceptions, 
attitudes and feelings, it will lead to a different way of relating to the other collective side of 
the conflict. In this way it can be instrumental in the process of desecuritisation in the long 
run. 
The term peace and coexistence education often describes attempts to educate people to value 
these concepts and to learn to live in line with the ideas of peace and coexistence by acquiring 
corresponding beliefs, attitudes and behavioural patterns (Bar-Tal 2004:253). Peace education 
is generally practised in educational and community settings. The most practised approach to 
peace education is considered as the face-to-face encounter between members of groups in 
conflict. Bar-Tal (2004) suggests two approaches to peace/coexistence education: a narrow 
approach (school approach) and a broad approach (societal approach). The school approach 
focuses on peace education within the school system. It views school as a major agent of 
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socialisation and concentrates on its use to change perceptions towards the other (Bar-Tal 
2002). The societal approach of peace education on the other hand does not limit itself to the 
school system, but envisages changing the psychological outlook of society at large (Bar-Tal 
2004:264). 
In the case of Israeli-Palestinian peace education, joint programmes have continued to be 
designed and implemented even under the worst conditions of violent conflict and continued 
animosity. In this chapter, selected Israeli and Palestinian peace education projects will be 
analysed within the context of the notion of desecuritisation and. the analytical framework 
presented in Chapter 1. The first section presents a general review of Israeli and Palestinian 
peace education. This review is followed by analysis of joint Israeli-Palestinian peace 
education efforts as a means of desecuritisation. The impact of joint peace education efforts 
on the desecuritisation of 'the other' and the effect of ongoing securitising moves on peace 
education work will be discussed here. In this connection, data were gathered from the NOOs 
websites and printed material provided by major Israeli-Palestinian joint peace education 
projects. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with academics and NOO staff 
involved in Israeli-Palestinian peace education as well as less formal talks with some project 
participants and facilitators of face-to-face encounters. Interviews were instrumental in 
structuring the analysis and data collection by providing background information about the 
history of peace education in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Daniel Bar-Tal pointed out that 
peace education in the Israeli-Palestinian context is not something developed during the Oslo 
Process. Bar-Tal briefly gave background information about peace education activities in 
Israel that constituted particulars of current peace education programmes. The informants also 
drew attention to the obstacles that have hindered peace education work on the ground. For 
example, during the interview, most of the interviewees also talked about the challenges and 
problems peace education programmes have faced. Furthermore, the answers that were given 
by informants during the interviews and informal talks were assumed to be supportive of the 
analysis of web sites and publicity documents since they represent the personal versions of the 
story. 
6.1 Peace Education in the Israeli - Palestinian Context 
In general, the goals of peace education in intractable conflict situations are to change 
attitudes, increase tolerance, reduce prejudices, weaken stereotypes and change conceptions 
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of self and of other (Bar-Tal 2004:262). It deals with collective narratives and deeply rooted 
historical memories and societal beliefs. Primarily it aims to legitimise the perspective of the 
other side, its collective narratives, fears and experiences. In this way peace education 
programmes hold the potential to generate changes in perceptions, attitudes, values, beliefs 
and consequently in behaviour towards the enemy that might lead a transition from a culture 
of war to a culture of peace (UN 1999). 
According to Daniel Bar-Tal (2004: 258) only after cementing the phase of coexistence is it 
possible to transform gradually toward reconciliation. Here, education for peace and 
coexistence is considered as a means of desecuritisation since it refers to "the process through 
which society members ... acquire the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours that are in line with 
the ideas of coexistence" (Bar-Tal 2004:261). Peace education programmes in general aim to 
create the conditions of optimal contact in which inter-group acceptance and understanding is 
promoted. Therefore, it is argued here that peace and coexistence education programmes 
make a positive impact on the advancement of desecuritisation processes even in situations of 
ongoing conflict. 
In the Israeli-Palestinian context, several phases have characterised the evolution of peace 
education and coexistence activities. Parallel to the efforts of successive Israeli governments 
to integrate Palestinians into Israeli economic and social life after the 1967 Six Day War, 
from the 1970s to the early 1980s coexistence activities were heavily influenced by the 
cultural approach, which aimed at exploring the possibility of Palestinian integration into 
Israeli life. Both Jews and Palestinian Arabs were encouraged to participate in these activities. 
Cultural encounters provided Jewish participants with an opportunity to learn about 
Palestinian Arabs through food, folklore, dancing and other practices (Abu-Nimer 2004:409). 
Based on his analysis of the coexistence programmes' reports of the time and interviews with 
the Arab and Jewish facilitators of these programmes, Mohammed Abu-Nimer found that by 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, these initial coexistence encounters between Jews and 
Palestinian Arabs aimed at dealing with negative stereotypes and images of the other (Abu-
Nimer 1999). In this phase of coexistence, until the 1990s, the primary focus was on the 
reduction of stereotypes and of increasing cultural understanding (Abu-Nimer 2004:409). 
The Director General of the Ministry of Education published a circular in 1984 entitled 
Education for Coexistence between Jews and Arabs outlining the principles of the new 
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educational policy for coexistence in Israel (Bar-Tal 2004:262). The document referred to 
"relations between Jews and Arabs inside Israel as an issue of civil equality and way of life in 
a multicultural country and relations of Israel and its Arab neighbours as an issue of relations 
between nations" (in Bar-Tal 2004:262-263). The programme focused in particular on 
Jewish-Arab relations within the state of Israel and aimed at developing "skills of tolerance 
and of the ability to listen and understand the other, and treat him or her as an individual 
without using stereotypes" (Bar-Tal 2004-263). yitzhak Navon, Minister of Education during 
the period 1984-1990, implemented this programme. In 1986, a new unit called Education for 
Democracy and Coexistence was established in the Ministry. During Navon's period of 
office, wide-scale in-service training was organised to train teachers in education for 
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coexistence, an attempt was made to extend Arabic language instruction in Jewish schools 
and encounter programmes between Jewish and Arab students of all ages were initiated. New 
educational programmes to advance the coexistence between Jews and Arabs were 
implemented in the schools (Bar-Tal 2004:263, Interview with Bar-Tal 27 January 2007). 
With the outbreak of the first Intifada at the end of 1987, however, the efforts began to fade 
and eventually disappeared from the Israeli Ministry of Education's agenda (Bar-Tal 2007, 
Firer 2007). 
A second wave of peace education occurred during the Oslo peace process with a particular 
focus on the Palestinian education system and coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians 
from the West Bank and Gaza. Since the early 1990s, the impact and nature of peace 
education programmes has generated an interest among academics, politicians and the general 
public. Over the last two decades, the Israeli-Palestinian field of peace education has 
expanded and diversified. Mostly organised and conducted by Israeli and Palestinian civil 
society, the bringing together of Jews and Arabs for dialogue in peace education encounters 
remains the primary tool for coexistence (Bar-Tal 2007 and Firer 2007). 
Following the 1993 Oslo Agreement, the most comprehensive coexistence and peace 
education programme was initiated in Israel to change Israeli Jews' perceptions of the 
Palestinian people and their legitimate representatives. When the Israeli government, led by 
Prime Minister yitzhak Rabin, recognised the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian 
people and signed the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles in 1993. Within this 
context, peace became a unifying national theme for the school year 1994--1995. This trend 
somewhat changed during the premiership of Benjamin Netanyahu, who was less supportive 
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of the peace process with the Palestinians. Finally, it came to a complete halt in the Autumn 
of 2000 when the second Intifada began and the peace process collapsed (Bar-Tal 2004:264-
265). 
The outbreak of the second Intifada on October 2000 negatively affected peace-building 
efforts in general and peace education efforts in particular. As was stated by Ruth Firer, a 
pioneer of peace education programmes in Israel, "when the Palestinian youngsters and 
children have been involved in the uprising, at first by stoning Israelis and later by suicide 
terrorist bombs, Israelis felt disillusioned by the prospect of peace" (Firer 2007). Following 
the outbreak of the Intifada, the Israeli Ministry of Education withdrew its support for peace 
education programmes. The Ministry declared that it was not involved in any peace education 
activities with the PNA (Firer 2004). However, despite the second Intifada, peace education 
and coexistence activities did not stop in Israel. According to the Abraham Fund's survey, in 
2002 there were still 275 organisations involved in coexistence activities and 150,000 people 
engaged in structured coexistence and peace education activities. 
6.2 Desecuritising the 'Other'? Peace Education in Israel and Palestinian 
As was discussed in Chapter I, Buzan and Wrever define desecuritisation is "a process in 
which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential 
threat... and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat" (2003: 
489). The first phase of desecuritisation involves a change of direction from animosity to 
normalisation along with a redefinition of the relationship, which implies a complex learning 
process of re-evaluation of the perceptions of the other and of the' self. In this regard, peace 
education as a means of cultural peace-building potentially contributes to the re-evaluation of 
perceptions. Hence, it becomes instrumental in the normalisation of relations in the first 
instance, and in reconciliation in the long run. 
Furthermore, by initiating peace education programmes, Israeli and Palestinian peace NGOs 
have been acting as a desecuritising actor, therefore taking the initial steps towards 
desecuritisation at societal level. Hence, the Israeli-Palestinian peace education programmes 
offer opportunities for reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. According to Abu-
Nimer (2004: 406), for Arab participants, these joint projects provide an opportunity to 
interact with Jews and voice their ideas and perceptions. Similarly for Jewish participants, 
these programmes are a chance to leam about the political perceptions and culture of 
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Palestinians. However, given the lack of political will among the political elite regarding 
desecuritisation and respective reconciliation, the civil efforts to develop a different type of 
relation other than antagonism have remained limited. 
The limitations of persuading the whole society of the importance of coexistence can be 
overcome by focusing on schools. According to Bar-Tal, school is an important agent in 
peace education for several reasons. First, since schools are compulsory, all children and 
adolescents are required to attend until a certain age, hence, schools reach a whole segment of 
a society, namely the young generation. Second, the young generation is relatively least 
affected by the dominant narratives within society. Third, in comparison to other socialisation 
agents, society has maximum control over the messages transmitted in schools. Educational 
authorities such as the Ministry of Education or the Board of Education can decide on 
curricula, educational programmes and school textbooks. Fourth, the young generation is 
required to learn the messages and information transmitted in schools, therefore, it is possible 
to be assured that students will at least be exposed to them (Bar-Tal 2004:262). Given the 
value of the school system as a major agent of socialisation, the insertion of peace education 
into formal education can thus serve as a significant medium of desecuritisation. 
Consequently, the majority of peace education programmes in the Israeli-Palestinian context 
focus on schools and pupils. 
Under the agreements following Oslo, both Israel and the PLO (later PNA) were required to 
foster mutual understanding and tolerance and to abstain from incitement, including hostile 
propaganda. Within this context the initial efforts directed towards formal education formed 
an important part of peace education. Israeli and Palestinian curricula and textbooks were 
reviewed in order to detect the elements of incitement, racism and hostile propaganda. Within 
this context, some of the joint Palestinian and Israeli NGOs developed projects for the 
development of new learning materials to contribute to the advancement of reconciliation and 
coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. 
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Table 6.1 Joint Israeli-Palestinian NGOs Dealing with Israeli-Palestinian Peace Education since 1993 
The Palestine 
Centre for Research & 
Information (!PCRl)' 
Peace 
in the Middle East 
(PRlME)' 
Seeds for Peace Middle 
East Programme 4 
-Channels 
CommunicationS 
IPCRl's peace education department 
programme for the creation of a joint Israeli-Palestinian 
Peace Education Centre for the development of curricula, 
the training of teachers and linking academic research in 
peace education with the field. 
two two 
mutually sensitive ones through developing textbooks. 
of Peace has on 
Israeli teenagers together to see the human face of their 
enemy. It reverses the legacy of hatred by nurturing 
friendships that have become the basis for mutual 
understanding and respect 
We are Jews and Palestinians both sides of the 
Line working together to promote acquaintance, 
understanding and reconciliation between both peoples 
through educational programmes, media and art 
into 220 teachers, 5.000 
Reconciliation: a schools from Israel and 30 high schools from the West 
Education Curriculum Bank participated in these projects. 
for 10th and 11'" gra.o"".1 
Lesson Plans in Peace 
Education (Grades I" -
12th) 
Advanced 
Programme. 
Seasonal Seminars. 
Centres 
Tel A viv and Tul 
Karem. 
Bi-lingual Youth 
Magazine. 
40 young people from 
participate in quarterly programmes. 
Each issue of Windows magazine reaches up to 40,000 
children and adults. 
I The Adam Institute for Democracy and Peace, Abut the Institute, hltp:l!www.adaminstitute.org.illenglish/who_r_we.htrnl 
2 The Israeli Palestine Centre for Research and Information, Peace Education Documents, http://wwwjpcri.org/filesipeace-education.html 
) Peace Research Institute in the Middle East Dual-Narrative History Project, Project description, http://vispo.comlPRlME/iraml92.pdf 
• Seeds for Peace Middle East Programme, http://www.scedsofpcace.org/programsimiddlceast 
5 Windows _ Channels for Communication, Introduction to Windows, httpJ/www.win~peace.org/about.html#lNTRO 
As an example, IPCRI, one of the leading Israeli-Palestinian NGOs involved in peace 
education, views the formal education system as a primary vehicle for "promoting the 
principles of tolerance, peace, respect for diversity, human rights and citizenship, and 
for promoting the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians" (IPCRI 2004a:5). 
Within this context, in 1997 IPCRI launched a peace education programme to 
penetrate the school systems of the two societies, and to turn the classroom into a 
vehicle for rapprochement. The basic idea was "to develop models of peace education 
and to train teachers and to reach a spill-over effect and have a wide-reaching impact" 
(IPCRI 2005:1). IPCRI's Peace Education team developed two different curricula for 
Israelis and Palestinians, Pathways into Reconciliation for Israeli schools and 
Education for Peace for the Palestinian schools. Both curricula highlighted the 
necessity to include learning basic values which stand as a basis of peace and 
democracy, such as equality, liberty and social involvement; learning and 
understanding control mechanisms such as majority-minority relations and personal, 
gender, cultural and national control; discussing questions like what history is and 
whose history it is as well as learning skills of conflict transformation. 
By August 2002, this programme had reached more than 60 high schools in Israel and 
in the West Bank and there were more than 400 teachers and 4,500 students in 
participating 9th and 10th grade classes (Baskin 2002). The long-term goals of the 
project were to develop an educational package including curricula, teacher training 
and encounters between Israeli and Palestinian students. It was planned that this 
programme would eventually be adopted and used by the Israeli and Palestinian 
Ministries of Education. IPCRI's Peace Education Programme succeeded in 
developing classroom study, conducting a number of encounter programmes, teacher 
training and research with the participation of Israeli and Palestinian teachers and 
students from participating schools. However, as a result of ongoing conflict, the 
Ministries of Education have not adopted the peace education programme. 
As part of its holistic approach, IPCRI's programme has included workshops and 
encounters as well as a curriculum development programme. As has been pointed out 
by Gershon Baskin, Israeli co-director of IPeRI, student encounters were one of the 
most important components of the programme. The aim of the student encounter was 
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to give an opportunity to Palestinian and Israeli youngsters to meet 'the other' and to 
challenge their own assumptions about 'the other.' The programme for the encounter 
included personal-level activities, like looking at the issue of names, family history, 
place of birth, influential people; culture-level activities which deal with values 
related to boy/girl relations, music, customs, parent/children relations and folklore as 
well as political-level activities that comprise a design exercise provided to illustrate 
the different narratives of the conflict through making multi-media posters. By the 
end of the encounter, the participants were able to identify both similarities and 
differences between them (Baskin 2007). 
Through the introduction of curricular and encounter activities, IPCRI's peace 
education project succeeded in changing perceptions regarding 'the other' among the 
15 and 16 years old Israeli and Palestinian participants. According to Ifat Maoz's 
study to examine the impact of IPCRI's encounter activities, comparisons of 
respondents' ratings before and after participating in the workshops reveal positive 
changes in their stereotypical perceptions of each other, as seen at Table 4 
(2000:730). In total 67 Palestinian students from three Palestinian high schools in the 
area of Bethlehem and 64 Jewish-Israeli students from three Jewish-Israeli high 
schools in Israeli towns participated in the workshops. 
Another study to measure the impact of IPCRI's peace education programmes was 
conducted by Yifat Biton and Gavriel Salomon from the University of Haifa Centre 
for Research on Peace Education. Biton and Salomon chose IPCRI's Pathways into 
Reconciliation programme that was then carried out in Israeli and Palestinian high 
schools. The participants in the study were Israeli-Jewish tenth-grade male and 
female youngsters (ages 15-16) from four high schools in different urban regions of 
Israel and same-age Palestinian male youngsters from four schools in major 
Palestinian urban areas. 484 Israeli students participated in the pre-test data collection 
(259 experimental and 225 control students), of whom 320 (186 experimental and 
134 control) participated also in the post-test. On the other hand, 334 Palestinian male 
students participated in the pre-test data collection (150 experimental and 184 
control), of whom 244 (99 experimental and 145 control) also participated in the post-
test. No female Palestinians participated in the study because the schools for girls in 
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the Palestinian Authority declined to participate in the peace education programme 
owing to the onset of the Intifada (2006:170). 
Biton and Salomon's study argued that a well-constructed peace education 
programme leads to the familiarisation of each side with the perspectives of the other, 
hence affecting one's views of the conflict in a more complex way. In a way, peace 
comes to be perceived more positively. Biton and Salomon's study shows "a shift 
towards viewing peace as a matter of cooperation and friendship" (2006: 176). The 
study has also confirmed that participation in a peace education programme can serve 
as a barrier against the deterioration of views and feelings. While expressions of 
mistrust and hatred of Jews by Palestinian non-participants doubled from pre- to post-
test, it barely changed at all among the programme participants. It became evident 
that participation in the programme served to prevent what appears to be an Intifada-
induced deterioration among non-participants. Furthermore, the study also confirmed 
that participation in a peace education programme disconnected the link between 
conflict and individuals in participants' minds (Biton and Salomon 2006: 177). 
Table 6.2 Jewish and· Palestinian Participants' Ratings of Each Other on 
Stereotypic Attributes Before and After Participation in the Workshop26 
Scale from I Not at 
Despite the success in achieving changes in perceptions regarding the other side 
among participants in the project, after eight years of implementation, the IPCRI team 
reached the conclusion that they had still not achieved a spill-over effect and that their 
26 Extracted from Maoz Table I. Jews' and Palestinians' Ratings of Each Other on Stereotypic 
Attributes Before and After Participation in the Workshop; Means (SD), 2000:727 
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peace education activities remained limited to the schools where IPCRI was working 
directly. As Baskin explained, the demand was much greater than IPCRI could 
handle financially and the programmes they had developed would need eventually to 
be taken over by Ministry of Education; this was, in fact, one of the main objectives 
of the programme (Baskin 2007). As this did not happen, in 2005 the IPCRI Peace 
Education team decided to shift its strategy and focus its efforts more systematically. 
Since then, the team has focused on different means of contributing to peace 
education, such as curriculum writing and organising conferences and workshops. 
Specifically, through the International Conference on Education for Peace and 
Democracy, which was held in November 2006, IPCRI has aimed to create a 
community of Israeli and Palestinian peace educators. Within this context, IPCRI has 
also created a joint Israeli-Palestinian Peace Education Centre in order to develop 
new curricula for peace education. This new project is based on the idea that there is a 
need to create space in the curriculum for peace education and this must be done 
through the formal education system. As opposed to their previous efforts to develop 
different texts for the Israeli and Palestinian school systems, the IPCRI team agreed 
on preparing only one set of texts for both Israeli and Palestinian schools. The 
materials have been preparing by an Israeli-Palestinian joint team, which was 
naturally considerate towards both sides' sensitivities. Through the prepared 
textbooks, the IPCRI team aims "to intervene with life-skills-based peace education 
that helps children and adults understand how conflicts arise and how to work 
towards peaceful, non-violent solutions to the underlying problems" (IPCRI 2005:2). 
The books in preparation emphasise the following principles: affirmation of self and 
others, cooperation, communication skills and problem-solving. 
Considering the ongoing securitisations and the respective security responses that 
follow, the idea of delivering the same reconciliatory messages to both the Israeli and 
Palestinian children was different from other approaches. As Baskin has pointed out, 
one of the main obstacles Israeli-Palestinian peace educators have to face is the 
question of how to teach peace alongside an ongoing conflict. Delivering the idea of 
coexistence and a method of teaching it to youngsters on both sides of the conflict is a 
crucial step towards changing perceptions and re-defining inter-group relations. 
According to Baskin, it is time now "to teach young people chances of peace and also 
to teach them peace is a possibility" (Baskin 2007). As was underlined by Baskin, 
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IPCRI's effort requires long-term continuity since it is aiming at a gradual mind-set 
change. Education for peace will thus take many years. At the time of the interview, 
IPCRI was in search offunds to continue its project. Besides the financial challenges, 
in the Israeli-Palestinian context, political events such as the election of a Hamas-led 
government in the Palestinian territories have significantly affected peace education 
efforts. In spite of their determination and constant work for peace education, the 
scale ofIPCRI's projects has remained limited. Furthermore, the lack of political will 
and support of Israeli and Palestinian Ministries of Education has left civil society 
efforts all alone in the peace education area. After the outbreak of the second Intifada 
on October 2000 the Israeli Ministry of Education withdrew its support for peace 
education programmes. More recently, the temporary halt of diplomatic relations with 
Palestinian Authority during the Hamas-Ied government in 2007 caused the freeze of 
all official activities between Israel and Palestine. Moreover, international funds for 
Palestinian governmental and non-governmental activities were also stopped during 
this period. This economic and political crisis had a negative impact of the 
effectiveness of peace education programmes. 
Another Israeli-Palestinian joint effort involved in the development of learning 
materials for both Israelis and Palestinians is the Peace Research Institute in the 
Middle East's (PRIME) project entitled Learning Each Other's Historical Narratives. 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, both Palestinians and Israelis have constructed 
narratives of the same history, which have ignored the other's perspective. Both 
Palestinian and Israeli history writing has focused attention on the protracted conflict 
between Jews and Arabs in political terms, on the competing struggles for statehood 
by the Israeli Zionists and their Palestinian neighbours. In this context, mainstream 
Israeli historiography worked for almost half a century to legitimize and consolidate 
the national memory by tracing the main events of the process of nation-building. 
Similarly, Palestinian historiography has focused on the same political events from a 
totally different perspective. Furthermore, as part of securitisation process, Israelis 
and Palestinians alike have focused on their own narrative while dehumanising the 
other and de-legitimising the other's narrative. These competing narratives have been 
injected into respective schoolbooks and curricula, which is referred to by the report 
evaluating Israeli and Palestinian textbooks during the ten-year period following the 
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peace process as one of the problems with Israeli and Palestinian textbooks.27 In some 
cases, each set of texts presents identical events and dates but offers conflicting 
interpretations. For example, Israeli textbooks present the Balfour Declaration as a 
legitimisation of the Zionist endeavour, whereas Palestinian textbooks show the 
declaration as an international conspiracy against them. While the Israeli textbooks 
call the 1948 war 'the War of Independence', the Palestinian textbooks refer to it as 
'al Nakba' (The Catastrophe). Israeli textbooks discuss aliyah (gradual Jewish 
migration to Palestine), but Palestinian textbooks call this the 'forced Judaization of 
Palestine.' In this regard, the textbooks reflect the official perspectives and security 
discourses of each side and aim to teach these particular perspectives to their younger 
generations. Moreover, while Israeli textbooks view the Zionist leadership's 
acceptance of the partition plan as proof of its desire for a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict, Palestinian textbooks either justify its rejection or ignore it completely. As in 
the official discourse, the terminology used in the books reflects different and nearly 
diametrically opposed emotional associations (Adwan and Firer 1997, 1999; Maoz 
2000a,2000b). 
In order to reconcile these conflicting narratives, PRIME has developed a project of a 
joint school textbook with Israeli and Palestinian teachers. The project has been co-
directed by Sami Adwan from Bethlehem University and Dan Bar-On from Ben 
Gurion University. The PRIME team has prepared two pilot textbooks that have been 
jointly authored by six Israeli history teachers, six Palestinian history and geography 
teachers and six international delegates with the guidance of two history professors, 
Adnan Massallam of Bethlehem University and Eyal Nave of Tel Aviv University. 
As was pointed out by Bar-On, in spite of the difficult political and military 
conditions following the second Intifada, joint meetings between Israeli and 
Palestinian teachers continued for three years and two of the three books have already 
been published (Bar-On 2007). 
21 The Middle East Media Research Institute'S (MEMRl) study of the new Palestinian Textbooks, The 
Centre for Monitoring the Impact of Peace (CMIP) reports on both new Palestinian textbooks and Israeli 
textbooks, IPCRl's examination of the Israeli and Palestinian textbooks and The Harry S. Truman 
Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace's comparative study of Palestinian and Israeli textbooks 
are among the most comprehensive evaluation reports. 
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Each book contains three chapters covering crucial historical events which have 
determined the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Each page is divided into three columns; 
the Israeli and Palestinian narratives mirror each other on opposite sides of the page 
with a blank column in the middle that creates space for students to think for 
themselves (An example of these pages is attached as Appendix 1). The main idea 
behind this project is that "at the present stage of hostility, the Israeli Jews and the 
Palestinians are not able to develop a joint narrative of their history ... in the 
meantime they could learn to acknowledge and live with the fact that there are at least 
two competing narratives to account for their past, present, and future" (Adwan and 
Bar-On 2004:514). The PRIME team argued that this is an essential intermediate 
phase between leaming about each other and legitimising the other's valid reasoning. 
Instead of criticizing the existing narratives or creating a narrative to deliver a more 
co-existential message, PRIME's textbook project simply aims at transforming "two 
hateful single narratives into two mutually sensitive ones" (Adwan and Bar-On 2007). 
In other words, a transformation from a conflict to a post-conflict narrative was 
intended as a way for Israelis and Palestinians to find a mutual level of respect for the 
other's narrative, which is instrumental for desecuritising the other. 
24 teachers have taught the pilot textbooks in 9th and lOth grade history classes. As . 
Bar-On stated, "the teachers' experience was unique since they introduced the other's 
narrative while the conflict was going on" (Bar-On and Adwan 2006:3). Parents' and 
pupils' reactions reflected the tense political situation. Despite initial resentment 
towards the idea of learning the others' narratives, many of the students who have 
been taught using PRIME's books have re-affirmed the importance of learning the 
other's narratives and seeing the differences between them and their own?8 At the 
time of interviews (January/February 2007) the project was not yet complete. Only 
two of the three books were published and the teachers participating in the 
preparation of the books were teaching by using them in their classes. The formal 
evaluation of the use of the shared history booklet in Israeli and Palestinian 
classrooms had only just started.29 Therefore, it was too early to predict the impact of 
28 For the examples from students', parents' and teacher's comments on the use of Learning Each 
Other's Historical Narrative textbooks see Adwan, S. and Bar-On, D. (2006) Learning Each Other's 
Historical Narratives: Palestinians and Israelis Part Two, Beit Jallah: PRIME 
29 The evaluation was planned to be conducted by a tearu of 18 Palestinian and Israeli observers and 
four Israeli and Palestinian professional evaluators during the time of interviews. 
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these books on the aim of teaching both sides' narratives together in the Israeli-
Palestinian context. 
Besides the joint peace education efforts involving formal education, there exist other 
peace education activities aimed at bringing Israeli and Palestinian teenagers together 
in contexts other than the classroom. Organised and conducted primarily by non-
profit organisations and jointly led by Israeli and Palestinian facilitators, these 
encounter activities bring Israeli and Palestinian participants together for brief periods 
of contact. The Adam Institute for Democracy and Peace Peace Education program, 
Seeds of Peace Middle East's Advanced Coexistence Programme and Seasonal 
Programmes and Windows' encounters programmes are among the peace education 
initiatives aiming to bring Palestinian and Israeli teenagers together. The Adam 
Institute mainly focuses on encounters between different sections of Israeli society to 
pronlOte democracy and peace and is not very influential at the Israeli-Palestinian 
encounters level, in spite of its Peace Education programme. By contrast, both Seeds 
of Peace, which is originally an American NGO, and Windows are more active in 
terms of encounters between Israeli and Palestinian youngsters. 
The main objective of the Seeds of Peace Programme is to empower youngsters from 
regions of conflict with the leadership skills required to promote reconciliation and 
coexistence. The main focus of the programme has been on the Middle East, although 
it has expanded its programmes to include South Asia, Cyprus and the Balkans. Seeds 
of Peace's Middle East Programme has focused primarily on bringing Arab and 
Israeli teenagers together to cement a basis for mutual understanding and respect. 
Through the Center for Coexistence in Jerusalem, Seeds of Peace organizes year-
round programmes to support Israeli and Palestinian teenagers' encounters. Advanced 
conflict resolution workshops, school presentations, cross-cultural exchanges, 
educational seminars and the publication of The Olive Branch magazine are among 
the activities that bring Israeli and Palestinian youth together. The most important of 
the Seeds of Peace's activities is the Advanced Coexistence Programme which was 
launched in 2003-2004. This involves around 200 Israeli and Palestinian teenagers 
from dozens of cities all over Israel, both sides of Jerusalem, and the West Bank 
coming together for weekly meetings in twelve different groups and in four different 
locations. Both Israeli and Palestinian participants reported that they have learned 
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each other's concerns and perspectives as an Israeli participant was cited in 
Winter/Spring 2006 issue of The Olive Branch: "We had many wonderful 
conversations, really getting to know one another as human beings ... These dialogues 
... were calmer and more open to getting to know "the other side" (The Olive Branch 
2006).30 
In 2005 the impact of Seeds of Peace's Israeli-Palestinian Programme from 1993 to 
2003 was evaluated externally by an independent research company called Social 
Impact.31 The assessment included surveys of 206 Seeds of Peace graduates, 149 
parents of participating students and 33 educators, as well as extensive interviews 
with Seeds of Peace staff and key stakeholders, including Ministry of Education 
officials, school principals, teachers and political leaders. Results of the evaluation 
indicated significant shifts in attitudes: 60 percent of the graduates felt that they had 
improved their understanding of the other side and 50 percent stated that they gained 
the ability to empathize with the plight of others. Furthermore, in 2005 both Seeds of 
Peace Camp participants and Delegation Leaders were surveyed before and after the 
camp to determine whether and to what extent the Seeds of Peace International Camp 
experience had altered their attitudes and opinions related to trust of the other side. 
Survey results for 279 Middle Eastern campers in 2005 show that 58 percent of 
Palestinians left camp profoundly more trusting of Jewish Israelis, 41 percent of 
Palestinians left camp believing in the possibility of friendships with Jewish Israelis 
(Seeds of Peace Annual Report 2005). 
Compared to Seeds of Peace, Windows Channels for Communication is a local 
organisation that has conducted several encounter programmes for Israeli and 
Palestinian youngsters. Windows aims at promoting mutual acquaintance, 
understanding and reconciliation between Israeli and Palestinian youth through 
educational and cultural programmes, media and art. As stated in its publicity 
documents, the members of Windows believe that "in order to reach a just and lasting 
peace, it is important ... to deepen knowledge and understanding of ... the 'other'" 
30 For more examples please see the other issues of The Olive Branch Magazine which can be 
downloaded from http://www.seedsofpeace.orgln_odeI1830 
31 The impact evaluation has been conducting for every ten years. The latest evaluation that was 
conducted in 2005 by Sociallmpact covers the period of 1993 and 2003. The 2005 evaluation report 
included the Seeds of Peace Camp participants of 1993-2003 period. 
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(Windows: Channels for Communication Multi-lingual Leaflet 2007). Through 
various programmes, Windows aims at empowering young people to change their 
perceptions. Since 1995, Windows has been publishing an ArabiclHebrew magazine 
called Windows, which is written by and for youngsters (ages 12-14) from both 
peoples. During the publication process, young contributors to the magazine are 
involved in a process of joint work that enables them to get to know each other and 
learn about their past, the harsh present reality and their aspirations for the future. As 
stated by one of the Israeli Arab editors of the November 2006 issue of Windows 
Magazine, meeting with Jewish children has helped to change his perceptions of 
Jews: 
Despite all of the difficulties, the joint meeting helped us to understand 
the other side. Because in Jaffa, for example, where I live, when 
something happens, people say that it happened because of the Jews 
and when I spent time with the Jewish children, I saw that not 
everything that happens in Jaffa is because of the Jews and even when 
it is, it is not because of all of them. I learned that one should not make 
generalisations (Windows Magazine 2006). 
The magazine provides an opportunity for Israeli and Palestinian youth to leam about 
each other's lives, feelings and opinions. The magazine also gives readers an 
opportunity to examine the attitudes they have towards each other and helps them to 
recognise their similarities and differences. For most, the Hebrew-Arabic Youth 
Magazine is the only means of communication with youth from the other community. 
As stated by one of the volunteers from Windows, from an early age both Palestinians 
and Israelis are exposed to misinformation and stereotypes of each other. They grow 
up in segregated communities and generally they do not have much chance to meet 
the young people from the other side. In this sense, reading the magazine allows 
children to view one another as individuals, free of their respective national lenses 
(anonymous Windows volunteer 2007). This enables Palestinian and Israeli youth to 
learn things about one another, many of which could not have been learned in any 
other way, and potentially become instrumental in descuritisation processes at 
181 
societallevel. During an informal talk with an Israeli Jewish student who participated 
in the Windows Magazine Project, it was pointed out that: 
Meeting and talking with the others is extremely important. Before 
participating in the Windows encounters I was against the occupation 
but now I have realised that I was ignorant about the extent of 
occupation and its effects on Palestinian people (Anonymous 
Participant in Windows Magazine Project 2007). 
A Palestinian participant shares similar views in Windows magazine's 22nd issue: 
It's important for me to know the others, to know their opinions. They 
might have different opinions than my own. I did not believe that there 
were Jews who wanted peace - I thought that they all wanted to kill us 
(Windows Magazine 2006). 
Even though the impact of Windows' encounter programmes has not yet been 
evaluated, unlike those ofIPCRI and Seeds of Peace, the views of participants and the 
continuous contacts between Israeli and Palestinian participants demonstrate that the 
Windows' activities have achieved the aim of changing perceptions of some 
youngsters vis-a-vis the other. Every issue of the magazine reflects the changes in 
their perceptions of the other and their views regarding peace after the encounters. In 
a recent issue, a Palestinian teenager expressed his wish for peace: "Peace with the 
Israelis is possible, if the war ends. I hope that each of us can live securely in our 
independent states" (Windows Magazine 2006). 
It is estimated that the Windows magazine reaches up to 40,000 children and adults 
with each issue and the messages given through the magazine help young people to 
cope with the reality ofthe conflict and encourage them to think about ways to bridge 
differences. As stated by one of the Windows participants, "although what we 
[volunteers and participants] do is relatively small, it has an impact" (Anonymous 
Windows volunteer 2007). 
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In spite of their efforts, the general impact of encounter projects like Windows and 
Seeds of Peace has remained limited in initiating a desecuritisation process. Besides 
the limited numbers of participants compared to the total population of Israeli and 
Palestinian youngsters, as an encounter facilitator put it, most of the participants in 
encounter projects are from social backgrounds sympathetic to reconciliation and 
peace. Even though encounters with the other side reinforce their position vis-a-vis 
peace and reconciliation, they do not have a significant impact among young people 
with radical views. Another problem is the social perception by their respective 
societies of those participating in encounter projects with the other side. In most of 
the cases, particularly Palestinian young people who participate in encounter 
activities with Israelis, participants are criticisedlblamed by their communities for 
collaborating with the occupier. This is not simply something faced only by young 
people participating in encounter programmes, it is also a general problem regarding 
most of the Palestinians and to some extent Israelis involved in peace education. 
Desecuritisation would require both top-down political processes as well as bottom-
up psychological processes. Peace education addresses the latter aspect, however, 
there is a need for more extensive political, social and cultural change, which is 
something that extends beyond civil society's peace education efforts. As Biton and 
Salomon argue, teaching to view peace as a central concept may well be a step in the 
right direction (2006: 178). Reducing hatred and a more positive view of peace, 
constitutes a part of peace as Rothman defines (1992) and incrementally contributes 
to the process of desecuritisation by enabling antagonists to reconcile their 
differences with less violence and a greater willingness to accept each other's 
existence and identity. 
6.3 Prospects and Problems of Desecuritisations in the Israeli-
Palestinian Context 
In this chapter peace education has been selected as an important sphere of joint 
Israeli-Palestinian attempts at desecuritisation since peace education programmes 
directly aim to re-define and re-evaluate the image of the other through textbooks, 
curricula and face to face encounters. In particular, peace education programmes 
aiming to teach coexistence and peace, like IPCRI and PRIME's, have aimed at 
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influencing the first phase of the desecuritisation process, peace stabilisation. In this 
chapter the effects of the Israeli-Palestinian peace education efforts on potential 
desecuritisation processes have been analysed. 
Applying effectiveness criteria introduced in Chapter 4 to assess Israeli-Palestinian 
peace education efforts, their potential to contribute in desecuritisation process can be 
seen. According to the first criterion, if a particular peace-building activity causes 
people to undertake independent initiatives and find out creative ways within their 
own communities to cross lines of division it is considered as effective. These efforts 
should continue in the face of difficulty, threats, or other overt pressure (Anderson 
and Olson 2003:16). Specifically, Windows and Seeds of Peace's programmes have 
succeeded in promoting involvement, particularly among the young, in these 
programmes not just as participants but as volunteers as facilitators, group leaders and 
technicians. Further, some of the former participants of Windows and Seeds of Peace 
programmes have initiated activities such as the publication of magazines (Windows 
and Olive Branch), organisation of sporting events and the launching of chat rooms 
and other means of electronic communication (ie. seedsnet) through which Israeli and 
Palestinian participants in encounter programmes can continue their interactions. The 
electronic means of communication are particularly important for the Palestinians 
from the West Bank and Gaza where merely visiting Israel means spending days or 
weeks to obtain permits. The involvement of the participants of these programmes in 
advancement of the ways and means building bridges to the other side can be 
considered as an indicator of the effectiveness of the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
education efforts. 
The second criterion is about the particular peace-building activity'S success in 
developing or supporting institutions or mechanisms to address the inequalities and 
injustices that cause and fuel a conflict. Peace-building activities can focus on 
political institutions and address weaknesses in or the lack of structures to manage 
conflicts non-violently (Anderson and Olson 2003:17). Through the development of 
new textbooks and curricula for peace education in schools, both IPCRl and PRIME 
have attempted to improve the formal education system to eliminate prejudices 
towards the other side of the conflict. However, given the existence of 1.5 million 
Israeli and 1.2 million Palestinian students, the scope of these projects has remained 
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limited (Bar-Tal 2007). Hence, the programmes in question have not been as effective 
as they set out to be. 
The third criterion concerns increasing people's ability to resist manipulation and 
provocation, an outcome that can be achieved through programmes that increase 
skills for analyzing, managing, and responding to conflict, or that change values and 
attitudes toward the use of force (Anderson and Olson 2003:17). Both through joint 
works to change narratives and through efforts to provide grounds for encounters, a 
change in perceptions, attitudes, values, beliefs and consequently in behaviour 
towards 'the other' has been aimed at. According to Gavriel Salomon, the Director of 
Haifa University's Centre for Research on Peace Education, despite the ongoing 
violence, participation in various programmes has yielded positive attitudinal, 
perceptual and relational changes among participating students (Interview with 
Salomon I February 2007). Through the books developed and produced by the IPCRl 
and PRIME peace education teams, a redefinition and re-evaluation of the image of 
'the other' has been aimed at. It is believed that at least the young people who read 
these books at school will eventually learn and re-evaluate each other's point of 
views. As Bar Tal pointed out during the interview, the changes manifested as more 
positive views of peace, a better ability to see the other side's perspective and a 
greater willingness for contact. 
The last criterion suggests that a peace-building programme is effective if it results in 
concrete reductions in the threat of violence and/or changed perceptions of 
vulnerability. The contribution of the Israeli and Palestinian peace education activities 
reductions in the threat of violence is almost insignificant since it is something 
beyond the power of civil societies. Thus, it is not fair to assess peace education 
programmes' effectiveness in accordance this criterion. 
As discussed, peace education programmes have been challenged by a lack of 
political will to implement these programmes. During the interviews, the civil society 
organisations involved in peace education pointed out that they could not achieve the 
long-term goals of peace education programmes since they do not have sufficient 
finance and authority. At the time of interviews, governmental level support for 
coexistence programmes in general peace education programmes in particular were 
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suspended as a result of the temporary halt of all political and economic relations with 
the Hamas-led govemment in Palestine. Given the existence of ongoing 
securitisations even before the Palestinian elections, respective Ministries of 
Educations were reluctant to support peace education activities other than during of 
Oslo period. 
Interviews conducted in February 2007 with Israeli and Palestinian team members 
from selected peace education programmes, demonstrated their dedication to the 
. advancement of peace education in the Israeli-Palestinian context. All interviewees 
agreed that when there is no top-down peace-making initiative, peace-building 
activities from below cannot bring peace about by themselves. Therefore, they should 
become modest in their goals and focus on maintaining the opportunity for mutually 
positive interactions between peace-builders and prepare the ground by initiating 
small projects that could become widespread making possible a future 
synchronisation with top-down initiatives should these take place. 
Along with the unwillingness of the respective governments to implement peace 
education programmes, a further major challenge for peace education project teams 
has been the restrictions on movement. Since Palestinians from the territories are 
required to have special permission to enter Israeli cities and towns, and Israelis are 
not allowed to enter Palestinian territories at all, the coordination of joint projects has 
been extremely difficult. The alienation of young generations from each other has 
posed serious challenges for youth projects that aim to develop better understanding 
between Israeli and Palestinian youngsters and teachers. Last but not least, through 
2006 and the first half of the 2007, the deterioration of diplomatic relations with the 
Hamas-led Palestinian Authority and the temporary freeze in international finance to 
Palestine caused a pause in coexistence works in general and peace education proj ects 
in particular. 
As a summary, the success in transforming overtly securitised relations between 
Israel and the Palestinians and in accelerating a full-fledged desecuritisation process 
has been constrained by ongoing political securitisation on the one hand and the lack 
of political will for widespread implementation of the suggested peace education 
programmes. As argued by the analytical framework developed in Chapter 1 
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desecuritisation requires both political level and civil society level involvement. In 
the Israeli-Palestinian case political elite was not willing to initiate a desecuritisation 
process as a result of different political considerations. Hence, in spite of their 
normalisation attempts after the demise of Arafat desecuritisation was never become 
an option. As the civil society does not hold enough power, authority and resources to 
desecuritise the relations, a fully-fledged desecuritisation has not occurred. In spite of 
desecuritising attempts of both Israeli and Palestinian civil society organisations by 
introducing several peace education activities, a societal-level desecuritisation 
process has not been realised since the second facilitating condition, the social 
conditions regarding the position of authority for the desecuritising actor (the relation 
between desecuritising actor and audience) fell short. Since desecuritising actors 
(civil society) do not possess authority and power to exert their influence on the 
whole society they were not able to desecuritise overtly securitised Israeli-Palestinian 
relations as a whole. Still, as part of general peace-building efforts of the Israeli-
Palestinian civil societies' peace education programmes have succeeded in a change 
in the language used to defined previously securitised relations (the first facilitating 
condition for desecuritisation). Last but not least, through several peace education 
programmes directed at different segments of society they have contributed to 
changing public opinion about the necessity for desecuritisation (the third facilitating 
condition). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusions: Towards a more Comprehensive Approach for 
AnalysingDesecuritisation as a Conflict Resolution 
Framework 
This final chapter aims at revisiting the questions and issues addressed in the thesis, 
summarising its findings, drawing out implications for the development of the 
desecuritisation approach and outlining the policy relevance by exploring prospects 
and problems for desecuritisations in the Israeli-Palestinian context. After a brief 
summary of the content of the previous chapters, this concluding chapter reflects on 
the application of securitisation theory as an analytical framework for analysing 
desecuritisations. By discussing the problems and prospects of desecuritisation in the 
Israeli-Palestinian context, the last section highlights the policy relevance of this 
research. 
7.1 Research Summary 
In this thesis the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory has been applied to the 
Israeli-Palestinian case with an in-depth focus on the notion of desecuritisation. The 
primary goal has been to apply securitisation theory to assess its limits and prospects 
as a theoretical framework. The novelty of this thesis is its particular focus on the 
desecuritisation concept through the development of an analytical framework for the 
analysis of conflict resolution. The Israeli-Palestinian case was chosen for analysis 
since it is argued that Israeli-Palestinian relations have the potential to be analysed 
according to the parties' attempts at both securitisation and desecuritisation. It is 
important to note that from the beginning it was not argued that an actual 
desecuritisation process existed. Rather, it has been argued that the Israeli-Palestinian 
case does not just present a case for securitisation; but also has the potential for 
desecuritisation, a potential which was affirmed by the empirical cases in spite of the 
prevailing political tensions and violence. 
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The aim of Chapter 1 was to review the concepts, arguments and assumptions 
introduced by the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory with a particular 
emphasis on desecuritisation. A framework for analysing conflict resolution was then 
provided, one which encompassed a concept of desecuritisation. In Chapters 5 and 6, 
this framework was applied to Israeli-Palestinian civil society's peace-building 
efforts. 
First of all, in this thesis it was argued that in order to analyse the problems and 
prospects for a potential desecuritisation process it is important to understand the 
processes of securitisation in their social and historical context. It is believed that the 
analysis of securitisation processes is beneficial both for the discussion regarding the 
limits and prospects of securitisation as a theoretical framework and for the empirical 
analysis of the desecuritisation potential in the Israeli-Palestinian case. 
In order to analyse desecuritisation potential in the Israeli-Palestinian case, threat 
constructions and respective securitisations were examined through the application of 
securitisation theory in Chapters 2 and 3. Within this context, beginning with the 
exploration of the political and historical circumstances that brought Jews and 
Palestinian Arabs into conflict in Palestine, Chapter 2 gave an historical account of 
Israeli and Palestinian threat constructions from 1897 till the 2000s. This chapter 
demonstrated how securitisations have developed and have been shaped by Israeli 
and Palestinian securitising actors. The idea that by denying each other's legitimacy 
both Israelis and Palestinian Arabs have entrapped themselves in a vicious circle of 
securitisations was explored. Since the situation was 'presented as a question of 
survival by numerous Israeli and Palestinian securitising actors, extraordinary means 
were employed to prevent the threat posed by 'the other'. Chapter 3 provided a 
detailed analysis of the more recent post-Arafat period (2004-2007). In this chapter 
the answers to the following questions were sought: How is support for security 
measures achieved and viewed as a legitimate exercise of state power? What is the 
audience (Israeli and Palestinian public) position regarding security threats that have 
been securitised by securitising actors? As discussed in Chapter 3, immediately after 
the death of Arafat, both Malunoud Abbas, Chairman of the Palestinian National 
Authority, and Ariel Sharon, the then Israeli Prime Minister, showed some signs of 
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nonnalisation. This was considered as a positive change from previously 
uncompromising positions regarding conflict resolution. But still, the peace process 
was not revived and a desecuritisation process was not initiated. The rise of Hamas as 
a political power in Palestine made things harder for Ariel Sharon since Hamas was 
known for its opposition to the State ofIsrael' s right to exist. This period was marked 
by a change of direction in the Israeli discourse from securitising Palestinians as an 
existential threat to the Israeli state and society to the securitising of Hamas as an 
existential threat to both the Israeli state and society and the peace process. However, 
during this period, Israeli leaders in particular tried to find ways to neutralize the 
threat posed by Hamas through conflict management instead of by utilising 
exceptional means. Instead, both Ariel Sharon and his successor Ehud Olmert 
preferred to manage the security situation by initiating unilateral conflict management 
strategies by arguing that they were needed because of the uncompromising position 
of the Hamas-led Palestinian government regarding the State of Israel's right to exist. 
In Palestine, during this period, as opposed to Abbas' nonnalisation efforts, Hamas 
leaders continued to securitise Israeli security measures as apartheid policies and used 
them to legitimise their resistance against Israeli occupation. By contrast, both the 
Israeli and Palestinian publics were keen to return to nonnal politics given the 
negative effects of the ongoing violence on their lives. By the end of 2006 and the 
beginning of 2007, public opinion polls showed that the majority of both the Israeli 
and Palestinian publics did not support the securitising actors' calls. The 
extraordinary measures which were regarded as being necessary by the securitising 
actors, such as the continuous firing of rockets into Israeli settlements by Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad and Israeli military interventions in Gaza, had been taken without the 
respective audiences' consent. Stemming from the analysis of securitisations in the 
Israeli-Palestinian case, the prevailing neglect of the public preferences in the 
securitisation process appear as empirical challenges to securitisation theory, which 
argues the necessity of audience's consent for a successful securitisation. 
Furthennore, the existence of several securitising and desecuritising actors with 
competing claims regarding the nature of the security threat challenges the 
securitisation framework that implicitly assumes the agreement of a group of political 
elite claiming a particular issue as a security threat. 
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Chapter 4 presented a review of the development of the idea of reconciliation and 
peace, as opposed to the continuous securitisation processes, in the Israeli-Palestinian 
context. This chapter demonstrated that, even though both the Israeli and Palestinian 
communities have outwardly presented a monolithic fao;:ade, alongside ongoing 
securitisations there have been more reconciliatory approaches that defend and 
support coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. Among all peace-building 
efforts, two sets of projects were chosen for the analysis of desecuritisation potential: 
water management and peace education. These cases were chosen as a result of their 
focus on coexistence, the former at the structural level and the latter at the cultural 
level of peace-building. 
Chapter 5 analysed Israeli and Palestinian coordination and cooperation over the 
management of shared water resources with their potential for desecuritisation. Water 
has appeared as an issue where both sides have succeeded in managing the securitised 
issues and kept water out of ongoing conflicts. Throughout the chapter, the place of 
. water as part of the peace-making and structural peace-building processes in the 
Israeli-Palestinian context was discussed. The chapter demonstrated that the joint 
effort in the Israeli and Palestinian water sector contributed to a re-evaluation and re-
definition of relations between both sides. 
In Chapter 6, joint Israeli-Palestinian peace education projects were analysed as 
examples of cultural peace-building along with their potential for desecuritisation. 
Through Chapters 5 and 6, the answers to the following questions were sought: What 
is the impact of selected peace-building efforts on the desecuritisation of the other? 
How are those efforts affected by ongoing securitising moves? 
Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that both water management programmes and peace 
education projects have continued to be designed and implemented even in the face of 
severe challenges. As the securitising actors (i.e. the govemingelites) seem incapable 
. of desecuritisation, Israeli and Palestinian civil society has been acting as a potential 
desecuritising actor. Applying the Reflecting on Peace Practice Project's criteria for 
the assessment of the effectiveness of peace-building programmes, through 
cooperation concerns regarding the quality and quantity of shared water resources and 
working for the creation of a culture of peace, Israeli and Palestinian civil society 
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actors have proved the potential for desecuritisation. However, as desecuritisation 
requires both political (peace-making) and civil society (peace-building) level 
involvement and determination in conflict resolution, the Israeli and Palestinian civil 
society have not succeeded in the realisation of a full-fledged desecuritisation process 
as a result of political elite's lack of willingness for desecuritisation. 
Overall, the application of securitisation theory was not flawless and a number of 
issues had to be tackled regarding the Copenhagen School's securitisation approach 
as a theoretical framework. The next section revisits securitisation theory and draws 
out a number of issues that could be adapted or shaped as an empirical case. 
7.2 Assessment of the Copenhagen School's Securitisation Theory as 
a Framework for Analysis 
Since the initial publications of the Copenhagen School, securitisation theory has 
provided a theoretical framework for analysing different international actors' security 
policies and actions. However, empirical application of securitisation theory shows a 
variation in how the theoretical framework has been applied. Given these differences, 
W rever argues that: 
There is by now a surprising amount of empirical studies done with full 
or partial use of the securitisation theory. These do not follow a 
standardised fonnat. .. The theory does not point to one particular type 
of study as the right one ... Optimistically, diversity is a sign that the 
theory ... can generate/structure different kinds of usage ... (Wrever 
2003 in StritzeI2007:359). 
As a response to W rever' s optimism, Stritzel argues that inconsistent applications of 
the theory indicate problems regarding its consistent conceptualisation. In this regard, 
this thesis empirically applies securitisation theory to a very complex conflict 
situation in order to acquire insights which can help to assess securitisation theory as a 
theoretical framework. Based on the adaptive approach taken in this thesis, the theory 
both adapted to, and was shaped by, empirical evidence. At the same time, the data 
were adapted to the extant theoretical materials. This thesis argued that the adaptive 
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approach paves the way for the theoretical reflection and conceptual restructuring of 
the securitisation theory. Stemming from the application of the theory, the issues set 
out below arose. 
As securitisation theory is based on the notion that security is a performative/speech 
act, the centrality of speech in the Copenhagen School's conceptualisation has 
attracted critiques (van Munster 2002, Bigo 200la and 2001b, Hansen 2000). First of 
all, as the analysis shows, Austinian speech act analysis is not always practical. It is 
not just the speech act as a linguistic form at which securitisation analysis should 
look, rather, the words that refer to the specific issue also constitute an integral part of 
the analysis of the security discourse and threat construction. In this sense, the 
Derridian approach appears to be better for analysing securitisations. For example, the 
constant use of negative terms in referring to a particular issue gradually contributes 
to the threat construction, and therefore to securitisation. In the Israeli-Palestinian 
case, Israeli securitising actors' constant use of the terms 'terror' and 'terrorism' have 
gradually become the main theme of Israeli securitisations and have constituted the 
pretext for the exceptional measures taken against Palestinians. In return, Palestinian 
securitising actors have constantly referred to the State of Israel as a colonial, 
imperialist, occupier and apartheid state. These connotations have led to an 
uncompromising position of not recognising the Israeli state's right to exist. As the 
securitisation analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian case affirmed, the analysis of security 
as a speech act should go beyond the grammatical limits of an Austinian speech act 
and focus on the contents and contexts of the speech acts. In this regard, the context 
could even be extended by including televisual images since, as Williams (2003 :512) 
argues, "as political communication becomes increasingly entwined with the 
production and transmission of visual images, the processes of securitisation ... 
cannot be fully assessed by focusing on the speech-act alone". 
By being a conflict between a state actor and a non-state actor, the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is a particularly challenging case for any international relations theory, not 
just for securitisation theory. Palestinian securitising actors' securitisations of the 
State of Israel paved the way for a resistance movement and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict evolved as an intractable conflict between a resistance movement and a state 
actor. Conceptually, by accommodating actors and referent objects other than the 
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state, the Copenhagen School is well-placed to consider non-state actors as well as 
state actors. However, the existence of non-state actors poses challenges to the 
particulars of the theory such as securitising actors, audiences and facilitating 
conditions. 
As far as the question of who can speak security is concerned, the Palestinian case 
underlines a particular dilemma. For a long time the PLO leadership that emerged 
outside the Palestinian territories spoke security in the name of Palestinians by 
prioritising the societallevel security which involves the survival of Palestinians as a 
whole. The PLO securitised the State of Israel as an existentiaI threat to the survival 
of the Palestinian community and ignored the fact that the basic security threat 
perceived by Palestinians within the territories was not societal security but human 
security. The focus moved from threats to Palestinian livelihoods to threats to the 
Palestinian collective identity. Till the emergence of local leadership, Palestinians 
from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip did not find a platform to express the threat 
which Israeli occupation posed in terms of human security. The lack of legitimate 
local representation on the Palestinian side gave rise to several securitising actors. 
Thus the Palestinian political elite and a number of militant groups have acted as 
securitising actors. In this regard, the Copenhagen School's concept of securitising 
actor has been challenged analytically. For example, since the mid 1990s, the Hamas 
movement has arisen as a strong political force in Palestine and developed a 
distinctive security discourse competing with first the PLO's and then the PaIestinian 
Authority's discourse regarding Israel. Particularly, the post-Arafat era became a 
discursive battlefield as the polarisation between the secular Palestinian Authority led 
by Mahmoud Abbas and the Islamist and more radical Hamas movement became 
increasingly intense. Certainly, the rise of Hamas poses an analytical problem for 
securitisation theory, which presupposes a dominant security discourse, which in turn 
implies a certain ruling elite. In general in the Palestinian case one cannot speak 
accurately of a single Palestinian security discourse since 1967. 
Moreover, getting a better insight into Israeli and Palestinian security discourses must 
reflect the actors that are influential in the formulation and transmission of the 
discourse and the relationships between them. This brings an understanding of 
domestic power structures, which is something ignored by securitisation theory. As in 
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the Israeli-Palestinian case, in most of the securitisation cases it is difficult to point 
out one securitising actor or a monolithic security discourse. Since the competing and 
conflicting security discourses reflect the domestic power structures and social 
dynamics within a particular society, the inclusion of domestic/social considerations 
into securitisation theory would be beneficial. 
Buzan and Wrever introduce facilitating conditions by pointing out that both power 
and the intersubjective establishment of a threat are important in understanding 
securitisations (Buzan et al. 1998:25). They claim that security can be conceived as a 
"structured field" since "some actors are placed in a position of power by virtue of 
being generally accepted voices of security, by having power to define security" 
(Buzan et al. 1998:31). Even though the Copenhagen School has positioned power as 
an important factor in securitisation, in the theoretical framework, they do not 
concentrate on the domestic power structures. In this regard, the analysis of the 
Israeli-Palestinian case suggests that domestic power structures and social 
considerations could be integrated into the facilitating conditions. Since Israeli-
Palestinian case is being a case one cannot understand just with internal facilitating 
conditions this study took side with an externalist approach as suggested by Stritzel. 
Thus, a specific emphasis put upon facilitating conditions in order to explore the 
embeddedness of security articulations in social relations of power both internally and 
externally. It was argued that for the analysis of securitisation speech acts in the 
Israeli-Palestinian case a number of external facilitating conditions had also be taken 
into considerations including global political changes, regional power asymmetries 
and other discourses confirming or limiting security discourse such as discourse on 
terror and the Axis of evil, discourses of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. 
The position of the audience as one of the components of the securitisation process is 
left ambiguous by the Copenhagen School. As pointed out by Wrever, the success of 
any attempt to securitise an issue is contingent upon the existence of an audience that 
accepts and tolerates acts by the securitising actor that are not otherwise legitimate 
(2000:251). However, neither Buzan nor Wrever explain whether an explicit 
endorsement by an audience is necessary. Even if they concede that the securitising 
move is realised through either coercion or consent and is achieved through 
negotiations between the securitising actor (ruling elite) and the audience (society), 
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they are not clear regarding the nature of the negotiation process. This is also 
something dependent upon the domestic power structures. Methodologically, the 
measurement of the audience's approval is also very problematic. In this study the 
audience position on the official security discourse was illustrated through opinion 
polls and election results. But both in Israel and in Palestine generally, the audience's 
approval was not always necessary for securitisation. According to opinion polls 
regularly conducted in Israel and Palestine, the audience preference is for 
normalisation yet with some obvious doubts about the other side's good intentions. 
The empowerment of the audience by the Copenhagen School derives from the 
principles of democracy and free speech. This may function in Western contexts but 
can be problematic in non-Western contexts as discussed by Hansen (2000) and 
Wilkinson (2007). The Israeli-Palestinian case shows that in intractable conflict 
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situations most of the time the audience's support could be disregarded and 
securitising actors take drastic actions when they think necessary. As securitisation 
refers to "the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is 
constructed within a political community" (Buzan and Wrever 2003:491), structures 
and the characteristics of the particular political community must be taken into 
consideration. In this respect, securitisation theory should avoid presumptions that 
derive from Western contexts and be open to consider those from other cultures. 
Another problematic aspect of securitisation theory is the vagueness of the 
desecuritisation concept. Many elements of the desecuritisation concept have been 
left implicit by the Copenhagen Scholars. Thus, it is generally assumed that, as the 
idea of desecuritisation is conceived as the opposite direction of a process driven by 
speech acts, one can hence assume that essentially the same elements, with some 
adjustments as seen in Figure 2, used to explain the outcome of security can be used 
to explain the outcome of a desecuritisation process. Given paucity of empirical 
application dealing with desecuritisation analysis, this thesis argues that the 
application of desecuritisation as a theoretical concept requires the reconsideration of 
a number of issues if a more comprehensive concept is to be achieved. The following 
section draws out implications for the development of the desecuritisation approach 
as a framework for analysing conflict resolution and reconciliation. 
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7.3 Desecuritisation as a Framework for Analysing Conflict 
Resolution and Reconciliation 
As far as the analysis of the desecuritisation process IS concerned, since the 
Copenhagen School does not suggest an explicit framework for analysis, different 
scholars have interpreted desecuritisation differently. This gives researchers room for 
manoeuvre to develop different frameworks for analysing desecuritisation. Within 
this context, this thesis has provided an analytical framework for analysing conflict 
resolution and applied it in Israeli-Palestinian civil societies' desecuritisation attempts 
at peace-building in the cultural - peace education - and structural - water 
management - spheres. It was argued that both peace-making and peace-building 
efforts together constitute a process of desecuritisation with a possible outcome of 
reconciliation. Therefore, the analytical framework presented peace-making and 
peace-building as steps towards desecuritisation with a particular emphasis on the 
significance of peace-building in the desecuritisation process. It was argued that 
peace-building underpins peace-making by addressing structural issues and the long-
term relationship between conflicting parties, thus, it tries to overcome the 
contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict in order to bring positive peace. 
Since peace-making is often tackled with political considerations and other 
distortions, it was assumed that civil society actors as peace-builders play an active 
role in exploring various peace avenues and aiding active peace initiatives throughout 
all levels of society. Within this context, the analytical framework developed here 
incorporates official-level conflict settlement efforts with bottom-up conflict 
resolution efforts and seeks to identify their desecuritisation potential. The following 
issues have been drawn out from the application of this framework, based on the 
notion of desecuritisation, to Israeli-Palestinian peace education and water 
management activities. 
Starting with the definition of desecuritisation as "a process in which a political 
community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a 
valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal 
with the threat" (Buzan and Wrever 2003:489), the empirical application of the 
concept underlines the problems and prospects of desecuritisation as a framework for 
analysis. The definition suggested by Buzan and Wrever is problematic in referring to 
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political community as the agent of desecuritisation. Since political community is not 
a monolith and several dynamics play roles in the desecuritisation process as well as 
securitisation, it is not possible to talk about the political community as a 
desecuritising actor. As seen in the Israeli-Palestinian case, even within a particular 
community it was difficult to point out only one agent for· 
securitisationldesecuritisation. Furthermore, the definition misses the point that 
desecuritisation is a process driven by a plurality of actors. Within this context, it is 
important to clarify the definition and to underline the interplay between actor and 
process. As far as the question of the identity of the desecuritising actor(s) is 
concerned, in contrast to the details given about the quality of securitising actor(s), the 
Copenhagen School does not explicitly identify them. In this regard, by distinguishing 
peace-making and peace-building processes in their contributions to a potential 
desecuritisation, the analytical framework presented in this thesis also distinguishes 
official-level desecuritising actors from grass roots and/or civil society desecuritising 
actors. Hence, it is argued that the same actors that had previously advocated 
securitisation may initiate the process of desecuritisation by renegotiating appropriate 
responses with relevant audiences as well as other actors. However, in the Israeli 
Palestinian context, in most of the cases the securitising actors appear incapable of 
desecuritisation. Therefore, actors other than the securitising actors may need to 
initiate the process. This thesis has shown that, given the reluctance of the policy-
makers to initiate desecuritisation processes through peace-making, at the civil society 
level a number of Israelis and Palestinians have assumed the responsibility to initiate 
a desecuritisation process through peace-building. Furthermore, the Israeli-Palestinian 
case highlighted a tension between elite securitisation and desecuritisation moves 
pursued by civil society. In this respect, the analytical framework provided in Chapter 
1 was successful in capturing the inconsistent security situation in an intractable 
conflict. Furthermore, by employing facilitating factors, the Copenhagen School's 
desecuritisation approach provided conceptual tools to understand the potential 
effectiveness of grassroots/civil society desecuritising actors vis-a-vis the current 
batch of power/elite securitising actors. 
As far as the language of desecuritisation is concerned, the analysis of Israeli-
Palestinian desecuritisation attempts illustrates Behnke's argument that 
desecuritisation as a speech act is contradictory. According to Behnke, an issue is 
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desecuritised through a lack of speech, not through speech acts affirming its new 
status (2006:65). The analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 focused on the questions of what 
kind of language is used by desecuritising actors and to what extent the language has 
been changed compared to the language used to define the previously securitised 
issue. As the desecuritisation framework employed here considers the desecuritisation 
as a process of redefinition and reinterpretation of a previously securitised issue, the 
changes in language in referring to both the perceptions towards the other and 
relations with the other were analysed. Attention was paid to the desecuritising 
actors' choice of terms with positive connotations, such as partner, peace, 
reconciliation and coexistence. In this respect, desecuritisation as a speech act does 
not appear as a conceptual tool to analyse desecuritisation attempts in the lsraeli-
Palestinian context. 
Another problematic point of the desecuritisation analysis is the question of how to 
desecuritise. As the three options, not to talk about issues in terms of security in the 
first place, once an issue is securitised, try not to generate security dilemmas and 
vicious circles and lastly to move security issues back into normal politics, outlined 
by the Copenhagen School (Wrever 2000:253) are too imprecise and vague when it 
comes to empirical application, these strategies do not provide an explanatory 
framework of how to desecuritise. Particularly in the societal sector, desecuritisation 
requires a level of acceptance that two identities could and should be able to coexist. 
However, both Israelis and Palestinians have developed their identities vis-a-vis an 
enemy other; therefore desecuritisation would be extremely difficult. Stemming from 
this analysis, it was found that in the societal sector, conflict management or 
normalisation appears as a more viable option. As stated by Wrever, there exists a 
distinction between the management of securitised issues (normalisation) and 
desecuritisation. The management of securitised issues bring the notion of 
normalising the situation - an insecurity situation, which still denotes a security threat 
but no, or insufficient, response (Wrever 1998:81). 
Last but not least, the Copenhagen School's definition of asecurity seems to be 
lacking in precision. The Copenhagen School defines asecurity as taking certain 
issues outside the realm of security thinking but they fail to give a precise 
conceptualisation. Partly because of the broad definition of asecurity, it was realised 
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that there was not a meaningful threshold provided by which one could judge whether 
or not an issue reaches asecurity. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, for instance, how 
much civil society interaction or peace-building has to happen before interlocutors in 
bargaining situations shift dialogue into the asecurity domain? What causal 
mechanisms or linkages to move a situation from being one of peace-building to a 
state of asecurity? Since in the Israeli-Palestinian case asecurity has not yet been 
reached, this thesis cannot answer the question of how certain issues reached the 
asecurity level in protracted conflict settings. For a better understanding the 
application of this analytical framework elsewhere - e.g. Northern Ireland or the 
Western Balkans - is required as a particular area for future research. This is 
particularly important for the development of the desecuritisation approach as a 
framework for conflict resolution that could be applied to different types of conflicts. 
7.4 Desecuritisation' in the Israeli-Palestinian Context: Prospects and 
Problems 
In this thesis, the idea of applying securitisation theory to the Israeli-Palestinian case 
stemmed from the prior assumption that it provides a case for analyzing 
desecuritisation processes as well as securitisations. The background and analysis 
chapters for desecuritisation analysis (Chapters 4-6) demonstrate that there exists a 
group of individuals and civil society actors both in Israel and the Palestinian 
Territories who have committed themselves to peace-building and reconciliation. 
However, their success in transforming overtly securitised relations between Israel 
and Palestine and in accelerating a full-fledged desecuritisation process has been 
constrained by ongoing political securitisations. 
Through the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian peace education and water 
management projects, the potential for a desecuritisation process through the use of 
effectiveness criteria was demonstrated. In this regard, the thesis shows that the 
continuation of peace-building efforts of Israeli and Palestinian civil society actors 
have constituted a stepping-stone for future desecuritisations. It is argued that bottom-
up desecuritisation efforts alone cannot bring about a shift from security to asecurity, 
but they can strengthen the belief that Israelis and Palestinians could and should be 
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able to co-exist. However, for there to be a genuine shift to asecurity, the political will 
for peace-making is required as well. 
As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the temporary freeze in official level contacts 
between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority during the Hamas 
government's administration had negatively affected civil society efforts. Only since 
the establishment of the Palestinian Unity Government in March 2007, have 
negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian governments restarted in the Annapolis 
Conference of 27 November 2007. Within this context, a number of positive 
developments have occurred in 2008 strengthening the potential for desecuritisation 
in the long term. 
In April 2008, a petition was prepared by IPCRI for the attention of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Israel, Tzipi Livni, and the Head of the Palestinian Negotiating 
Team, Ahmad Qureia. It presented a joint request to the international donor 
community during their meeting in London on 2 May 2008 for the creation of the 
International Fund for Palestinian-Israeli Peace. In the petition, the importance of 
integrating peace-building with the official-level peace-making process was 
highlighted by saying "It should be clear to you that even prior to reaching full 
agreement on the core issues; it is necessary and even urgent to build support for 
peace amongst the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. We must have constituencies for 
peace in order to build support both now and after agreement is reached" (Petition to 
the Governments of Israel and Palestine 2008). In the petition, the variety of bottom-
up peace-building activities and their impact of bringing together tens of thousands of 
Israelis and Palestinians were underlined. The petition also called for the resources 
necessary to truly realise the potential of these efforts to be committed. While the 
petition did not succeed in the establishment of the International Fund for Palestinian-
Israeli Peace, the call was taken seriously by Livni and Qureia. The determination of 
the Israeli and Palestinian civil societies had not been disregarded by the Israeli and 
Palestinian leaderships. Within the framework of the current negotiations between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority on a final-status agreement, Livni and Qureia 
have agreed to review school textbooks with a view to removing content that incites 
violence or a lack of tolerance on national or religious grounds. Even though the talks 
deal mainly with the core issues of the conflict, a number of joint teams dealing with 
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structural and cultural issues have been set up. Within this context, one of the 
committees established deals with the culture of peace. and is to focus mainly on 
issues of incitement. The committee has had numerous meetings and has prepared 
several preliminary proposals for ways in which incitement could be dealt with in the 
framework of a final-status agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
(Haaretz 2008b). 
Given the lack of official support for the Israeli and Palestinian peace education 
efforts of the civil society, the inclusion of culture of peace is considered as an 
important step towards official-level peace-building. The initial proposals presented to 
Livni and Qureia targeted the elimination of incitement in the media, with emphasis 
on the electronic media as well as schoolbooks. The focus will be "the content that 
incites to violence, content that harms the right to self determination of the other side 
or content that encourages a lack of recognition of the other side's right to exist" 
(Haaretz 2008b). The inclusion of the media is particularly important regarding both 
sides' recognition of the need for societal-level peace education, which constitutes an 
integral part of the desecuritisation process. This development brings the issue of 
effectiveness of peace education progranunes. According to the second criterion the 
particular peace-building activity is considered as effective if it involves in 
developing or supporting institutions or mechanisms to address the inequalities and 
injustices that cause and fuel a conflict. Given their success, particularly IPCRI's 
constant. pressure through media and petition campaign, to persuade Israeli and 
Palestinian negotiators to include peace education in negotiation agenda the Israeli-
Palestinian peace education activities proved to be effective. 
The official-level support for the creation of a peace culture is an extremely important 
step for desecuritisation as well as the public support for a two-state solution and the 
renewal of negotiations. Fortunately, the political turbulence experienced both in 
Israel, political scandals involving Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and, in 
Palestine, infighting and political tension between Fatah and Hamas, which delayed 
the negotiations, have not changed Israeli and Palestinian public support for 
reconciliation. As far as Israeli and Palestinian public opinions are concerned, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, the general support for reconciliation was significantly high 
within both communities by the end of2006 (Shamir 2007:40). According to the most 
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recent public opinion polls conducted in April 2008, both the Israeli and Palestinian 
public opinions were still in favour of the renewal of negotiations. According to Tel 
Aviv University Tami Steinrnetz Centre's War and Peace Index results, 57 percent of 
Israeli Jewish respondents declared that they were in favour ()f holding negotiations 
with the PA and an even larger majority of 70 percent support the formula of two 
states for two peoples. 32 Similarly, 56 percent of Palestinians support the mutual 
recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for 
the Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement. Also, 58 percent of 
Palestinians prefers the two-state solution according to a Joint Israeli-Palestinian 
Public Opinion Poll held in June 2008.33 
Given the difficulty of reaching an agreement over the controversial issues like 
Jerusalem, borders and the right to return, Israeli and Palestinian peace-makers have a 
long way to go to reach a final status agreement. While the resolution of the political 
aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is important, it seems beyond doubt that the 
desecuritisation of relations is also essential for reconciliation. In this regard, the most 
recent developments, such as the inclusion of the creation of a peace culture between 
the Israelis and Palestinians in the negotiation process, have strengthened the potential 
for Israeli-Palestinian desecuritisations. However, the fragile state of the relations 
between the two sides and the existence of a number of competing security discourses 
continue to make things extremely difficult for desecuritising actors. Recent 
developments can be seen to be making valuable ground for the initiation of a 
desecuritisation process, but then, in an instant of violence, (from members of either 
group) that progress can come crumbling down. 
32 The data for the index are collected in a monthly telephone survey that is based on a probabilistic 
representative sample of the entire adult population of Israel (age 18+) including Arabs, kibbutzim and 
moshavim, and the settlements in the territories. The size of the sample is about 600 men and women 
and the sampling error is about 4.5 percent. 
33 The poll was conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of 
Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey 
Research in Ramallah, between May 27 and June 7, 2008. The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults 
interviewed face-ta-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 
June 5 and 7,2008. The margin of error was 3 percent. 
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